When decision making changed for Britain's railways - The L&SWR's Decisions in the early 20th Century

In the late 1800s the railways were still dominant in the transportation market. If you wished to move yourself, your luggage or your goods, the railways were only way to do it quickly and efficiently. However, the railways’ profitability and performance was declining in this period. This was possibly for a number of reasons such as declining management quality, ingrained working patters, managerial empire building and intrusive and costly and governmen legislation. While I wouldn’t like to go into these factors in detail, it was clear that the railways weren’t doing as well financially as in their formative years. In short, something needed to be done to get the profitability back up, and the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), who had suffered like most railways, set to work in the early 20^th Century. In this blog entry I will describe briefly the reasons for two major decisions that the L&SWR took to attempt to secure the profitability of their passenger service between 1898 and 1922. These are the rebuilding of Waterloo station and the suburban Electrification project. I will show that the initiating factor for investment changed on the L&SWR, as it did within many companies in the early twentieth century, because of a change in the business environment.

But why should I just focus on the company’s passenger traffic? Despite having a booming goods business, the majority of the company’s revenue came from passenger services. Thus, if we take 1900 as an example, while the goods revenue of the company came to £1,356,209, the passenger revenue was £2,997,274 (or 68.8% of overall revenue). Thus any decisions regarding the company’s passenger services were vital to its profitability.

Waterloo Station

Has anyone ever read Jerome K. Jerome’s 1889 book Three Men in a Boat? In it he described the problem with Waterloo Station in the late 19^th Century.

“We got to Waterloo at eleven, and asked where the eleven-five started from. Of course nobody knew; nobody at Waterloo ever does know where a train is going to start from, or where a train when it does start is going to, or anything about it. The porter who took our things thought it would go from number two platform, while another porter, with whom he discussed the question, had heard a rumour that it would go from number one. The station-master, on the other hand, was convinced it would start from the local.”

While I won’t go into great detail as to why the station was so difficult to navigate, in short, it had been built up bit by bit over the years since 1848. The L&SWR hadn’t conducted complete rebuilds of the station as more capacity was required to accommodate the traffic, but rather had just ‘bolted on’ new platforms, canopies and facilities every now and again. Thus, in 1898 Waterloo actually had three stations that were all connected; Central, which was the old 1848 structure, South, added in 1878 and North, dating from 1885. This was confused by the fact that the 18 lines running into the station only shared ten platform numbers.

In the 1890s the company was facing a capacity problem at Waterloo as passenger traffic had grown at a very rapid rate. The table below shows the growth in the number of passengers carried, the number of passenger train miles run and the revenue from passenger traffic between 1890 and 1900. Therefore, the rebuild it was a direct response to the fact that passenger traffic had grown at a very rapid rate in the 10 years and that more accommodation was required. Thus, the move to rebuild the station taken in 1898 was reactive to the physical constraints of the company’s infrastructure.

In a sense, this was the last of the L&SWR’s great projects that was reacting to the physical constraints of the company’s infrastructure. To look at any business decisions before 1900, the majority were made because the continually rising traffic meant that the company required extra facilities to deal with that fact. Thus, the company were never exceedingly worried that the expense would be unnecessary as in the long run the expected revenues from passenger growth would eventually cover the cost of construction. This was essentially because the railways were operating in a period when they had monopolies on transportation in most places and did not see any challenge to their unique position. Thus, the Waterloo rebuild was continuing this pattern of decision making, but, it was the last large-scale investment that adhered to it.

The station was completed in 1919 and on the 21^st of March 1922 was officially opened by Queen Mary.

The Electrification Scheme

There were a number of things that affected the way that the L&SWR viewed their suburban passenger services in the early 20^th century, most of which involved electricity. Firstly, the company opened its long-awaited extension to Bank Station via the Waterloo and City line. Electrically run, this was a good testing bed for electric trains within the L&SWR’s sphere of influence. Yet, at this point the L&SWR showed little interest in using the technology on its overground services. Further, up to 1905 the company cooperated with the Metropolitan District Railway Company when they electrified their lines to Richmond and Wimbledon. The Chairman of the L&SWR, Campbell, said he would watch how the new services did with interest. Indeed, the result was that passengers deserted the slow L&SWR steam hauled routes to the city in favour of the clean electric trains. The most important event came when the London United Tramways Company (LUT) started extending into the L&SWR’s suburban region. They reached Hounslow in 1901, Twickenham in 1902 and Hampton court in 1903. Further, in 1902 the LUT received permission to extend to Sunbury and Wimbledon and was looking at building lines to Staines. Finally, in 1906-07 the LUT extended to Kingston, Surbiton, New Malden and Wimbledon.

Thus, the L&SWR started to suffer in its suburban zone. According to Faulkner and Williams in 1902 the L&SWR lost 64% of its receipts on the Hounslow route because of the LUT’s activities. Indeed, if we consider the table above we can see that in the 10 years after 1900 the growth in the number of passengers, passenger train miles and passenger revenue slowed considerably in contrast with the 10 years before. Thus, there were worrying signs that underlying idea that had endured for decades, that the growth number of passengers would continue unabated, was probably doubted. Indeed, at the 1913 General Meeting, the investors were told that the company had lost £100,000 in revenue and the passenger numbers were by then falling by a million per year. Thus the company’s had, by that point, become a reality.

The first stage of the electrification plan was confirmed by the board in December 1912. The proposed routes to be electrified are shown in the picture. The move was therefore different from the rebuilding of Waterloo. Waterloo was rebuilt based on the assumption that Passenger traffic would continue to rise and that there would be no alteration in this fact. However, the Electrification scheme was adopted because of exactly the opposite reason, a fear that passenger traffic, and profits, would decline. Therefore, the attack on passenger traffic by the company’s first real competitors in the suburban passenger market must have been unexpected given the prior history of the L&SWR. Thus, they were made the decision because they were trying to protect their business.

The company completed the planned suburban electrification in the years after 1912, connecting to Wimbledon, Kingston, Hampton Court, Hounslow, Claygate and Shepperton by 1915-16. It was the Southern Railway that would continue the L&SWR’s work.

Conclusion

In the context of the profitability and performance problems of the British Railway industry in the late Victorian period, what could be said about these two events? Firstly, it is evident that despite the failing profitability of the period 1870 to 1900, it wasn’t substantial enough to change the company’s reaction to the increased passenger traffic and the need for greater facilities. Faced with capacity problems they did not try alternative ideas to solve them, for example reducing the number of trains running into Waterloo or closing stations to reduce the number of passengers carried. Instead, they continued with the long-standing pattern of rebuilding existing facilities so every passenger would be accommodated, confident in the knowledge that the cost would, eventually be covered. However, they were shocked into action when the passenger growth, that had always been expected, did not materialise because of new and unexpected competed forms of passenger transport. As such, they were forced into reacting to their business environment by trying to protect the traffic they did have.

Thus, what these two large L&SWR investments symbolise is an important moment in the history of Britain’s railways. The early 1900s were when companies stopped considering that Traffic would always continue to rise, but rather, tried to protect what they had because the business environment had changed. In essence, the period was when Britain’s railway’s would start their long decline towards Beeching.

Bibliography

Faulkner, J.N. and Williams, R.A. The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1988)

Document of the Day - British Railways Magazine - 1959

Presented are some images from the November 1959 issue of British Railway's 'British Railways Magazine.' (BRM) What is interesting, having done some work on the first railway company magazine (the South Western Gazette) is that the BRM is both similar and different from its predecessor. On the one hand both the SWG and BRM had articles on sports events and social activities. However, what seems to me be to be different (and this is only a cursory view) is that the BRM seems to have little about the actual operation of the railways, whereas the Gazette frequently included such things. Possibly, this is because railway operating procedures by this point were far more established than in the 1880s when the Gazette started, and by the 1950s the information that staff to do their jobs was communicated to them through other means.

Ticket Machines - Some people's thoughts....

On Wednesday it was plastered all over the news that ticket machines aren’t really that user friendly and as a result a third of queues at ticket offices had waiting times longer that the ‘industry standard’ of five minutes at peak times. This research was undertaken by Passenger Focus, an organisation that was set up to defend the rights of rail users, but who in reality are only listened to by the media. The Association of Train Operating Companies, Network Rail and anyone else in the industry rarely, if ever, take any notice of them. Now I could rant about ticket machines for ages, but in reality I have nothing to complain about. In all honesty I do not find them that confusing, but I acknowledge that it might just being a case of being well-versed in their operation to the point whereby it is second nature. My only gripe is when the touch-screens don’t work and I find myself repeatedly beating my finger against them like someone who needs a ticket to Narnia, but can’t find it. This said, I am also aware that my case is exceptional and many others do have problems.

Rather than discuss the results of the survey, which I felt was a highly imperfect one, I felt it would be far more interesting to get some views and experiences from my friends on the subject of ticket machines. Thus, I posted the BBC website’s article on Facebook and requested people’s opinions. However, what happened was that the discussion that started trailing off into lots of discussion about the quality of the railways generally and the various run-ins that a few of my friends have had with railway officials. Yet from amongst these I received some interesting comments.

Sarah said that she was “always paying over the odds” because she was “thick!” I think not Sarah. If anything has come out of the survey it is that ticket machines are confusing and sometimes do not show the cheapest price. However, this is what they are legally obliged to do. Simon followed this by saying that “I've picked up some very cheap tickets from the ticket office as opposed to the machines.” Therefore, as limited as this evidence is, my friends confirm that occasionally the ticket machines overprice which it seems from all prior pieces of evidence is not a new phenomenon.

But then again, Adrian recounted a story in which he was offered a ticket at the ticket office, as opposed to the machine which he was unable to use.

“I normally buy off-peak returns to Manchester Piccadilly from Thames Ditton or Surbiton, which allow me to make the inward journey at any time within a month. This, with my 16-25 railcard, costs me £45.60. When approaching a ticket kiosk the member of staff offered me a return for somewhere in the region of £120, even though the machine offered me my usual £45 snatch minutes earlier (but it wouldn't take my card). I even had an old ticket for a previous journey, which I showed him, and he paused, shrugged and said that £120 something was the price he was being shown. I then persuaded him to sell me a travelcard. This way I travelled to Euston and bought my usual £45 ticket from there.”

Therefore, it seems that there is not just a problem of ticket pricing at machines or at the offices, there is a very real problem somewhere in the software. If machines and offices are out of sync with each other this amounts to a form of corruption. Indeed, unless people are willing to check both the machine and the office prices, then this put the railway companies’ operatives in a position of power. Who has the correct knowledge, or time in this case, to be able to question what prices are presented to them? Very people I’m sure. Therefore, the companies can effectively stop people from receiving the cheapest prices. They might try to deny they do this, but the evidence is plain to see in the cases recounted by my friends and others.

Only Simon talked about the actual quality of the interaction with the machines. While in no way representative of the nation’s experiences, the lack of commentary on how user-friendly they ticket machines were in the discussion I started, possibly shows that the quality of this interaction is secondary to people’s concerns over receiving the correct and cheapest price. Simon said:

“I think the machines operated by South West Trains are okay. It's Southern's that are rubbish! You don't seem to be able to buy multiple tickets of a single type. However, Southern do provide Oyster services which SWT do not.”

In my own experience I have found that the difference between different companies’ ticket machines can make a very real difference in the quality of the buying experience. I agree with Simon that SWT’s ticket machines are okay, but they could be improved. The only other experience that comes to mind is East Coast’s machines which are very user friendly. I think, however, the report that Passenger Focus presented is quite poor because it was not a complete survey of ticket machine services across the nation. PF only looked at the machines operated by four companies (South West Trains, First Great Western, East Midlands Trains and SouthEastern). This is no way to run a survey and what is required is more data from which to draw conclusions. Indeed, if the Association of Train Operating Companies’ (ATOC) own figures show that ticket machine users are satisfied 7 out of 10 times, then there seems to be a discrepancy that can only put down to regional variations that haven’t been accounted for in PF’s work (even if ATOC’s figures can also be considered dubious).

Overall, I think that the process of purchasing tickets by all means, from machines, offices or online, needs to be looked at more carefully and using far better research. Perhaps there should be a standard machine or software? Or what about a poster with the prices of the most used tickets at each station? Of course, with such a fractured industry this is unlikely to happen. I think first we need to get the prices altered…oh dear, well, that’s another problem!

Document of the Day - SER Notice of Special Traffic

This is probably one of my most fragile documents because when I got it out of the packet it literally started to disintegrate. Indeed, I think in the year or so that I have had it I have never got it out and this is why I was unaware of its fragility. One of the questions that I think needs more research is how alike the operating procedures of Victorian Railway Companies were. If all the companies operated in similar or identical ways, this would mean that the room for new and innovative ideas regarding operating procedures and efficiencies would be reduced. If they operated in different ways information exchange and innovation may have been prevalent within the industry. This document from the South Eastern Railway in 1893 is interesting as it is almost identical in form, tone, appearance and procedure to those circulars regarding Special Traffic that were produced by the London and South Western Railway in the period. Therefore, this is a sign that many railway companies by the late Victorian period may have adopted similar, if not identical ways of of working, that may have meant that the industry was stagnating. Although, with just this one document as evidence, I can't make any conclusions really.

Document of the Day - How to load a wagon

Above and below are two examples of the approach that the Southern Railway had to the loading of wagons in 1934. The documents can be found in an appendix to the working timetable dated 26th March 1934. Clearly, as the railways used many small wagons, rather than large ones, their loading was of vital importance to make the most efficient use of the rolling stock and reduce cost. Thus, the company prescribed the way in which wagons should be loaded. It is unknown how they worked these methods out, but there is no doubt that in large part the person or persons who put together the appendix were drawing on decades old knowledge.

Document of the Day - Communications Receipt

While a little dull as documents go, this communications receipt is of interest in some respects as it shows that by the 1900s railway companies had long-established formal methods of communications with their customers. As shown the receipt above was pre-printed, however there were spaces were the required information could be written. Thus, this sped up the time it took for officials to actually reply to an individual in an era when everything was hand-written and quite slow.

Document of the Day - Urgent Train Messages

Above an below are two examples of 'urgent train messages' sent on the London and South Western Railway in 1911 and 1912 respectively. These were messages that were required to be sent quickly by a station master or official to any part of the line. They would be sent by handing them to the guard, who then in turn would make sure they would be delivered by their destination.

However, while the name of the documents are 'urgent' train messages, I think that our conception of 'urgent' is different from that of railway workers in the 1910s. We tend to think of an urgent message as something that can be conveyed immediately by phone, text or email. Yet, the railways worked on the principal of daily returns being sent from stations to HQ offices and officials once a day, and through the operation of many long-established working and trading arrangements. Thus, as the second UTM below details, 'urgent' may refer to changes in activities that may occur on the next day that there wasn't enough time to convey through the established channels. Therefore, 'Urgent' could refer to any change in operations that the station master or official became aware of after he had sent away his regular daily returns to the relevant office or individual; even if they had been sent up only 20 minutes beforehand,