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Sunday, 23 May 2010
Three Station Masters at Hampton Court - The Odd Bunch

Thursday, 20 May 2010
Conservative transport policy...time to be scared?
This fear isn't irrational though. It doesn't automatically stem from a loathing of all things Tory, (however I do have to confess that as a disgruntled Lib-Dem I am quick to condemn them) nor does it come from a default loathing of the fee market, which history tells us they love, cuddle and, given the chance, would have coitus with. It doesn't even originate from erroneous idea that since the beginning the Conservatives have always historically been the ones to mess up the railways. Indeed, some of the greatest policy errors, including the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894 and parts of the Railways Act of 1921, both of which restricted the way that railway companies could charge for their services and therefore damaged their profits, were both enacted by Liberal governments.
My worry, profuse in nature and massive in my head, is that over the last 50 years Conservative Governments have persistently damaged Britain's rail network. Now, I'm not saying that that's what Conservative Governments set out to do, but I can't help discerning a pattern of destructive policies and loathing towards the railways that was ongoing. It is my hope, however, that the new Conservative-Lib Dem Government doesn't go the same way.
The first real pain that the Conservatives inflicted on Britain's railways was installing one Richard Beeching as chairman of British Railways (BR) in 1961. He was appointed by Ernest Marples (shown), the Conservative Minister for Transport, who brought him from his position as Technical Director at ICI. It is in his new position that Beeching came to be considered a 'Railway Satan.' He was tasked with moving BR into profitability. He shared the view with the Government that BR should be run like a business and not solely in the public interest. In his 1963 report, The Reshaping of British Railways, he proposed closing 6000 of the country's 18000 miles of railway, most of which were rural and cross country lines. This would also mean shutting 7000 stations and allow BR to shed 70,000 jobs over three years. He estimated the recommended changes would make BR profitable by 1970 and as a result Marples implemented most of them.
The Beeching Report, as we now know, was terrible for many reasons. Firstly the report did not take into account the social benefits of railway lines serving communities that had no other transport links. These small communities, that still shape our view of the sleepy little English village, had existences that revolved around their railway lines. Suddenly, like a whirlwind, these services were gone. Secondly, Beeching's cuts were based on traffic figures that were gathered in the spring when some places that had heavy tourist traffic were at their quietest, such as lines on the North Cornwall coast. Therefore when these lines were closed it destroyed industry and tourism in these regions. North Cornwall, to this day, still has a failing economy. Thirdly, there was no attempt to decrease cost through other means, such as modernisation, (despite the failed BR modernisation plan of the 1950s) that would have allowed some lines to stay open. Beeching's sole cost-cutting policy was to apply the axe when a line failed to pay its way. Lastly, the cuts went too far. The plans did not foresee that roads would fill up and did not anticipate any future transport needs. These are just some of the many criticisms of the plan, and in the end Beeching's goal of profitability was never reached. What it most certainly did do was cost many people their livelihoods.
Now I am not automatically going to knock Beeching himself and I have always though that it was Marples particularly that was at fault. Firstly, Marples was a man who's background looked a bit suspect. Marples co-owned a construction company, Marples-Ridgeway, that was heavily into road building. Indeed, surprise, surprise, it was Marples that authorised the M1 be built from London to Nottingham and it was Marples-Ridgeway that built it. Further, and this is important, Beeching only made recommendations in his report, it was Marples who actually gave the order to close the lines. Therefore, when the line between London and Nottingham closed, forcing travellers onto the M1, the fishiness is plain to smell. Marples evidently used his position, and the Beeching report, to further his own business interests. Secondly, Marples brought in a businessmen in Beeching and that in itself was going to mean harsh cuts were going to be proposed. My point is that if you place a wolf in a chicken coup, don't expect that it'll imitate the chickens. Businessmen will act as businessmen if they are simply told to make something profitable. Indeed, it was Beeching's narrow terms of reference, simply to bring BR into profit, that meant he looked at things simply in terms of profit and loss. Thus, he acted accordingly. Overall I feel that it was Marples who was the man to blame for the cuts, as he was driven by a pro-road agenda. Beeching, I feel, simply did his job, even if he did it badly.
So where to next? Oh yes, the privatisation of British Rail in the early to mid 1990s. This is, in some ways, a more erroneous action by a Conservative Government that the Beeching cuts. Beeching, effigies of which railway enthusiasts still stick pins into, at least was brought in to solve a specific problem. British Railways was unprofitable, its cost tax payers money, Beeching was tasked with reversing this. However, John Major's Government of the 1990s broke up British Rail because of ideology. The free market was their God, and they worshipped it to the max. Their goal was to make Britain's railways efficient and innovative by the introduction of competition. Silly arses.
By the early 1990s British Rail was actually running very efficiently. Maggie, bless her cotton socks, had restricted BR's budget quite considerably. This had had the effect of scaring its bosses so much that the aim of Beeching, railway profitability, actually became a reality in some parts of the organisation. Certain services, such as intercity and Network South East, actually started to make money. The Thatcher Government also shocked everyone when it authorised the electrification of the East Coast Main Line and purchased new rolling stock. Everyone involved stood back and applauded. BR was, by 1994, at its most cost-effective. Then Thatcher was out and Major came in.
Thatcher, it may surprise everyone to know, was actually against the privatisation of the railways. However, Major, under the influence of the 'Adam Smith think tank,' pushed forward with privatisation in the Railways Act 1993. This created an infrastructure company, Railtrack, that maintained all the working parts (track, signals, major stations etc.), three ROSCOs that owned the rolling stock and who leased it to the 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) who actually ran the trains. Further, BR's engineering department was split up, as was the freight services that were now under the control of 6 private companies. This is the very basic version of how BR was split up. To go through the number of companies that were involved and the cack-handed way that BR was destroyed, would take endless Blog posts that would make me into a hermit.
The split up of BR caused many problems, and what follows were the key ones. Firstly, the track ownership was separated from the trains. This currently causes problems as there are conflicts between the operators of trains and the Network Rail. Secondly, the infrastructure maintenance was privatised , leading to cost cutting, sloppy maintenance and a string of crashes. The Southall accident in 1997, Ladbroke Grove in 1999 and Hatfield in 2000 all contributed to Railtrack's downfall. In 2001 it was placed in administration and in 2002 all of its assets were transferred to the state owned, not-for-profit company, Network Rail. Thirdly, the railways now cost the taxpayer far more money than is necessary. Because in the privatisation process someone forgot to flag up that railways don't make profit, it means that many franchises, such as South West Trains and National Express East Anglia are subsidised simply so that they have profits high enough to pay their shareholders dividends. Yet at the same time many Train Operating Companies still have to pay money back to the government as part of their contracts, and failure to do so sees them stripped of their franchises, for example National Express East Coast last year. Overall, these weird arrangements mean that we pay over the odds as taxpayers for the train services. In 1994 government funding for BR was £1,627m, approximately £2,168m in 2005 terms. In 2005 government support came to £4,593m. I could list more faults, but the general consensus is that a Conservative Government privatised the railways very badly, when they were at their most cost-effective, simply because it sat well with their ideology.
What, therefore, does the future hold with this government? Are those who, like me, are interested in having good railways quaking in their boots? Railway commentators were shocked and worried last week when the new Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond (shown), laid out a possible change in direction for the Department for Transport. I wrote a few Blogs back about how I felt that Lord Adonis was probably the best Secretary of State for the railways in a long while, and how his enthusiasm for railways should be continued. However, Hammond was quoted last week as saying that Labour's "war on the
motorist" was going to be ended. Is there a war? I didn't hear gunfire. All I heard were Clarksonesque individuals who like to feel victimised mouthing off. Hammond was referring to an illusory conflict and it was a worrying portent. I read this statement as meaning the new government was taking a pro-roads stance and could hear Marples' footsteps in the background. If he was going to view transport policy through a prism of pro or anti different forms of transport then he was simplifying a complex issue.
As I speak the Government's 'Programme for Government' is being unrolled through the news outlets. In the transport section there is a lot of good news for those interested in better railways. There will be longer franchises, Network Rail will be more accountable to it customers (i.e. us), high speed rail is supported, with options to expand it beyond the basic plans already drawn up, there is support for Crossrail, support for electrification (which I honestly didn't think would still be on the cardsunder the new Government), the rail regulator will become a strong passenger champion and, lastly, there is a commitment to fair rail pricing. Some things have been left out, such as improvements to Thameslink, re-opening closed lines and the Intercity Express Program. However this plan for the next 5 years is, on the surface of things, a very good result for the railways given the financial constraints of government.
History has taught me to fear Conservative transport policies when it comes to the railways, that they are essentially a destructive party in this respect. Therefore, naturally, I suspect that many of the above policies have the Lib Dem's fingerprints all over them. Yet if the Government adheres in the next 5 years to what it has set out today, then I might start to change my opinion. I wait and see...
Saturday, 15 May 2010
Early Railway Administrators...The Good, the Bad and the Shiny
So lets start at the bottom. The best place to start if you ask me, just ask any builder. Firstly we have to ask a question, who was the early nineteenth century clerk? Anderson argued in the 1970s that clerks in this period were 'superior to most workers.'1 Attwell agreed, saying that because of their skills in 'literacy, arithmetic up to vulgar and decimal fractions,' they 'stood above the manual worker,'2 even if their skills by modern standards were pretty poor. Railway managers and directors therefore looked to this group to be some of the first railway administrators.
If you had gone to your local station in 1845 it would not be run by a station master. It would be managed by the 'Station Clerk.' London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) rule books throughout the 1840s consistently refer to the administrators of stations by this title. By the early 1850s the company had, however, phased the title out and replaced it with 'station agent.' This said, the move does not seem to have been universal. A search of nineteenth century newspapers shows that it may have still around as late as the 1860s. Generally, clerks were chosen to manage stations simply because there was no one else available in the labour market. However in some sense, while the clerks were of good standing, their clerical status held them back, in that they did not have the social status to be appointed as managers. Overall,what the title represents is the fact that the concept of to directors they were simply clerks, with some responsibilities, sited at stations. They were filling clerical roles akin to those in other industries that weren't unique to the railways.
Next I will look upwards at management. I tend to think that directors split their organisations along a distinct fault line. There were those 'bright sparks' who were engineers, that managed the technical parts of the organisation, such as the building of the lines and the running of trains. On the other hand there were the hotch-potch of individuals that ran companies' traffic departments, that did not have any technical experience or training, but that brought experience from other industries.
Firstly, I will look at the engineers who were involved in the management of early railways. On the London and South Western Railway (and what a surprise I am focussing on it again) the Way and Works Department was managed by two men between 1836 and 1850. These were Albinus, 'I'm bloody difficult to find information on,' Martin, and Joseph, 'I'm in history I'm like a supernova,' Locke (shown). Both men had their separate remits. Locke managed the line while under construction and Martin managed engineering work after everything was completed. Locke also managed the Locomotive department. He initially, in 1838, devolved control of the department to Joseph Woods, who was one of his employees. Woods was succeeded in 1841 by John Viret Gooch, also an employee of Locke. Gooch's assistant and successor in 1850, was William Beattie, who was, surprisingly, also an employee of Locke (yes, that is sarcasm – can you smell patronage?). What these appointments show is that engineers naturally had charge of engineering functions within railway companies. What, however, is different from the railway industry later on and is important to note, is that engineers were initially the most important managers within a company. This was because the building and operation of a railway line were the first concerns of the directors and this meant engineers had were amongst the company's first employees to be appointed.
Indeed, there is evidence that engineers status' were so high that some were considered better as superintendents of railway companies overall, being given charge of the whole of a company's operations. Indeed in 1845 Martin, who already had the position of Superintendent of the Line on the L&SWR, became General Superintendent taking control of the 'whole concern'. His tenure was short-lived, lasting until 1850 when he left. Further to this, in Bonavia's history of railway organisation from 1971 he states that in G.P. Neele's 1904 book, Railway Reminiscences, listed of the railway industry's top managers in September 1847. Engineers featured in the list were I.K. Brunel (what a surprise) and John Hawkshaw (who?).3 Overall I think that early railway company directors may have perceived that engineers' higher education automatically provided with them with the brain-power to manage a whole railway.
But then again it wasn't engineers who took up most of the high-ranking posts. In the 1830s and 40s, when the majority of businesses were small family firms, directors who had no blueprint of railway organisation would naturally look to employ individuals who had come from the only organisations that routinely administered vast numbers of resources and employees. That said, if you had been press-ganged, can you really be called an employee? Yes, I'm of course talking about the armed forces. Thus, a lot of Traffic and General Managers in the early railway industry had, at some point, worn uniform. Terry Gourvish studied Captain Mark Huish who was general manager of the L&NWR between 1846 and 1858 and who had served in India.4 Bonavia also noted Captain Eborall of the London and Birmingham Railway, Captain Laws and Binstead of Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway and Captian Coddington of the Caledonian Railway.5 Military men were everywhere, filling the administrative ranks of railway companies. This said, there has been no study on how many were actually employed. Their influence is, however, plain to see. Why else would administrators, industry-wide and at all levels of company hierarchies, start to be called 'officers'? Why else would companies adopt draconian, military style rules and regulations? Military men clearly transferred many on the concepts that they learned in the forces to the railways.
Lastly, there were other managers, that Bonavia ignored, that came from 'like' industries such as stagecoaches or canals. I tend to think that they possibly made up a considerable portion of railways' early administrative staff, and they were potentially more numerous than military men. I suppose we know less about them as they were not very glamorous. After all, soldiers have swords, shiny bits and MASSIVE egos (well sometimes). One example of ex-manager from a 'like' industry working on an early British railway springs to mind. Let us go back to the South Western from which I will tell you a tale.
In 1852 Cornelius Stovin, the L&SWR's Traffic Manager, absconded to Canada with quite a bit of cash. I have always felt that the directors of the L&SWR must have been a little dim when appointing him. From a bit of detective work I think I have established Stovin's employment history which reveals that before he joined the L&SWR he had a shady past. On the 1851 census Stovin is listed as having been born in Birmingham. Stovin was appointed to the post of Traffic Manager on the 23rd February 1839 accepting the post on the 28th . Interestingly, his acceptance reached the company only days after a Cornelius Stovin, a stagecoach proprietor, was declared bankrupt in Birmingham. Given the unusual nature of the name and the geographical link, it is not unreasonable to presume this was the same person. Given that he got the job I also think it is not unreasonable to presume the L&SWR directors were a bit dim and should have done their homework. While this is an interesting tale, it shows that individuals who had worked in similar industries, that transported goods and people, did work in the early railway industry. This said, we know even less about them than the military men and it is again an area of research that needs further work.
Who was an early railway manager is something that I am keen to research further in my career. From this brief survey of the available evidence it is clear that directors employed individuals as managers who had worked in a mixed-bag of industries and came from many walks of life. No one knew how to manage a railway in the early days and this policy was the only option open to directors because there were no 'career railwaymen' in the labour market. It would take at least until the 1860 for the railway professional, who would spend their entire career in the railway industry, to really become established. But that is a topic for another post...
1Anderson, Geoffrey, Victorian Clerks, (Manchester, 1976), p.129
2Attwell, Paul, 'The Clerk Deskilled: A Study in False Nostalgia,' Journal of Historical Sociology (1989) Vol.2 No.4 pp.370
3Bonavia, Michael R., The Organisation of British Railways, (Shepperton, 1971) p.13
4Gourvish, T.R., Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway: A Study of Management, (Leicester, 1972)
5Bonavia, Michael R., The Organisation of British Railways, (Shepperton, 1971) p.13
Wednesday, 12 May 2010
Goodbye Lord Adonis...You'll be missed
While I am in no way a Labour supporter, one of my main irritations about the fact they are now out of government is that Lord Adonis, probably the man in the country who least lives up to his name, will have left the Department of Transport (DofT). I think that at the moment it is a shame he will not go down in British political history for his work at the DofT. Every time I hear his name mentioned on the news it is to regale us with tales of how he was one of the members of the Labour party negotiating team that tried establish a Liberal Democrat-Labour coalition, against the wishes of many in his party. This is, unfortunately, not what he should really be remembered for. After all, he was only trying to keep his party in power. What's more, it is likley that he will also be remembered as the man who erroneously grounded everyone under an ash-cloud when the Icelandic volcano blew its top. Again this is not really something he should be remembered for.What Adonis should be remembered for is the many policies that he enacted and drove forward to improve this country's rail network. He took office as Minister for Transport in October 2008 under Geoff Hoon, and succeeded him as Secretary of State in June 2009. Hoon was pro-plane and pro-car in his approach, but largely ineffective. Yet Adonis felt that the 'green' transport policies were the future, and as such railways took centre stage. As such, Christian Wolmar stated in Rail Magazine that 'the new Transport Secretary has effected a complete revolution in the government’s handling of the railways.' (RAIL No. 624, August 11th 2009)
Firstly, and it has already been mentioned, he was the man that got the plans for building a new High Speed Line to the north off the ground. This was after years of political indecision and having the proposal firmly locked away in a filing cabinet. On Adonis' advice, the Government set up the the High Speed Two Ltd company in February in 2009 to look into the viability of the project. Adonis therefore brought the issue to the forefront of politics and this had the effect of forcing the other two major parties into developing their own policies regarding a high speed line. Subsequently, there was universal consensus in the election manifestos that the development of High Speed 2 is now an economic, social and environmental necessity. Therefore there is now a real hope that building work will start in the next parliament (even if the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives do disagree on the finer details). This said, the sad thing is that if it does succeed Adonis won't be at the helm to take any credit for getting this gargantuan project off the ground.
Further, Adonis set out in July 2009 a Government plan to electrify important lines that still are dependent on diesel traction. These included the Great Western main line to South Wales and the Liverpool to Manchester route. This would electrify 300 miles of railway, would give faster journey times, and provide travellers with a more pleasant journey. This last part is particularly relevant to me. Having recently completed two journeys on the Great Western mainlLine I can say that the juddery, jiggery and jumpy service was more than a little irritating at times, especially when trying to consume hot tea. While the plans were given a very negative reception in the mainstream media, the railway media and franchise holders for once had the same opinion, and applauded the vision that Adonis had shown. However, I think the electrification plans are less likely to be undertaken by the incoming government. It was a proposal that came from Adonis and his team, and not from business or the travellers. Therefore with him gone, electrification probably won't see the light of day for a long time. In addition, while relatively cheap compared to HS2 at 1.1 billion pounds, it was only projected to break even after 40 years. With a massive debt the Government are highly likely to side-line it based on this projection.
The last area where the loss of Adonis will be felt is in his support for the travelling public. He demonstrated frequently that for him the traveller came first. Mainly this ethos was expressed through the DofT's increasing influence over the companies running the franchises. Yes, Adonis was accused of micromanagement, but there are a number of cases where this was of very large benefit to the customers. Additionally, there were none that come to mind where it was not. Firstly, he beat South West Trains up (something that I am never unhappy about) regarding their plans to close ticket offices, reversing the decision. Secondly, as National Express East Coast's own money worries were beginning to hit the quality of the service, he told them that their game was up and stripped them of their franchise. As a result we now have the Government running East Coast as a not-for-profit company. I certainly have no complaints and to my mind the service has improved. Lastly, he conducted a rail tour round the country experiencing the delights of the British rail network. The joy at the end of it was that he complained about the fare prices and gave an ear-full to the Train Operating Companies (TOC). This was a man who frequently supported the rail user over the TOC's lust for profit.
There were of course mistakes, and the Intercity Express Programme (IEP) springs to mind. This was a project to replace all of Britain's ageing high speed trains, some of which are nearly 35 years old, at a cost of 7.5 billion. Yet, the plan was correctly put on hold in February this year after £20 million had been spent. The project's value for money was to be reviewed given the financial crisis. Yet, as I have stated before in my blog, it was better to spend 20 million erroneously, than waste 7.5 billion. I suspect, given the fact that Labour dropped the plan in February, that this project will not be revived. This is one case where I won't complain and for various reasons I am happy to see the back of it.
As I write there is no Secretary of State for Transport, the new government hasn't appointed one. Lord Adonis was a man who could see into the future. He envisioned a Britain where people used trains more than cars, where rail transportation was clean and comfortable, and where the rights of the rail user were above those of those of the TOCs. He saw that long-term rail policy is not something that interests a great many people, that the rail user is essentially concerned with those aspects of travel that confront them from day to day, such as fares, open ticket offices and quality of service. He addressed these things, yet at the same time realised that their were bigger issues that needed attention to make the railway industry a success, such as long term strategy, funding and the environment. He realised that the media and the public would not demand these changes, rather that the big initiatives needed to come from his office, from his mind. Therefore this is why I feel that in the last year and a half Britain probably had its best Secretary of State For Transport in a very long time (well, as far as the railways go). It is just a shame that his tenure is now cut short.
What, therefore, are the priorities for the new Secretary of State for Transport regarding Britain's railways? The important things are having vision and the protection of the interests of the traveller. It is not good enough for the new Secretary of State to simply accept the 'way things are.' He or she needs to push to make Britain's railways the best they can with ideas, confidence and having the railway user always in mind. Adonis' momentum needs to be continued, but I suspect it will not as it will be hard to better this exceptional Secretary of State for Transport. Goodbye Lord Adonis.
Sunday, 9 May 2010
Sub-First Class on First Great Western
When booking tickets to see my friends Jack and Katie in Cheltenham another quirk on the National Rail Enquiries ticketing website was that First Class would cost me only £5 extra each way. So, as I was on holiday, I thought I would pay the extra and enjoy those luxuries that my memory reminded me were part of the First Class experience. The only downside was that I would on the way back have to get a rail replacement bus service from Cheltenham to Gloucester because of engineering works. This was thankfully avoided by Jack driving me in a car. So here I sit (currently at Stroud – a beautiful building) in First Class on the return service. I have to be honest that First Great Western's version of First Class is so far below GNER's of four years ago (and which I hope has continued under the current operators of the franchise, East Coast), that I am thinking about writing a letter in aid of the common good. .
Firstly, and this is just happening as I write, the Buffet car is not open because of staff shortages. So, evidently I won't be getting my complimentary cup of tea and/or coffee. Now I don't know whether I have any rights in this regard, but I was under the impression that if you sell a service at higher cost based on a range of perks and then fail to deliver, then this would constitute a breech of the trade's descriptions act. I mean the complementary drinks are there, plain to see, on FGW's website. They hope (although the member of the train crew who made the announcement seemed unsure) that some staff will join them at Swindon to open the buffet and operate a trolley. In all honestly I doubt this'll happen (it didn't by the way). That's no great loss though, the tea service wasn't up to much on the way in
On the GNER service there were cups and saucers on the table, a staff member with tea and coffee pots to pour on demand, and real milk in a small jug on every table. I think I replenished my tea three or four times...I consumed to the maximum and it was bliss.
This is a lot for FGW to live up to. All I can say is “Oh dear.” In no world, in no parallel universe, in no moment of time, is a card cup, lukewarm water and UHT milk 'first class.' This was bad tea. Now I know I may be being picky as the tea was free, but in a way that is not the point. Running a First Class service isn't just about giving away free items that I'd have to pay for as a standard class traveller. First Class travel is about being provided with a service that is better than that I'd get in standard class. I have paid extra money to avoid those slightly rough-and-ready aspects of standard class. But what about the other services that I have supposed to have paid for? How did they manifest themselves on my journey?
Well, on my inward journey I got the impression that one newspaper was divvied out amongst six people and now, on the way out, where is it? Is this a mythical newspaper? As far as I can see, throughout the carriage, there are no newspapers on tables. In fact come to think of it I haven't seen any staff yet. At least on GNER the newspapers were there waiting for you and there was one per customer. Indeed if, as I witnessed at one point, the paper was missing, you could go to the buffet bar and get one. This strikes me again miss-selling a service. Again it is only a small point in the grand scheme of things, but my complaint is that I have paid extra money for a degree of service that I simply haven't been receiving. Is this because FGW staff simply forgot? Is this because FGW are being cheap? I can't tell you, but I am a disgruntled consumer and at this point I don't care.
I suppose I can't slate every aspect of FGW's First Class service. I have a big, comfortable seat that reclines. However my slight complaint with it is that the arm-rests are a bit tacky, simply being made out of very hard plastic. But let me try and be positive, I have a lovely table. I can't really say much about it, except that, and this won't surprise you at this point, the plug socket doesn't work. I have just mentioned this to the ticket inspector. It seems he can't do anything about it and mumbled something about the fuse coming out. It's lucky on this occasion that I have a long-lasting battery on my computer. However, again this a case having been sold an advertised service (on the website is says there is a plug socket on every table) that I am not receiving.
I am now at Swindon, the home of the Great Western Railway. I have to be honest that if the company's managers of 100 years ago could see how their successors run their First Class service, they would be horrified. My conclusion is this; don't buy First Class tickets from First Great Western. I feel that it is a waste of money. Maybe I am being old-fashioned. Maybe my GNER experience set my expectations abnormally high. Now as I only paid £5 extra for the pleasure of sitting in First Class on each journey I can't really complain. I have received some services, mainly on the way out, that were approximately equatable to that value. Yet if I was someone who hadn't been fortunate in getting a good deal when booking, if I had paid an extra £20 or even £30 pounds as a treat perhaps, I would be very disappointed with a service which in my opinion was simply standard class with a few add-ons. Having a First Class service is not just about hand-outs, better seats and a bit more space, it is about a superior travelling experience. If it isn't, then it should just be named 'Standard Class+.' Sorry First Great Western it's simply not good enough and you will be receiving a letter soon...
NOTE: This was posted when I got home
Wednesday, 5 May 2010
The pies that Viscount Pirrie had his fingers in
But this is not a new phenomenon and my work on the directors of the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) has exposed the links between the directors of that company and external organisations. I have pieced together the history of L&SWR directorship in part through the Directory of Directors (DoD), a publication that from 1880 told the casual reader who, exactly sat on what company boards. So if Lord Geoffrey Munkton-Spitalton-Poo sat on the the board of the Walton-on-Thames Dog Food and Cannery Co., as well as the company that supplied the dogs for the food, it'd be in there. I just hope someday, someone, is going to sit down and like a massive spider work out exactly all these directorial webs, it'd be well sticky and catch many flies. For now, however, we're just going to have to put up with my little study of the other interests of the directors of the L&SWR. I want to highlight one part of my study in this blog.
In 1880, when the DoD was first published, the directors of the L&SWR seem quite a boring, uninteresting bunch. Of the 12 individuals, only 3 had other directorships. That meant that 9 of them simply turned up every fortnight to the L&SWR committee and board meetings and spent the rest of the time supping Cognac and beating the local peasantry (oh, and there were quite a few gentry in there also if you didn't get the stereotype). Of the three that had other financial interests, firstly, Serjeant Gaselee, (yes that is his name and I have always wondered if he did a lot of marching) was a director of the London and Provincial Law Assurance Society. We can surmise that because he was in insurance, he was therefore evil. Arthur Govett, whose name I can't make fun of, was a director of the quaintly named Whitby, Redcar and Middlesbrough Railway Co., a company so insignificant it doesn't even warrant its own Wikipedia entry. Lastly, Captain James Gilbert Johnson, who I am sure did do some marching, was a director of the South Indian Railway Company and the Southampton Dock Company (SDC). The latter, as we will see is the crux of our story. However what can be said of the South Western Board members of the 1880s is that there were no tangible links at board level between the L&SWR's business and external companies. Boy, would that change.
You see the Southampton Dock Company in the 1880s, was, as companies go, pretty crap. Originally in 1831 the London and Southampton Railway, that would become the L&SWR, was promoted with the docks as part of it. This was quickly dropped and the Docks Company was set up independently. Unfortunately for the SDC a chronic lack of investment in the second half of the nineteenth century meant that by the 1880s the biggest boat you would be likely to see docked there would be little Tommy Burton's toy replica of the H.M.S Victory. So the L&SWR in 1885 stumped up some cash to help the company get a large, modern, dock built. The provisos were that four L&SWR directors would be on the Dock Company Board and the SDC had to use the L&SWR's engineer for the work. This effectively made the Dock Company into a vassal state of the railway company. The problem was that the L&SWR didn't give the SDC enough cash to finish the job. So when in 1890 the new dock was opened it was missing small things that you might need there, you know, things like cranes. The upshot was that in 1892 the L&SWR directors decided to buy the SDC, they finished the docks, fell in the dock and climbed out again (OK I made the last part up). This was a sensible course of action for the L&SWR. If the SDC had have gone under, and yes I will unashamedly use shipping metaphors, it would have meant that much of the L&SWR's goods traffic, that came through Southampton, would sail to other ports and complete their onward journeys via other railway companies. Therefore the L&SWR had to buy the SDC to save their own skin. After the purchase the L&SWR invested and expanded the docks precipitating a very large increase in the trade moving through the port, and making Southampton one of Britain's major trading centres.
So this is the state of play in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Now, if you are a wandering shipping magnate, wandering around, then you'd say getting a 'piece of that action' of a company with an expanding dock and increasing trade, would be a good thing. One such magnate was the Right Honourable Lord William Pirrie, 1st Viscount Pirrie (shown).
Pirrie had been born on the 31
st May 1847 in Quebec, Canada, however his parents had brought him back to Colnig, County Down, when he was two. He went to school at the Royal Belfast Academical institution and in 1862 became a gentlemen apprentice at the Belfast shipbuilders Harland and Wolff (H&W). He would stay with the company all his life and would make partner in 1874, becoming its chairman on the death of Sir Edward Harland in 1895. Now looking at the myriad of directorships he held in 1907 it would seem that Pirrie was a man with little time on his hands to attend all the board meetings. I'm going to list them because the energy of the man must have been amazing. In alphabetical order they are:- African Steam Ship Co, British and Atlantic Steam Navigation Co, Eastern Telegraph Co, Frederick Leyland and Co, International Merchantile Marine Co. of New Jersey, London City and Midland Bank, Mississippi And Dominion Steam Ship Co, Ocean Transport Co, Oceanic Steam Navigation Co, Scottish Widows' Fund Life Assurance Soc and Wilsons and Furness-Leyland Line Ltd. Oh, and don't forget H&W. In short, he must have been run ragged.
On the death of Arthur Govett, he of quaint railways and director of the L&SWR, Pirrie was elected to replace him on the board. This therefore created a link between the L&SWR, the Docks at Southampton and the Shipping magnate's various concerns. Now I am not sure as to whether the L&SWR approached Pirrie, or the other way round, however the appointment must have been attractive to all involved. The South Western had access to an influential figure in the board rooms of one of Britain's biggest shipbuilders and also of many shipping lines. This therefore had the potential to bring trade to the Docks and the L&SWR, and make it a heck of a lot of money. It also brought Pirrie's experience in shipbuilding to the company, as the L&SWR had its own Steam Packet services operating, and in the years after 1907 it had built a number of new ships. The benefits for Pirrie were that those shipping companies he was involved in may have got preferential rates for docking at Southampton from the L&SWR. Further, when the L&SWR came to build ships, H&W may have received the contracts, making that company substantial sums.
Another point of interest was that Pirrie was involved in the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co, a company that also went by the name of the White Star Line. You may have heard of them as they owned a little vessel called the Titanic, you know, the one that came off worse than the iceberg in 1912. The White Star Line operated a considerable numbers of ships out of the South Western's Southampton Docks, as well as had all its ships built by H&W. In addition the White Star Line completed in 1911 its own docks at Southampton, with rail links to the South Western and attachments to their dock infrastructure. This is from where the Titanic sailed, and then promptly sank. Many of the first class passengers that sailed on the Titanic, were brought to Southampton by the L&SWR, and all of them stayed before they sailed in the very high class, caviare supplying, gold plated, South Western Hotel (owned by the L&SWR), just outside the dock complex. This hotel had long been the home of the high-class passenger waiting to depart from Southampton. These arrangements therefore would have benifitted both the White Star Line and the L&SWR.
Therefore, it is clear that, Pirrie had his fingers in many interlocking pies, a bit like a strudel. It is quite clear that he was the linchpin of a network that existed between transport, shipping and shipbuilding concerns. These links between them were clearly important to the companies involved as he brought bringing his expertise and influence, like a business octopus, to each. At the same time he personally would have befitted as the network increased his own wealth and the wealth of his main company, H&W. He wouldn't have chosen directorships by 'fancy,' and clearly he strategically placed himself so as to benefit himself and his companies to the maximum effect. There is however a large gap of information. At the current time we do not know to what extent his network connections played in shaping the different companies' policies, cooperative arrangements and investments. There is still much work to be done on the interlocking agreements and arrangements between companies. This, then, is what I hope to do in my work, a daunting task to be sure.
Saturday, 1 May 2010
The South West Oyster Fiasco
For those of you who are unaware of the Oyster card, this is an electronic ticketing device that you can use in the TfL area (basically greater London) to make journeys. There are card readers at every station and at the start of the journey you simply touch your card onto the yellow panel and then touch out at the end. If you have opted for the pre-pay option this will take money off your card's account. If you have put a Travel Card onto the Oyster then it just logs your journey and hands the data over to a government department (Ok...that last part I hope isn't true, but I'm as sure as heck the data collected has been used somewhere at some point). Usually single journeys from 'anywhere' to 'somewhere else' with an Oyster are cheaper than buying a paper ticket. I have always felt that for a system of travel it is perfect. Efficient, relatively hustle free and cheap.Although they could have meddled with the names and concepts to make it a bit more interesting. Card readers sounds so droll, so mild, so boring. How about instead of 'card readers' they call them 'quest start portals'? And Oyster? Really? How'd they come up with that one? Even a 'Crustacean Card' would have sounded better. Continuing the 'quest' theme, what about 'Mighty Steed' card. Whims, I venture, but it could have been so much more interesting. Anyway, I digress.
Originally Oyster was only rolled out on the London Underground (and bus) services in July 2003. London Underground is run by TfL and is therefore nationalised. Yet the National Rail services are run by private TOCs and are therefore privatised. It was always hoped, and expected, by TfL and the Mayor, that in time the suburban routes of the National Rail operators, such as South Eastern, Southern, and our beloved SWT, would allow Oyster readers to be placed at their stations so that every traveller in London could enjoy its benefits. Of course when the Mayor at the time, Ken Livingstone, muted this, he had the door slammed in his face by the TOCs more than once. Yet, never a man to give up, Ken kept beating away like a persistent door-to-door salesman; getting to the point where he was sitting on the sofa with the TOCs, in their living room (it was a house share), with a cup of tea.
This process of getting Oyster on National Rail services took a long time for a number of reasons. Firstly there was the obvious one. TfL, I hope, is run in the interest of the public (this is of course unless you are Bob Crow) and therefore is a not-for profit organisation. The TOC's are really not. The implementation of Oyster on National Rail routes would mean that many of the fares between stations which the TOCs controlled themselves would actually be reduced as they would be brought in line with the fares of TfL's zonal system. In the end the agreement meant that while Oyster Rates on National Rail services are usually cheaper than the paper tickets, they are now set by the TOCs. Secondly it would mean a lot of investment in the network by the TOCs. The estimated cost of Oyster equipment at SWT's stations cost them an estimated £40 million. Therefore the negotiations, which went on before January 2009, were complicated and frustrating, but by mid-2008 most companies had agreed a deal with TfL. That is except SWT, dragging their feel like a petulant child who screams as everyone walks away.
Basically, I think, they hated the fact that this would be a heavy investment and cut into their immediate profits. This said, most children of this ilk do eventually have to be picked up and brought back to the family. SWT was no exception, and under heavy pressure from TfL and realising they were being left out, they agreed to adopt Oyster. Yet, for making the move they were given one very important concession. (this is the ice cream to calm the kid down).
As many of you will have found out no SWT ticket office will top up or put travel cars on your Oyster, or sell you the thing in the first place. This forces the traveller to go to the local 'travel shops' for all their Oyster needs. SWTs fatuous arguments were that the equipment was too expensive and also that selling Oyster services wasn't part of their franchise agreement. Hang on a minute, it wasn't part of anyone's franchise agreement.
I'm befuzzled, I cannot see why a company that consistently acts as though they only care about profit refuses to sell Oyster products at its ticket offices? While there would be an initial sunk cost, this would be soon made up in the cut they'd get from selling Oyster products. It's not like there isn't a precedent. The owners of the myriad of newsagents certainly, at some point, saw that they could make a bit of extra cash from operating Oyster machines. In addition all the London-connecting TOCs saw the benefit of having Oyster-selling equipment at ticket offices. So why can't SWT? I suspect it is again because it would cut immediately into their profit margin. This, for company who has got a ten year franchise agreement (2007-2017), is incredibly short sighted and is probably loosing them a lot more profit than they realise.
The short-sighted nature of SWT was brought home to me on Thursday. My usual route between Hampton Court and Waterloo is as follows. Firstly I go from Hampton Court to Surbiton, where I change onto the direct train to Waterloo. This train comes from Alton and is one of SWT's long-distance services. On Thursday, after enjoying a mere 7 minutes of stationary delight at Subiton station, I got on my usual fast train. Sitting reading my book I suddenly became aware of the Ticket Inspector, passing through the carriage. He got to me and I dutifully pulled out my Oyster. “Oyster eh”, came the response, “Not to worry,” and moved on without checking a thing. This is not the first time my Oyster hasn't been checked by a SWT ticket inspector, and I am sure it won't be the last. In addition I have a number of friends who have experienced the same thing.
The truth is that SWT staff simply don't have the device issued to most TfL staff to check whether Oysters are valid. Therefore if I am on a train without having 'touched in' at the start of my journey I would technically be travelling without a ticket and would be required to pay a fine of £20. Further there are ticket inspectors on services between stations with no ticket barriers (Whitton to Mortlake, Teddington to Strawberry Hill). Overall it begs the question as to why SWT staff don't have the Oyster checkers? Is the company slow? Have they forgotten something in the run-up to Oyster's introduction? It isn't like they haven't had the time to buy these devices for their ticket inspectors, and they are ten-a-penny elsewhere in London. I can't answer this question, but ultimately SWT haven't bought them and therefore again are loosing revenue. Again, this is possibly because they don't want spend the any more than they have to now, even if long-term this may loose them money.
Overall the point that I have been making throughout this post is that I feel that SWT, as a business, are not long-term thinkers. They care more about immediate profit and their dividends, rather than long-term gain in both reputation and financial terms. With this attitude we can only hope that this company, which I personally perceive as only acting in the interest of Stagecoach's shareholders, looses the franchise in 2017.