The Feltham Marshalling Yard - Railway Innovation and PhD Inspiration

On the British railway network there is one place that I love more than any other. It is a place I have been in contact with throughout most of my life, it is a place that has fired my interest in railways and it is the place that inspired me to start my PhD. Most people’s favourite railways spots are usually stations, places where they journey to and from daily, where they interact with the staff or have memories of sitting excitedly as a child waiting for the train to whisk them off on holiday, to school or the fair. My favourite railway location is somewhere that I have never seen, touched or heard operate in the flesh because it was scrubbed from the railway map in 1969, 13 years before I was born. (There is a video at the end of the post though) It is lost from railway history and in the minds of many is forgotten. I am talking about the Marshalling Yards at Feltham which is now a wasteland occupied by joggers, dirt-bikers and adventurers. The site of the yard isn’t strictly speaking open public, it being owned by Network Rail. But if you know where the rather large hole in the fence is, you can get in.

But why do I love this place? Well firstly, I used to live very near to the site and went jogging there myself. On a good day I reckon that I could do a circuit of the site in about 40 minutes. Further, I have to be honest that my interest in passenger traffic is close to none. I don’t know why this is really. I suppose I see it as mundane. Contrastingly, freight traffic has always struck me as far more dynamic, complex and industrial, and that has always appealed to me. Therefore, to have the overgrown site of the Feltham yard 15 minutes walk from my house was always fascinating and exciting (the overgrown state is shown). It was my fascination with the site that spurred my interest in doing a PhD on the London and South Western Railway (LSWR). I had never been interested in the LSWR before 2006 as I perceived the company as being a strictly passenger line. Indeed before that point, what had encapsulated me were the northern lines, particularly the London and North Eastern Railway (LNER). The discovery that the Feltham was built by the LSWR and was one of the most modern marshalling yards in the country meant that it became central in my mind when thinking about what PhD I might do.

As many of you now realise, my PhD has evolved to become a history of the quality of management on the LSWR between 1864 and 1914. While interesting to many business historians, it isn’t really the stuff that will fire the soul of many. The original plan that I proposed to my supervisor in 2006 was much more engaging. I was going to do a history of Feltham Marshalling yard from 1910, when the LSWR started thinking about it, up until 1969, when British Rail closed it down. After a bit of investigation it was clear that the material available would not be enough to satisfy even a quarter of the 90,000 words required for the PhD. As such my work evolved into a PhD on the LSWR’s freight services, something that again I struggled to find enough material on. Lastly, it evolved into what it is today. But the fires of interest never die and I do hope at some point to conduct a study on the Feltham Marshalling Yard’s history. However, for the rest of the blog entry I will detail some of its history and why it is important to understand its position within British railway history more generally.

The LSWR in the late 19^th century had freight traffic coming onto their network in the London area from four places. Traffic arriving from the London and North Western Railway came from Willesden Junction, trains coming from the Midland Railway originated at Brent, the Great Central Railway sent trains from Neasden and the Great Northern Railway’s trains arrived via the Widened Lines. There were also the the LSWR’s own goods flows origination from the Nine Elms Goods Depot. There were some facilities and arrangements to manage and marshal these trains before their onward journeys onto the LSWR’s network. There was a small yard at Brentford which received GNR trains and trip workings were undertaken between there and Willesden, Brent and Neasden. The company also maintained staff at Brent to marshal there wagons. However, all were ultimately unsatisfactory and what was needed was a facility that could efficiently sort wagons for LSWR destinations into complete trains more efficiently.

It was, therefore, in the early 1900s that the LSWR directors started to look for a site for such a yard. After considering a number of sites at Byfleet and at Feltham Junction, in 1910 the company’s directors settled on a site that was between the Feltham Junction and Feltham Station. (the new flows of traffic are shown above) The sale of 41.5 acres of land was confirmed in 1911, with additional land being purchased in 1915. The plans were confirmed on the 30^th March 1916:-

The National Archives - RAIL 411/271 – Traffic Committee – ‘30/03/1916 – 507) Feltham Marshalling Sidings – The General Manager submitted a plan shewing how marshalling sidings (15 down + 16 up) can be provided on the land near Feltham which has been specially purchased for the purpose + recommended that in the first place the levelling of the ground including the work of diverting and bridging over the river crane and covering in the mill-stream be taken in hand. – Approved’

Work, which included the diversion of three watercourses (including the River Crane) as well as the excavation of 120,000cu yd of material, started soon after with the help of around 200 German POWs. The first nine ‘down’ sidings, designed to relieve congestion at the Brent yard, were opened on the 9^th December 1917 and the LSWR’s staff were transferred from Brent. Between then and 2^nd October 1921, the yard gradually opened. In addition, plans for an engine shed were approved in December 1921, with it opening in March 1923. Within the yard there were 32 miles of track, with the longest siding being 1,662ft in length and the shortest being 1,331 ft. Once the yard was completed it was handling 2500 wagons a day. These were brought in by 50 down and 26 up trains, and being removed by 18 down and 46 up services. This was, probably, the busiest marshalling yard in the country at that time and it was said that after arrival a train could be sorted in 12 minutes. The reason for this quick turnaround will be explained below. (Faulkner & Williams, p.127-131)

So why was Feltham so important to British railway history? There are two reasons. The first relates to something that I have banged on about to the point of exhaustion. As has been discussed, in the late Victorian period the British railway industry’s profitability and performance dropped significantly. What the building of the Feltham Marshalling yard represents was the move that the LSWR, like other railway companies, made towards making their services more efficient. So, by reorganising the marshalling of freight trains, operations that in their previous form had been built up of many years without significant reassessment, the company was

effectively attempting to reduce their costs by improving smoothness of their operations. Therefore, if you go back to my article of last week in which I talked about the LSWR’s rebuilding of Waterloo and their Electrification project, it is clear that the building of the Feltham Marshalling yard was part of a wider corporate movement of effecting large changes within the company’s operations to improve its efficiency.

However, the second reason for the yard’s importance is a technological one. As can be seen on the plan above, the yard had ‘reception’ sidings, as well as a ‘marshalling’ sidings. This was because in-between these sets of sidings there were ‘humps.’ (shown below) Hump shunting had not been seen in Britain to a great extent beyond coal yard facilities. Yet, in America they were a regular feature of railway operations. When considering the organisation of yard the LSWR management was heavily influenced by American practice. Thus, they introduced this feature to Feltham. A train would arrive at the reception sidings and the locomotive would go to the Engine Shed. Then, a specially designed locomotive, the Urie Class E6, would arrive behind the train. It would then begin to push the train over the hump. At the top each wagon would be uncoupled and then would roll down the other side into a siding.

It was at this point that the yard’s second innovation would come into play. On the other side of the hump were the different sidings in which trains for various destinations would be assembled. This of course meant that the points would have to be changed automatically as each of the wagons was pushed over the hump. The innovation was that the points were electrically thrown by a central control tower so that the wagons could be marshalled automatically. In addition, there was the use of track circuits, whereby the controllers of the yard could monitor the journey of wagons once they had passed the hump. Further, there was extensive use of telephone communication across the yard. As such, the Feltham Marshalling Yard had an impressive array of recent technological devices to ensure smooth operation.

Therefore, on a technological level the Feltham Marshalling Yard signalled a new era in goods management as it was a departure from the previous ad hoc arrangements of the railway industry. It showed how after the turn of the century railway companies innovated for reasons of efficiency. It was a major step forward in British railway operations at the time and that is why I love it. I will, therefore, leave the last word to the Railway Gazette of 1919.

‘Thus, not only in its conception and design, but also in the possibilities which it opens up in the matter of future development of and changes in railway operation, we consider that the new Feltham Concentration Yard of the London & South Western Railway is considerably more than local interest.’(October 17, 1919, pp. 476)

UPDATE - 28/08/2015 - Colin Chivers, Hon Editor of the South Western Circle" is currently at an advanced stage of producing a Monograph about Feltham Yard for members of the Circle early next year, with surplus copies from the print run to be available for sale to non-members. He would be delighted to hear from former BR staff who worked there who may be able to contribute some memories of life there in its later years. He can be contacted via editor@lswr.org

Bibliography

Faulkner, J.N. & Williams, R.N., The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, (Newton Abbot, 1988) p.127-131

Harris, Michael, ‘Marshalling Yards,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997) p. 315

Klapper, C.F. Sir Herbert Walker’s Southern Railway, (Shepperton, 1973) p.66-67

The Evasive Philip Hammond

I think I should keep returning to criticism of our new Secretary of State for Transport because at the moment I see little sign that he has anything pro-rail to say. Now of course this is because I am pro-rail and want him to do positive things for the rail industry. Truth be told, I can’t drive, so my view is naturally going to be skewed by my self-interest and I can’t expect every Secretary of State to naturally take the position that I want. This said, Philip Hammond has repeatedly shown himself to be ignorant of rail issues. Christian Wolmar, Britain’s most noted Railway commentator, recently did an interview with Hammond for RAIL magazine and came out with the conclusion that he was a man that saw everything through a car-shaped prism (RAIL 647 pp.44). Indeed, my own Blog entry of the 11th June showed that Hammond has a history of being a pro-car voice in parliament. Therefore, while I do suffer from an obvious bias in my perspective, I think that it is vitally important that railway commentators, journalists and anyone else with an outlet, criticises him and his policies so that he understands that the railways of Britain are not just an expense which has parts that can be cut, chopped and disposed of willy-nilly.

A few days ago I came across comments he gave to the Transport Select Committee on the 26th of July. His appearance in front of the committee was a good thing as it showed us how competent he was with his new responsibilities two and a half month in. I started to read the comments with an open mind, and I suppose I can’t be too harsh when critiquing his development. Before new government was formed he had never held a shadow transport brief and therefore his learning curve was naturally going to be steeper than other individuals who could have taken the job. This said, he does have the full resources of the Department for Transport, and serving under him are the former Liberal Democrat and Conservative shadow transport secretaries. So, it isn’t like he didn’t have any help, and he should, by now, be up to speed on the major and important issues facing the railway industry. I have to be honest; the man just came off as vague and evasive. This was shown particularly in reference to the questions he received regarding the rail industry.

Early in committee the chair asked Hammond ‘One of the commitments [in the coalition agreement] is, "We are committed to fair pricing for rail travel." It is a bit vague, is it not?’ Hammond replied that the government was facing a huge public deficit (yes we know that) and that ‘it is clear that we have to be prepared to look at all possible options in addressing the challenges of tackling fiscal deficit and also sustaining investment in our railways because it is clear that there are important investments in the railway, including investments that are directed at improving passenger comfort and passenger convenience, that it would be very unfortunate if we were to lose...’

So basically Hammond answered the question by not answering the question. So the questioner had another crack at him. ‘Q7 Chair: ....You are committed to fair pricing. Fair to whom?’ Again Philip Hammond did his best to avoid answering the question directly. ‘I think there are two aspects on this. First of all, there is the question of overall fairness policy on the railway and ensuring that any increases in fares can be justified in terms of improvements in the service that passengers receive. [....] It is not just about fares; it is about value for money for passengers. [...] It is about making sure that [passengers] are given proper information about the most advantageous fare available to them, that the information that is published is clear so that passengers can get the best deal that is possible within any given framework of any given fare structure.’ This is ridiculous. He is not only did not answer the question again, but he is also confusing quality of service with fairness.

Indeed, in the context of his recent RAIL magazine conference keynote speech, I think that he was avoiding the question because he has little intention of making rail prices ‘fair.’ He said that “we will face some stark choices, and it would be irresponsible at this point to rule out even considering an increased contribution from the fare payer as part of the solution to protecting investment in the railways.” If we consider that at the moment a large section of the population are priced out of using rail transportation because of the cost, and that the prices currently can in no way be considered ‘fair,’ then it seems that prices can only become more unfair. In the mind of the Hammond, putting fares up is all that can be done with them. Indeed, I think that the concept of ‘fair’ in the conventional sense does not seem to register with him. This was essentially because it was part of the Liberal Democrat manifesto to introduce ‘fair’ rail pricing, and hence why it made into the coalition agreement. For him, a dyed in the wool Conservative, fairness is not the underlying principal, the bottom line is. As such, Hammond avoided the committee’s question as he knows that it is a commitment that it is untenable to maintain. If only he’d have come out and said “yes, sorry, that one was the Lib Dems sticking their awe in…forget it,” then I might have had a bit of respect for him.

He was then asked about the cuts that would inevitably come, ‘The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills said last week that the UK needs to spend £42 billion per annum on infrastructure investment, including transport. How is that going to be achieved in current circumstances?’ Philip Hammond again didn’t answer the question effectively. He stated that there would be no reduction in any capital expenditure that had been pencilled in by the Labour Government. Yet, I think the word ‘pencilled’ is very telling. Combine this with the lack of specifics and there is a case for saying that he did not answer the question in full, again, because he knows that he cannot actually commit to cancelling projects that this point. This is another case where I’d really just appreciate some honesty from the man, yet, he says he will be keeping the investment. In no world is that really a reality and most rail commentators have pointed out the department will have to make cuts in capital expenditure.

Of course there is one area where costs could be reduced effectively, namely at Network Rail. NR does cost between 30 and 50 present more in maintenance per mile than continental railways, and Roy McNulty will report on how the not-for-profit organisation operates and can reduce the debt. At the RAIL conference Hammond said that he had received a ‘scoping study report from Sir Roy. I suspect that this gave him a number of preliminary conclusions about the state of NR’s finances. Yet, at the both the conference and in front of the committee he couldn’t give a cogent response to question as to where the NR may be scaled back. In fact there were no specifics. I’ll just post all of his response to the question here, so that you can get the full force of his evasion.

Q24: “Just thinking on my feet, it is not something that has been talked about actively in the department in the time that I have been there…Clearly, because of what I have already said about the way we will, in every day working terms, think about Network Rail’s debt, we will not be able to take the attitude that the previous administration did to ever rising Network Rail debt. We will have to look again at how we finance the capital investment in the railways. The mere fact that it may be borrowing by Network Rail does not mean we can ignore it. We will want to look at that as capital spending in the same way that we would if it was financed by public capital investment directly. That will mean that we need to look at the model once we have Sir Roy McNulty’s conclusions and hopefully have come to some conclusions before we begin the negotiations around the next control period, control period five.”

Did you read any ideas within that? No, I didn’t either. I find it hard to believe that a man who has been doing the job for nearly three months has no ideas whatsoever about where NR could make savings. I suspect that he is avoiding answering the question of where NR will have to cut back because to do so would reveal changes he wants to introduce that may actually go against the coalition and which would break promises. Either that or he is out of the loop to the point of incompetence.

You can read all of Hammond’s responses to questions HERE, but I suspect it won’t get you far because he never gives an informed response to a question regarding Britain’s railways.The reality is that he hasn't had that decency to tell the travelling public what he is really keen to do, put up fares and cut back services. He comes across as a man who is evasive but has an agenda that he is not keen to reveal. That, I’m afraid, is simply not good enough!

Philip Hammond's full keynote speech at the RAIL conference can be read in the latest issue of RAIL Magazine pp. 34-37.

Where have the Documents of the Day gone? - Turnip Rail '+Documents'

What's the low-down

Well I set up an extension of the 'Turnip Rail' Blog website called 'Turnip Rail + Documents.' Once a day (hopefully, time permitting) I will post extracts from a document in my collection that all come the history of Britain's Railways. This will avoid clogging up this Blog with a document of the day!

My Mission

So what is the aim of this new site? The goal is to promote the idea that private ownership of historical railway documents is not a good thing if they are kept hidden away. Why? The data that is contained within the documents could potentially help re-write the history of Britain's Railways. While we as a historical community are aware of when events happened, such as when lines were built, when yards were constructed or when accidents happened, there are so many questions that could be answered by using privately held documents. Thus, this site is to not only show what documents I have in my collection, but also to provide some brief analysis alongside to highlight each one's importance to British railway history. I suppose the overriding goal is to show how your document could aid the study of British railway history and why it should be more widely available.

Action

With these goals in mind, anybody can provide me with images of their documents so that more data can be spread throughout the internet. Of course, there is one problem, in that I cannot show everything that is held within large documents. So, as an example, beside me is a handbook listing all of Britain's stations in 1956 and showing their various facilities. It is 494 pages long, however, the most I will post is 3 or 4 images from it. Therefore, if anyone wishes to have a fuller copy of the larger documents I will post I may have to look into the time it would take to copy them. Overall, just sit back and enjoy the collection.

Go to it here

David

P.S. I will eventually try and migrate all the old Documents of the Day over to the new site so that the old is eventually free of non-article material.

When decision making changed for Britain's railways - The L&SWR's Decisions in the early 20th Century

In the late 1800s the railways were still dominant in the transportation market. If you wished to move yourself, your luggage or your goods, the railways were only way to do it quickly and efficiently. However, the railways’ profitability and performance was declining in this period. This was possibly for a number of reasons such as declining management quality, ingrained working patters, managerial empire building and intrusive and costly and governmen legislation. While I wouldn’t like to go into these factors in detail, it was clear that the railways weren’t doing as well financially as in their formative years. In short, something needed to be done to get the profitability back up, and the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), who had suffered like most railways, set to work in the early 20^th Century. In this blog entry I will describe briefly the reasons for two major decisions that the L&SWR took to attempt to secure the profitability of their passenger service between 1898 and 1922. These are the rebuilding of Waterloo station and the suburban Electrification project. I will show that the initiating factor for investment changed on the L&SWR, as it did within many companies in the early twentieth century, because of a change in the business environment.

But why should I just focus on the company’s passenger traffic? Despite having a booming goods business, the majority of the company’s revenue came from passenger services. Thus, if we take 1900 as an example, while the goods revenue of the company came to £1,356,209, the passenger revenue was £2,997,274 (or 68.8% of overall revenue). Thus any decisions regarding the company’s passenger services were vital to its profitability.

Waterloo Station

Has anyone ever read Jerome K. Jerome’s 1889 book Three Men in a Boat? In it he described the problem with Waterloo Station in the late 19^th Century.

“We got to Waterloo at eleven, and asked where the eleven-five started from. Of course nobody knew; nobody at Waterloo ever does know where a train is going to start from, or where a train when it does start is going to, or anything about it. The porter who took our things thought it would go from number two platform, while another porter, with whom he discussed the question, had heard a rumour that it would go from number one. The station-master, on the other hand, was convinced it would start from the local.”

While I won’t go into great detail as to why the station was so difficult to navigate, in short, it had been built up bit by bit over the years since 1848. The L&SWR hadn’t conducted complete rebuilds of the station as more capacity was required to accommodate the traffic, but rather had just ‘bolted on’ new platforms, canopies and facilities every now and again. Thus, in 1898 Waterloo actually had three stations that were all connected; Central, which was the old 1848 structure, South, added in 1878 and North, dating from 1885. This was confused by the fact that the 18 lines running into the station only shared ten platform numbers.

In the 1890s the company was facing a capacity problem at Waterloo as passenger traffic had grown at a very rapid rate. The table below shows the growth in the number of passengers carried, the number of passenger train miles run and the revenue from passenger traffic between 1890 and 1900. Therefore, the rebuild it was a direct response to the fact that passenger traffic had grown at a very rapid rate in the 10 years and that more accommodation was required. Thus, the move to rebuild the station taken in 1898 was reactive to the physical constraints of the company’s infrastructure.

In a sense, this was the last of the L&SWR’s great projects that was reacting to the physical constraints of the company’s infrastructure. To look at any business decisions before 1900, the majority were made because the continually rising traffic meant that the company required extra facilities to deal with that fact. Thus, the company were never exceedingly worried that the expense would be unnecessary as in the long run the expected revenues from passenger growth would eventually cover the cost of construction. This was essentially because the railways were operating in a period when they had monopolies on transportation in most places and did not see any challenge to their unique position. Thus, the Waterloo rebuild was continuing this pattern of decision making, but, it was the last large-scale investment that adhered to it.

The station was completed in 1919 and on the 21^st of March 1922 was officially opened by Queen Mary.

The Electrification Scheme

There were a number of things that affected the way that the L&SWR viewed their suburban passenger services in the early 20^th century, most of which involved electricity. Firstly, the company opened its long-awaited extension to Bank Station via the Waterloo and City line. Electrically run, this was a good testing bed for electric trains within the L&SWR’s sphere of influence. Yet, at this point the L&SWR showed little interest in using the technology on its overground services. Further, up to 1905 the company cooperated with the Metropolitan District Railway Company when they electrified their lines to Richmond and Wimbledon. The Chairman of the L&SWR, Campbell, said he would watch how the new services did with interest. Indeed, the result was that passengers deserted the slow L&SWR steam hauled routes to the city in favour of the clean electric trains. The most important event came when the London United Tramways Company (LUT) started extending into the L&SWR’s suburban region. They reached Hounslow in 1901, Twickenham in 1902 and Hampton court in 1903. Further, in 1902 the LUT received permission to extend to Sunbury and Wimbledon and was looking at building lines to Staines. Finally, in 1906-07 the LUT extended to Kingston, Surbiton, New Malden and Wimbledon.

Thus, the L&SWR started to suffer in its suburban zone. According to Faulkner and Williams in 1902 the L&SWR lost 64% of its receipts on the Hounslow route because of the LUT’s activities. Indeed, if we consider the table above we can see that in the 10 years after 1900 the growth in the number of passengers, passenger train miles and passenger revenue slowed considerably in contrast with the 10 years before. Thus, there were worrying signs that underlying idea that had endured for decades, that the growth number of passengers would continue unabated, was probably doubted. Indeed, at the 1913 General Meeting, the investors were told that the company had lost £100,000 in revenue and the passenger numbers were by then falling by a million per year. Thus the company’s had, by that point, become a reality.

The first stage of the electrification plan was confirmed by the board in December 1912. The proposed routes to be electrified are shown in the picture. The move was therefore different from the rebuilding of Waterloo. Waterloo was rebuilt based on the assumption that Passenger traffic would continue to rise and that there would be no alteration in this fact. However, the Electrification scheme was adopted because of exactly the opposite reason, a fear that passenger traffic, and profits, would decline. Therefore, the attack on passenger traffic by the company’s first real competitors in the suburban passenger market must have been unexpected given the prior history of the L&SWR. Thus, they were made the decision because they were trying to protect their business.

The company completed the planned suburban electrification in the years after 1912, connecting to Wimbledon, Kingston, Hampton Court, Hounslow, Claygate and Shepperton by 1915-16. It was the Southern Railway that would continue the L&SWR’s work.

Conclusion

In the context of the profitability and performance problems of the British Railway industry in the late Victorian period, what could be said about these two events? Firstly, it is evident that despite the failing profitability of the period 1870 to 1900, it wasn’t substantial enough to change the company’s reaction to the increased passenger traffic and the need for greater facilities. Faced with capacity problems they did not try alternative ideas to solve them, for example reducing the number of trains running into Waterloo or closing stations to reduce the number of passengers carried. Instead, they continued with the long-standing pattern of rebuilding existing facilities so every passenger would be accommodated, confident in the knowledge that the cost would, eventually be covered. However, they were shocked into action when the passenger growth, that had always been expected, did not materialise because of new and unexpected competed forms of passenger transport. As such, they were forced into reacting to their business environment by trying to protect the traffic they did have.

Thus, what these two large L&SWR investments symbolise is an important moment in the history of Britain’s railways. The early 1900s were when companies stopped considering that Traffic would always continue to rise, but rather, tried to protect what they had because the business environment had changed. In essence, the period was when Britain’s railway’s would start their long decline towards Beeching.

Bibliography

Faulkner, J.N. and Williams, R.A. The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1988)

Document of the Day - British Railways Magazine - 1959

Presented are some images from the November 1959 issue of British Railway's 'British Railways Magazine.' (BRM) What is interesting, having done some work on the first railway company magazine (the South Western Gazette) is that the BRM is both similar and different from its predecessor. On the one hand both the SWG and BRM had articles on sports events and social activities. However, what seems to me be to be different (and this is only a cursory view) is that the BRM seems to have little about the actual operation of the railways, whereas the Gazette frequently included such things. Possibly, this is because railway operating procedures by this point were far more established than in the 1880s when the Gazette started, and by the 1950s the information that staff to do their jobs was communicated to them through other means.

Ticket Machines - Some people's thoughts....

On Wednesday it was plastered all over the news that ticket machines aren’t really that user friendly and as a result a third of queues at ticket offices had waiting times longer that the ‘industry standard’ of five minutes at peak times. This research was undertaken by Passenger Focus, an organisation that was set up to defend the rights of rail users, but who in reality are only listened to by the media. The Association of Train Operating Companies, Network Rail and anyone else in the industry rarely, if ever, take any notice of them. Now I could rant about ticket machines for ages, but in reality I have nothing to complain about. In all honesty I do not find them that confusing, but I acknowledge that it might just being a case of being well-versed in their operation to the point whereby it is second nature. My only gripe is when the touch-screens don’t work and I find myself repeatedly beating my finger against them like someone who needs a ticket to Narnia, but can’t find it. This said, I am also aware that my case is exceptional and many others do have problems.

Rather than discuss the results of the survey, which I felt was a highly imperfect one, I felt it would be far more interesting to get some views and experiences from my friends on the subject of ticket machines. Thus, I posted the BBC website’s article on Facebook and requested people’s opinions. However, what happened was that the discussion that started trailing off into lots of discussion about the quality of the railways generally and the various run-ins that a few of my friends have had with railway officials. Yet from amongst these I received some interesting comments.

Sarah said that she was “always paying over the odds” because she was “thick!” I think not Sarah. If anything has come out of the survey it is that ticket machines are confusing and sometimes do not show the cheapest price. However, this is what they are legally obliged to do. Simon followed this by saying that “I've picked up some very cheap tickets from the ticket office as opposed to the machines.” Therefore, as limited as this evidence is, my friends confirm that occasionally the ticket machines overprice which it seems from all prior pieces of evidence is not a new phenomenon.

But then again, Adrian recounted a story in which he was offered a ticket at the ticket office, as opposed to the machine which he was unable to use.

“I normally buy off-peak returns to Manchester Piccadilly from Thames Ditton or Surbiton, which allow me to make the inward journey at any time within a month. This, with my 16-25 railcard, costs me £45.60. When approaching a ticket kiosk the member of staff offered me a return for somewhere in the region of £120, even though the machine offered me my usual £45 snatch minutes earlier (but it wouldn't take my card). I even had an old ticket for a previous journey, which I showed him, and he paused, shrugged and said that £120 something was the price he was being shown. I then persuaded him to sell me a travelcard. This way I travelled to Euston and bought my usual £45 ticket from there.”

Therefore, it seems that there is not just a problem of ticket pricing at machines or at the offices, there is a very real problem somewhere in the software. If machines and offices are out of sync with each other this amounts to a form of corruption. Indeed, unless people are willing to check both the machine and the office prices, then this put the railway companies’ operatives in a position of power. Who has the correct knowledge, or time in this case, to be able to question what prices are presented to them? Very people I’m sure. Therefore, the companies can effectively stop people from receiving the cheapest prices. They might try to deny they do this, but the evidence is plain to see in the cases recounted by my friends and others.

Only Simon talked about the actual quality of the interaction with the machines. While in no way representative of the nation’s experiences, the lack of commentary on how user-friendly they ticket machines were in the discussion I started, possibly shows that the quality of this interaction is secondary to people’s concerns over receiving the correct and cheapest price. Simon said:

“I think the machines operated by South West Trains are okay. It's Southern's that are rubbish! You don't seem to be able to buy multiple tickets of a single type. However, Southern do provide Oyster services which SWT do not.”

In my own experience I have found that the difference between different companies’ ticket machines can make a very real difference in the quality of the buying experience. I agree with Simon that SWT’s ticket machines are okay, but they could be improved. The only other experience that comes to mind is East Coast’s machines which are very user friendly. I think, however, the report that Passenger Focus presented is quite poor because it was not a complete survey of ticket machine services across the nation. PF only looked at the machines operated by four companies (South West Trains, First Great Western, East Midlands Trains and SouthEastern). This is no way to run a survey and what is required is more data from which to draw conclusions. Indeed, if the Association of Train Operating Companies’ (ATOC) own figures show that ticket machine users are satisfied 7 out of 10 times, then there seems to be a discrepancy that can only put down to regional variations that haven’t been accounted for in PF’s work (even if ATOC’s figures can also be considered dubious).

Overall, I think that the process of purchasing tickets by all means, from machines, offices or online, needs to be looked at more carefully and using far better research. Perhaps there should be a standard machine or software? Or what about a poster with the prices of the most used tickets at each station? Of course, with such a fractured industry this is unlikely to happen. I think first we need to get the prices altered…oh dear, well, that’s another problem!

Document of the Day - SER Notice of Special Traffic

This is probably one of my most fragile documents because when I got it out of the packet it literally started to disintegrate. Indeed, I think in the year or so that I have had it I have never got it out and this is why I was unaware of its fragility. One of the questions that I think needs more research is how alike the operating procedures of Victorian Railway Companies were. If all the companies operated in similar or identical ways, this would mean that the room for new and innovative ideas regarding operating procedures and efficiencies would be reduced. If they operated in different ways information exchange and innovation may have been prevalent within the industry. This document from the South Eastern Railway in 1893 is interesting as it is almost identical in form, tone, appearance and procedure to those circulars regarding Special Traffic that were produced by the London and South Western Railway in the period. Therefore, this is a sign that many railway companies by the late Victorian period may have adopted similar, if not identical ways of of working, that may have meant that the industry was stagnating. Although, with just this one document as evidence, I can't make any conclusions really.