The Accommodation of Smokers on the London and South Western Railway

While it is right to study the British railway industry in isolation, it should never be forgotten that its importance to Victorian society means that it can be held up as a mirror to it at times. For example, some railway companies in the late Victorian period encouraged the development of the temperance movement amongst their employees. This was following the nation-wide rise of the temperance movement. Further, before World War One there was an expansion of education and many in society saw it as a means of social improvement. Subsequently, the railway companies set up education courses for their staff to take advantage of the pro-education feeling in the nation and develop better employees. Lastly, in the 1990s smoking gradually became socially less acceptable, and as such by 2000 it was banned on all railway journeys. This was followed in July 2007 by its prohibition anywhere within railway premises. This change of the law was much to consternation of some of my friends.

I once suggested to one of my friends who smoked that he should actually write a history of smoking on Britain’s railways. While he had never complained about the ban on smoking within railway carriages, he has taken issue with the fact that he cannot smoke on platforms as they are not covered. He didn’t warm to the idea, and as such no work has been done on this subject. Indeed for this blog entry I thought I might give a short history of how the London and South Western Railway approached the issue of smoking on its trains and at its stations. The information has come from the various copies of the company’s rule books, appendices to the working timetables and bylaws that I have.

What surprised me when looking for rules on smoking in the documents, is that the 2007 law has returned the status of smoking on railway premises to its original state. A London and South Western Railway rule book from 1845 states that:

‘Smoking is strictly prohibited both in the carriages, and in the company’s stations. Every person smoking in a carriage or station is hereby subjected to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings; and every person persisting in smoking in a carriage or station, after being warned to desist by the Guard in charge of the train, or any officer of the company, shall, in addition to incurring a penalty not exceeding forty shillings be immediately, or, if travelling, at the first opportunity, be removed from the Company’s premises.’

So, smoking was banned everywhere within the railway company and the nuisance aspect of the habit comes through loud and clear. This is primarily as it is only later in the century that smoking became cheaper and accessible to a greater proportion of the population. As such, it was probably only been the first class passengers that could have afforded to smoke. This fact is reinforced by the hefty nature of the maximum fine, forty shillings, which would have been well beyond a week’s salary for many individuals. A low paid L&SWR clerk at the time earned approximately 19 shillings a week, a well-paid clerk earned double this. This indicates that even for the middle classes the fine would have been a great burden. Also, today the fine would be the equivalent of paying a maximum £161. Therefore, this suggests that it was only the richer end of society that were smoking, and that the fine was tailored accordingly.

This regulation was in place for many years as it was replicated word for word in the company’s 1864 staff rule book. The first sign of a change is found in an 1884 staff rule book as follows:

‘7. Every person smoking in any shed or covered platform of a station, or in any building of the company, or in any carriage or compartment not specifically provided for the purpose, is hereby subjected to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings. The company’s officers and servants are required to take the necessary steps to enforce obedience to this bye-law; and any person offending against it is liable, in addition to incurring the penalty above mentions, to be summarily removed, at the first opportunity, or from the company’s premises.’

It is uncertain what year that the L&SWR allowed smoking in some carriages, however I suspect the change occurred in the early 1870s. [Ed. I was helpfully informed by Jeremy (see comment below) that the railway companies were compelled by the 1868 Regulation of Railways Act to provide smoking compartments in all passenger trains. I have posted the rule in the comments section below.] The change came because smoking as a habit was becoming far more widespread due to the advent of the cigarette and the lowering of the price of tobacco. Therefore, the company must have felt obliged to provide provision for the increased numbers of customers who smoked, as it would be unseemly not to do so. This said, because of the harsh tone and strictness of the rule, it would seem to suggest that the company was merely accommodating the rise in the numbers of smokers who wished to travel; and there is no indication that it was seeking to encourage the practice. One transgression would be all it took to land you with a fine and removal from the premises.

Additionally, it should be noted that the L&SWR were able to make this change at the time as larger coaches with a greater number of compartments were being introduced. Subsequently, it was easier for company officials to designate particular compartments for smokers without disruption to other people’s journeys. Thus, the introduction of the smoking compartment was also aided by the advancement of railway design.

The provision of smoking compartments on the L&SWR was, therefore, set in stone by the 1880s because of these factors. They would be present on British railways until the 1990s. However, what changed around the compartments were the rules for governing how the railway employees should deal with those passengers who transgressed by smoking outside of them. For the next change in attitude we have to move forward to the L&SWR’s Bye-laws of 1906 which stated that:

’16. No person shall smoke in any railway carriage or compartment thereof not specially provided for smoking; or in or upon any part of the company’s premises where smoking is expressly prohibited by the Company; and no person shall smoke elsewhere within the Company’s premises if requested by any servant or agent of the company not to do so. Any person infringing or not observing this by-law and regulation shall be liable to the penalty prescribed by By-law No. 1; and any person who persists in so offending after being warned by any passenger to servant or agent of the company to desist, and fails to quit such carriage, compartment, or place immediately upon request by any servant or agent of the company, may, without prejudice to any such penalty be removed therefrom, or from the company’s premises, by or under the direct of any servant or agent.’

This was clearly a change in tone. The rules of 1845, 1864 and 1884, were very direct, strongly worded and the staff were to take the harshest measures to deal with those who broke them. While the ruling presented here is essentially the same as the 1884 one, the wording of this bylaw essentially instructs passengers to be warned that if they inappropriately smoked it may possibly land them with a fine (still up to 40 shillings). It is much less strict than earlier regulations.

What is also interesting is that at the same time the onus was on the staff to provide enough smoking compartments for those who required them. Rule No. 195 in the 1904 and 1912 L&SWR staff rule books stated that ‘Guards must, before starting, see that they have a sufficient number of compartments reserved for smokers...’ Thus, having enough provision for smokers is the responsibility of the guard, and by default the railway company. This demonstrated that no longer were smokers to be just accommodated by the L&SWR staff, as before, but that they were to be expected as passengers. This aligns well with the new, less harsh, tone of the bylaw of 1906. Because by the early 19^th century was smoking was a universal social activity, both the bylaw and the rule book indicate that the L&SWR directors and managers were obviously far more positive about those who chose to do it on the company’s premises.

As a postscript, in the 1934 Southern Railway (which took over the L&SWR’s territory in 1923) appendix to the working timetable, it shows how far railway companies’ attitudes had changed since the 1840s. It stated that:

‘Any person reported by a passenger, or seen to be smoking in a non-smoking compartment, must be politely informed that this is a contravention of one of the Company’s Bye-laws (No. 17 in the public timetable); and the passenger must be requested to desist from smoking or to change into a smoking compartment. Failing compliance, the name and address of the offending passenger must be obtained and the circumstance reported to the Divisional Superintendent.’

Thus, for those who smoked outside the designated compartments the Southern Railway imposed no fines and there was no ejection of the offender from company premises. Further, the tone of the instruction seems quite weak willed in comparison with earlier examples. The most that could happen is that those who transgressed the bylaw may have gotten a stern letter from the Divisional Superintendent (given gave their name and address to the company’s staff in the first place). By this time smoking was not perceived of as much of a nuisance as it had been in the past, and as such there was a far more relaxed attitude to those passengers who chose to break the rules. Therefore, the Southern Railway’s attitude was clearly shaped by smoking’s almost universal acceptance in society at the time.

Overall, the L&SWR’ rules, accommodations and attitudes to passengers smoking changed in line with the general shift away from it being the preserve of the rich, towards its almost universal acceptance within society. However, what is also important to note that the nuisance aspect of smoking, that some people do not want to inhale others’ smoke, never really went away. Smokers and non-smokers were always segregated. Indeed, as the evidence shows, railway companies always defended the rights of non-smokers to continue their journeys without being affected by those who wished to smoke, despite the habit becoming socially more acceptable over the period of this study.

The Eras of Early Railway Managers

I have been writing my Podcast script and I have to say that it is going well. I suppose the natural upshot of thinking about my work so often is that I do develop new theories and ideas about it. At the end of the day this makes it all my blogging work worthwhile. My first Podcast will be on senior railway managers of the British railway industry between 1825 and 1870. A useful by-product of this work is that it led me to think about how who was a senior manager changed.

Now, I have talked in my blog before about how very early senior managers joined the railways after careers in three main areas of employment, the military, transport and engineering. Yet, what has struck me is that there were different periods when these types of managers occupied the most senior positions within companies. Engineers occupied the majority of senior posts when the industry was emerging. However, by the late 1840s they were then followed by the ex-military and pre-railway era transport men (such as canal managers and stagecoach proprietors) who took the positions over and rose in the hierarchy. Further, this ‘mixed-bag’ of managers was in turn usurped as ‘career managers’ came to the fore in the 1850s and 60s, most of whom started as clerks.

At the outset of the railways, engineers were the railway companies’ logical choices for the most senior managerial posts. They were educated, on-site and knew how to manage large numbers of men. However, as the railways moved away from requiring technical management, they turned increasingly to individuals who had experience of moving goods and supplies, and hence why those who had been in military or transport careers were employed.

However, this change was not principally because the services of engineers were no longer required. Many senior engineers stayed on in the railways to manage Engineering or Locomotive departments and developed long careers in the railways. The driving force behind the rise of senior managers who had had transport or military careers was the rise of the Traffic Departments themselves, which they administered. As the railway lines were completed attention turned increasingly to the operation of the line. Subsequently, this centralised the role of the movement of goods and passengers within railway company operations.

As such, this change meant that the needs of Traffic Departments increasingly determined the actions of the Locomotive and Engineering Departments. After all, if a Traffic Department need more locomotives its head would turn to the Locomotive Superintendent to remedy the situation. If the Traffic Department needed more sidings or an extra crane, the Traffic Superintendent would ask the Chief Engineer to oblige. Therefore, the Traffic Managers became central to company policy and the way that the strategic thinking developed (while of course under the gaze of the directors).

Subsequently, it is unsurprising that that in the 1840s and 50s the engineers, men with specialist skills, became increasingly restricted to careers within Engineering and Locomotive departments. However, it was the ex-military and pre-railway era transport men that benefitted, becoming senior managers within the industry in large numbers. Yet, these men were essentially usurped from this position by another unique group of individuals in the labour market, the clerks. This group had, by the end of the century, generated most of the country’s senior railway managers.

In the early days of the railway industry, clerks had never really been posted to any positions higher than ‘station clerks’ (early station masters) or to regular clerical posts. However, this move created an educated group of individuals, within all departments, that were all the time gathering experience of railway operations. Thus, as the companies grew they found that they had larger and larger numbers of individuals working for them that had experience of traffic management. This was something that none of their predecessors possessed, they having only had ‘transferrable skills’ from the military or the pre-railway transport industry. Thus, the companies increasingly did not look to external sources for managers. The result was that by the late 1850s and early 1860s internal labour markets fed more and more clerks up the company hierarchy. Subsequently, senior railway managers very rarely came from external sources, and almost certainly had begun their careers as lowly clerks. This was, in reality, a take-over by stealth.

This is only a brief survey of the ideas banging about my head, but suffice to say that they will be developed soon. I should also point out that while I have talked in absolutist terms in this post about the different eras, many of the lines between the groups of managers were very blurred in the Victorian period. More research needs to be done on this topic to really define more closley the changes in railway senior management.

Railway linkages in Railway Directorship

I thought I'd return to the work that I am currently doing on the directorships that the board members of the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) held that were beyond the company. I think their may have been some misunderstanding over my post a few days ago on this topic. The directors of the L&SWR did sit on the boards of other railway companies before 1914. The figures for the L&SWR board members' external railway directorships are as follows:-

1880 - 2 directorships, held by 2 men (Average = 1/director)

1885 - 6 directorships, held by 3 men (Average = 2/director)

1890 - 7 directorships, held by 5 men (Average = 1.4/director)

1895 - 5 directorships, held by 4 men (Average = 1.25/director)

1900 - 2 directorships, held by 2 men (Average = 1/director)

1905 - 1 directorship, held by 1 man (Average = 1 director)

1910 - None

1914 - None

Firstly, the evidence suggests that the number of interlocking directorships with other railways were always small amongst L&SWR directors. Although, the fact that throughout this period the company only had 12 directors, clearly would have influenced this fact. Additionally, of the seven L&SWR board members that were on other railway company boards, only three, A.F. Govett, Arthur E. Guest and Capitan James Johnston, had membership of more than one railway company board. There can also be observed a trend in the figures of declining membership of other railway companies' boards by L&SWR directors, and after 1914 there were none.

I am uncertain why this may be so. However it has been posited by Geoffrey Channon that as the corporate economy developed, as more large business opened up their boards to new directors, railway company boards became less appealing. For most of the 19th century railways had been the only businesses where individuals could obtain directorships. Yet, as the economy grew, the increasing number of other businesses became more appealing for potential directors, and thus, fewer individuals sat on railway company boards.

What the evidence above doesn't show is that slightly more of L&SWR board member's external railway directorships were not on British railway company boards. In total, across all years between 1880 and 1914, L&SWR directors had positions on 11 railway company boards. Only 5 of these directorships were within British railway companies (the Whitby Redcar and Middlesbrough Railway, the Taff Vale Railway, the Cardiff, Penarth and Barry Junction Railway, the North Staffordshire Railway and the Great Northern and City.) However, the remaining 6 directorships were on the boards of railway companies operating overseas, with one in Spain (the Olot and Girona Railway), one in Mexico (the Mexico Southern Railway), two in Brazil (the Donna Thereza Christina and the Southern Brazilian Rio Grande Do Sul Railway) and two in India (the Pondicheri Railway and the South Indian Railway)

This possibly indicates that these directors ordinarily did not choose railway company directorships because of any immediate advantage for the L&SWR. The locations of these railways are so diverse that it is possible that the directors were simply on the board for their own advantage. Indeed, this borne out by the fact that the British railway boards that they sat on were firstly not linked with the L&SWR at any point physically, but also that they were generally small railways, insignificant in the highly developed railway industry. Thus, they would have little, if any affect on the L&SWR's business.

Increased Fares Means Increased Transport Poverty

While tackling the deficit, the coalition government has also wedded itself to the idea of decreasing the divide between rich and poor and increasing social mobility. Yesterday, on the 100 day anniversary of the coalition partnership, Nick Clegg said, "Our determination to fix the deficit is matched by our determination to create a more socially mobile society." Yet, the government still aspires to do this on the backdrop of savage cuts in every area from health to defence. While I am sure that they understand the inherent contradiction in trying to improve the lives of Britain’s poorest, while at the same time cutting their benefits and employment opportunities, I don’t think, with the level of cuts proposed, it can be done.

I am not alone though and the coalition’s proposed policies have been frequently attacked from the left, right and all those in between. There is an increasing body of comment and detailed statistical analysis in the blogosphere and elsewhere, that shows that if anything the proposed cuts will only serve to increase divisions in Britain between rich and poor. Kevin Meagher at Left Foot Forward recently quoted Danny Dorling, professor of Human Geography at Sheffield University, as saying that “Britain is a country pulling itself apart” along a North-South rich-poor divide (To be found HERE)Meagher went on to argue that the removal of Regional Development Agencies and their replacement with Local Economic Partnerships, will only exacerbate this divide as the latter will not have the scope because of their smaller sze to make an impact on the national economic imbalance. Indeed, he again quotes Dorling as saying that “The recession is exacerbating those [existing] differences and I suspect the dividing line will also move southwards as the government’s cuts take effect.”

Additionally, the TUC released yesterday a list that showed that cuts in education, health, housing, welfare and social care have the greatest impact on the poorest in our society. The 100 cuts that they can be found HERE. Furthermore, cuts in government run organisations and local authorities will disproportionately affect people above the north-south divide, as in these regions government is the largest employer. Therefore, the result is that the inevitable redundancies may lower many individual’s and family’s standards of living, and may even force them into poverty. These two examples are simply a small portion of the attacks on the government’s claims of fairness. Overall, my assessment is that the coalition government cannot really talk about ‘fairness’ and ‘social mobility’ when it is demonstrably true that their policies so far will only serve to breed inequality.

So what does this have to do with the railways? I have always been an advocate of the idea that there is a concept of ‘transport poverty,’ a divide between richer and poorer travellers. Many people are simply priced out of rail travel, and choose to make their journeys solely by car, because of their financial positions. This, therefore, has the obvious negative effects on the environment and the congestion on the roads, but it also disproportionately affects the poorest in our society. It was for this reason that I was pleased to see that in the Lib Dem manifesto there was a commitment to lowing fares. This was, however, watered down in the coalition agreement to simply a promise of ‘fair rail pricing.’ While less direct than the original Lib Dem manifesto, I originally thought, in the context of my own beliefs of course, that ‘fair’ meant exactly what it said on the tin; reasonable prices for all, which would subsequently increase accessibility to the rail network.

We have since learnt from the Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, that ‘fair’ is a word that can be twisted to mean whatever you want it to do. At the House of Commons select committee on Transport, in response to the question ‘You are committed to fair pricing. Fair to whom?,’ he stated ‘I think there are two aspects on this. First of all, there is the question of overall fairness policy on the railway and ensuring that any increases in fares can be justified in terms of improvements in the service that passengers receive. [....] It is not just about fares; it is about value for money for passengers. [...] It is about making sure that [passengers] are given proper information about the most advantageous fare available to them, that the information that is published is clear so that passengers can get the best deal that is possible within any given framework of any given fare structure.’ So basically, the coalition meant that prices would be ‘fair’ within the existing pricing framework. But then again, prices are not ‘fair’ if large numbers of people won’t use the railways because of the pricing structure, if the prices are some of the highest in Europe (in some places 60% higher) and if rail travel is therefore reserved for the better off half off society.

But rail prices, I suspect, are about to become more unfair. In years past the Train Operating Companies (TOC) have been allowed to raise ticket prices by the retail Price Index (now at 4.8%) plus 1%, a total of 5.8% this year. But it has been reported this week (To be found HERE) that in an attempt to reduce the £5 billion annual subsidy the Department for Transport (DfT) gives to the TOC’s, it may be ready to break this rule and allow the companies to increase the ticket prices by up to a possible 10%.

I think that this is a severe mistake for a number of reasons. If prices did rise by this much, a greater proportion of the population would be priced out of using rail travel. This would put greater pressure on the road and motorway network, increasing congestion on both long-distance and suburban routes. With increased car journeys being made this would, of course, be detrimental to the environment. The other possible implication could be that individuals would be more inclined to search for work in their locale, rather than further afield, because they would be unwilling to pay the higher train fares on long-distance journeys. Thus, this would also affect their economic situation. Lastly, it would increase the hardship on people who cannot, or do not, drive for whatever reason and who have no option to use the railways for work or leisure.

But, I do feel strongly that there are other ways to keep the level of the subsidy to the TOCs constant, while at the same time maintaining (or reducing) current fare levels. It is no secret that Network Rail, one of the biggest draws on the Department for Transport’s finances, is terribly managed. Figures put the cost of maintaining Britain’s railway infrastructure at 30-50% above continental networks. Yet if the management was improved, efficiencies made and the organisation was streamlined, then some of that saved money could be used to keep the cost of fares down and keep the subsidy at the current level. This would increase access to rail transportation and reduce ‘transport poverty.’

Given the Government's track record on fairness so far, I’m afraid all I can foresee is that the fares will go up as reported. However, this will only serve to increase the numbers of people who won’t pay the extortionately high price of railway travel, increasing the ‘transport poverty’ divide.

To direct a company, two companies...many companies

In my PhD work I have been thinking about what other directorships the L&SWR board members had. It isn't the most riveting subject. In fact it is quite dull. But, I can't always do everything that I want and a certain amount of mud has to be slung before I get to the gold at the bottom. However, one trend I identified struck me as interesting, as it reflected on the developmental state of the 'corporate' economy in Britain more generally. For this post I will use my research in combination with Geoffrey Channon’s, who's excellent book, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, has become somewhat of a bible from me, although unfortunately their wasn't a Gideon-esque service giving them out, the cost of the book being £65.00. Anyway, I digress.

In 1880 a publication came out called the Directory of Directors (DoD), a title from which it wouldn't be hard to determine what its function was. It basically listed every director, of every company, and thus is invaluable guide to how different companies and industries, shared directors. As such, both Channon and I have used the DoD to determine how the board members of the Great Western Railway (GWR), in Channon's case, and the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), in my case, shared directors with other businesses and sectors of the economy.

In short, we have both identified a pattern that I think represents the changing nature of the British corporate economy after 1900. Between 1880 both Channon and I have shown that the GWR and L&SWR's directors did not sit on many other boards. Now, our studies haven't presented the results of our research in the same way, but they can be compared. In Channon's case he identified that between 1881 and 1885, the majority of GWR directors (13 out of 21 - 61.9%) had no external directorships, with 5 (23.8%) having between 1 and 3, with only 3 having four or above (14.3%). Comparatively, my research has shown that in 1880 9 directors out of the L&SWR's 12 had no directorships (75%), with the remainder having between being on between 1 and 3 external boards. Similarly, in 1885 7 directors (58.33%) had no external directorships, while 5 had between 1 and 3 (41.67%). Thus, the period before 1900 can be considered one where railway company directors did not have many, if any, external directorships beyond their primary concern, the railways.

This is in stark contrast with the period after 1900. In Channon’s sample, between 1906 and 1910 only 4 of the GWR’s 22 directors sat on no other company boards. Yet, 10 (45.4%) had between 1 and 3 external directorships and 8 (36.4%) had between 4 and 6. A similar pattern was exhibited amongst the L&SWR directors. In 1910, 5 directors (41.67%) had no seats on external boards, 4 (33.3%) had between 1 and 3 external directorships and 2 (16.67%) had between 4 and 6. One, Lord Pirrie, sat on 12 company boards, mainly in shipping. In 1914, however, more L&SWR directors were seated on even more boards. Of them, 5 (41.67%) had between 1 and 3 external directorships, 2 (16.67%) sat on between 4 and 6 boards and another 2 had above 13. This left only 3 (25%) individuals who were solely L&SWR board members. In both the case of the GWR and L&SWR directors, most of the directors sat on external boards of companies that were not concerned with railways or transportation. Rather, these external companies were in the sectors of finance, industry and manufacturing.

Therefore, in the period after 1900 there is a clear change in the way that individuals chose to join company boards. For much of the 1900s the railway industry was the biggest, while others were still developing. Therefore, for an aspiring director the railways were some of the few companies on whose boards they could sit. Hence, many railway directors had fewer directorships. This trend may be also indicative of the nature of the business landscape in that many firms were family run and therefore may not have boards of directors. However, after 1900 the number of limited companies expanded, opening up the opportunities for individuals to sit on more boards. This is, therefore, reflected in the results above.

Lost Documents from railway's past

I thought that as I had collected so many documents from the history of Britain's railways that I would knuckle down and sort them out. Oh dear. I hadn't realised how many I had in my collection. I think we are looking at 100s of individual items, ranging from luggage labels through to policy documents, from instructional circulars to timetables. With it all laid out on my floor it all looked like a mess, although one of those messes where you know exactly where everything is. I realised I did not have time to sort and catalogue everything, so I decided to organise my largest collection. For any regular readers of my blog you can probably guess that this was my collection of London and South Western Documents, of which I have 100s.

As I went through the collection I noticed there is a distinct pattern in the material that has come into my possession through various means (ebay being the main culprit). Within a large organisation such as the L&SWR there were three main types of communication that occurred. Firstly, communication flowed from management down the organisation. On the L&SWR this was in the form of rule books, circulars, instructions, appendices to the Working Timetable and letters. Secondly, there was 'horozontal' communication between locations on the network, for example between stations, yards and offices. Some examples include letters, telegrams, train messages, waybills and wagon labels. I have plenty of documents that are examples of downward and horizontal communication. This isn't surprising though, as such documents are abundantly available on ebay and at ephemera fairs. Just have look at the 'paper ephemera' category on ebay (under Transportation and then Railwayana)

Yet, there is one flow of information from which I have very few documents. Communication up the organisation was vital to the functioning of the company. Information flowed from the station master, guard or engine driver to the management, it was then collated and strategic decisions regarding such things as investment, train times and efficiency were made. So documents that were used would include staff timesheets, station traffic returns, guard's report books, fuel usage forms and stores request forms. Yet, I have few documents of this nature, the sole examples being some unused forms for the hours staff members worked and a guard's report book. It is not very impressive really.

The reason for this disparity between how much material I have from each of the three directions of communication is simple. I have lots of material that ended up at stations, yards or offices around the L&SWR's network because these were places where they could be saved (or lost) easily. Imagine a absent minded clerk placing something in a draw and forgetting about it, a station master who knocked a form down the side of the desk, or even a porter who took his Rule Book home when it was superseded by a new one. It is these people's documents I have. But, a book that listed who worked at a station, or how many wagons passed through another or how much oil they used at a locomotive shed, went up the organisation to be assessed in a main company office and therefore took up space. This is why I have posted the two images above that were published in the South Western Magazine in 1917. They clearly show large data books and 'waste paper' being disposed of systematically. Once the information contained within had been extracted, the medium through which it came to headquarters was disposed of. Hence, this is why I suspect that the vast majority of these documents are missing from the railway ephemera market, and why I have only unused examples of upward forms of communication.

Thus, this is probably why many questions regarding the efficiency and performance of Britain's railways in this period may never be answered as location-specific data is scarce.

Railway silly stuff from the archives

This is from a London and South Western Railway Rule Book from 1845. I'm sure that you have read it with complete innocence!
Early Railway dance moves, from a L&SWR Rule book from 1868. Those Victorians certainly jived.
A contradictory one for 'Safe Asbestos' from the Southern Railway Magazine in 1924.

I'm always keen to have more silly (looking) stuff, so let me know!