Teacher, Tram Manager and Entrepreneur: The Remarkable Life of Euphemia Penman

Euphemia Penman was a remarkable woman who rose to become one of the most respected managers in the emergent tram systems of late-Victorian London. In the period, given the social conventions of the time, this was without a doubt a significant achievment.

For those of you that have followed TurnipRail for some time I can happily report that my thesis on the management of the London and South Western Railway is nearly at an end. What I have not divulged before is that after it is dispensed with I am hoping to start exciting new work on the management history of trams and trolleybuses. It was while doing some preliminary work for this new project that I came across ‘Miss Penman.’

But first, I feel a bit of background is required. In the 1870s numerous tram systems had been established in London under the Tramways Act 1870. One part of this legislation specified that local authorities were able to acquire these companies, much to their annoyance, after they had been operating for twenty-one years. In 1898 the London County Council (LCC), who always seemed to work in the interest of those it served, decided to take advantage of this clause and started the processes of acquiring the London Tramways Company (LTC).  

It was on a list of senior LTC officials the LCC was going to re-engage after the take-over that I first found Euphemia. Within the new organisational structure she was to take up the important position of ‘Superintendent of conductors and of checking staff at chief and cash offices,’ and her proposed salary was an impressive £350 per annum with ‘house, coal and light.’^[1] (this later increased to £400).^[2] Given this level of seniority and pay was very unusual for a woman in late-Victorian businesses, I resolved to find out more about Penman’s life and career.

She was born to David and Rachel Penman in Breath, Scotland, in 1852 and in that year she had three older brothers, James, William and Harry. Beyond this very little has been found about her early life. By 1870 she was teaching a ‘Sabbath evening class’ in Dysart (near Kirkcaldy) and in March that year, because of the high esteem in which she was held by her students, they presented her with pew bible in which was inscribed the following: ‘Presented to Miss Euphemia Penman as a token of respect, by her Sunday Scholars. – Dysart March 28 1870.’ She would never be aware of it, but this was not the last ‘token of respect’ Euphemia would receive in Dysart.

Euphemia’s first position in the tramway industry was as a simple checker of tickets on the Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Company (GTOC). ^[3] She seemingly rose through the ranks quickly and by 1879 she was forewoman of the female staff employed at the company’s central offices. Clearly she made an impression on the GTOC’s senior management. When Mr Smart, its most senior official, gained the same post within the LTC in 1879 ^[4] she followed him south, becoming head of its women checkers’ department.

At the same time many other GTOC staff followed Smart to the LTC.^[5]  This is very interesting, as the movement of so many officials from an established tram system (the GTOC being formed in 1871) to a newer one evidences that within the early tram industry there was a dearth of knowledge on how to administer and operate these new transportation systems. The LTS was therefore astute in recruiting officials that at that point would have been considered experts in tram management.

Between 1879 and 1898 Euphemia’s status rose within the company and indicative of this by 1890 she was living in a house provided by the LTC at its headquarters on the Camberwell New Road.^[6] The organisation grew, and in 1894^[7]  she was given the huge responsibility of overseeing the company’s 560 conductors.^[8] Her duties were to receive reports daily as to their work, engage and, if necessary, dismiss any, and she also oversaw the distribution of tickets.^[9]

In the 1890s for a woman to possess such authority within business was exceptional. The Sunderland Daily Echo stated she was the ‘only woman in England who occupies the very unique position of superintendent of tramway conductors.’ Like in her days as a Sunday school teacher she was respected by those beneath her, the paper reporting ‘that she has won the respect and confidence of the men is shown by the fact that there is not one who has a word to say against her encroachment into what one would ordinarily regard as the special preserve of man.’ The men apparently spoke highly of her fairness, her strict regard for discipline and business abilities.^[10]

Indeed, it was Euphemia’s business abilities that make the last part of her story even more fascinating than it already is. She was not only a woman with decision-making responsibility within a major company, but she was also a businessperson outside it. In late-May 1899 she and her partner Robert Lindsay, who was changing professions, dissolved their business as cab proprietors operating out of Oak Tree-place St. John’s Road, London.^[11] Little is known about this concern, although it was not small. As a result of it shutting down in early-May Lindsay was advertising the sale of twenty-five horses, twelve ‘hansom cabs’, twelve cab harnesses, a chaff machine, a platform weighing machine and ‘usual sundries.’^[12]

The extent of Euphemia’s involvement in this firm has not been determined; yet, given the cabs traded under R. Lindsay’s name, and taking into account her responsibilities within the LTS, it is more likely she was a silent partner. Irrespective of this, this activity demonstrates that she actively sought commercial opportunities for herself beyond her employment.

In March 1899, only months after transferring to the LCC’s employ, Euphemia fell ill; another likely reason by the cab business was dissolved. No reports detail what she was suffering from, however, she underwent an operation that unfortunately did not rectify the problem and on Tuesday 9 July she died suddenly while recovering in Margate. ^[13] She was buried two days later in Glasgow.^[14] Reflecting her successful life, her will left the considerable sum of £624 14s 2d to three individuals; Thomas Gibson, a watchmaker, Joshua Kidd Bruce, a veterinary surgeon, and Thomas Davies.^[15]

Euphemia was greatly mourned after her death and, as a testament to the high regard in which she was held, the LTC’ directors and employees raised funds for a memorial to commemorate her life. Designed by D Carnegie and Son of Dundee, in January 1900 a granite monument was erected in Dysart; the same place where her Sunday school students had presented her with a bible thirty years before.^[16]

I have only briefly touched on the life of Euphemia Penman in this short biography, yet there is clearly much more to be discovered about her. What has however been demonstrated is that she was a remarkable individual within the late-Victorian period; not simply because she defied social conventions that said that only men were to rise high in business, but because of the clear talent she brought to her work, the entrepreneurial spirit she had and the high esteem in which she was held by those employed under her.

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[1] London Metropolitan Archives [LMA], LCC Min 6719, Highways Committee Minute Book, 10 November 1898, p.70

[2] LMA, LCC Min 6720, Highways Committee Minute Book, 23 March 1899, p.346

[3] Hull Daily Mail, Thursday, 18 August 1898

[4] Evening Telegraph, Thursday, 13 July 1899

[5] Hull Daily Mail, Thursday, 18 August 1898

[6] Retrieved from Ancestry – Electoral register, Camberwell, 1890, p.188

[7] Evening Telegraph, Thursday, 13 July 1899

[8] Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, Saturday 26 November 1898, p.5

[9] Evening Telegraph, Thursday, 13 July 1899

[10] Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, Saturday 26 November 1898, p.5

[11] The London Gazette, 16 June 1899

[12] The Standard, Monday, 1 May 1899, p. 12

[13] Whitstable Times and Herne Bay Herald, Saturday 22 July 1899

[14] North Wales Chronicle, Saturday, 15 July 15 1899

[15] Recovered from Ancestry.

[16] The Courier and Argus, Tuesday, 16 January 16, 1900, p. 6

One Railway's Fight Against Trams...With No Money

A few months I wrote about how the railways’ profitability in the late 19^th century came under threat from trams (HERE). One of those most affected in the years after 1901 was the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), for whom suburban traffic made up a considerable part of their income. In that year London United Tramways (LUT) began services between Hammersmith and Kew Bridge, Shepherds Bush and Kew Bridge, (via Chiswick) Shepherd’s Bush and Acton, and to Brentford and Hounslow. Twickenham was connected in 1902, with Hampton Court reached the year after. By 1906 Kingston, Surbiton, New Malden and Wimbledon also had trams.[1] Being clean, modern and able to pick up and drop off individuals from much more convenient locations than trains, trams were an instant success and in 1902 took 64% of the L&SWR’s receipts from passengers to Hounslow. [2]

Previously, I wrote about how ultimately the threat to the company’s profitability was countered through the adoption of electric traction (HERE). Yet, before this decision was made the L&SWR attempted a number of other solutions to counter the threat. This was because a large project such as electrification of the company’s suburban lines would consume large amounts of capital. However, at the time the L&SWR was already undertaking large capital projects such as the widening of its main lines, the rebuilding of Waterloo Station and the relocation of its locomotive works to Eastleigh, and thus an extra project would increase an already heavy burden on the company's capital supplies. Thus, it had to find other ways to attract traffic back to the railway. Yet, the solutions that its General Manager, Charles Owens, came up with were piecemeal, simply adapting existing operational structures and practices to the new trading environment. Thus they did not have the desired of effect of drawing passengers back to the railway.

The first move that Owens made was to improve the carriage stock on the suburban routes through the introduction of ‘bogie’ carriages in ‘block sets.’ By 1900 six-wheeled carriages were being used on most suburban routes in sets, however, some of these dated back to 1879. Thus, modernisation was required. In 1900 and 1901 the Locomotive Committee agreed to replace some old sets with new designs. However, these still had six-fixed wheels and were not really an advance in design. [3] But with the new threat developing the mind-set of the committee changed, and at the May 1902 it authorised the construction of thirty-two higher-quality bogie carriages[4] that were eventually were formed into eight four-car block trains. Consequently, between 1902 and September 1912 145 of these sets were built.[5] Evidently, the switch to bogie vehicles was an attempt to upgrade the quality of the company’s suburban carriage stock and attract passengers back to the railway. However, while the new carriages made massive improvement in the suburban rolling stock, it did not halt the haemorrhaging of passengers as the upgrades simply brought the rolling stock’s quality up to a level that was already expected by the travelling public.

The second move that the company made was to introduce steam railmotors. These were a locomotive and a carriage combined into one unit and the L&SWR produced seventeen between April 1903 and June 1906. The first two were built for the company’s joint Fratton and Southsea branch with the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, and were introduced in direct response to a threat there from trams. While most texts attribute the initiative to the Locomotive Superintendent, Dugald Drummond, the Railway Magazine stated that Owens was responsible. Indeed, once deemed a success on the Fratton and Southsea branch more railmotors were built. While the L&SWR used them extensively used on small branches throughout the country, a number were placed on services between Twickenham and Gunnersbury, right in the company’s competed territory. However, with limited capacity, the regularly with which regular maintenance was required[6] and their uneconomical nature, the railmotors were not a success and were withdrawn in 1916 and 1919. [7]

Thirdly, Owens tried, in vein, to negotiate with the LUT. In 1904 the LUT had a bill in Parliament that would extend its services to Staines. Naturally, the L&SWR lodged an objection to this. In the wake of this Owens managed to negotiate a deal with the LUT. For three years the L&SWR would agree to drop its opposition to the Staines extension if the tram company agreed to not promote further routes in the L&SWR’s territory. Additionally, the Staines project was only allowed with the L&SWR’s consent. [8] However, this negotiation was too late, and the LUT’s bills of 1902 had already pushed its network deep into the L&SWR’s.

Lastly, the L&SWR attempted to win back traffic by a very old method, the manipulation of fares. In the June 1911 edition of Railway Magazine Owens suggested that the way to claw back inner-suburban traffic was to reduce the cost of season tickets and that this process was already under way.[9] How successful this was, and whether there was any further manipulation of ticket prices, is unknown.

Therefore, hamstrung by a lack of capital resources, Owens’ attempts to mitigate the effect of trams on the company’s passenger business were all unsuccessful. By February 1913 the company was still losing £100,000 and 1 million passengers per year.[10] His answers to the threat all had their genesis in practices and procedures that could be found in the railways before 1900. The response that worked, and which had been on the cards for some time, was electrification which begun in 1913. However, this was only possible after the L&SWR had finished its major capital projects, such as the building of the Eastleigh works, and slowed the progress of others including the rebuilding of Waterloo.

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[1] Chivers, Colin, The Riverside Electric: LSWR Electrification 1912-1922 – South Western Circle Monograph No. 5, (Unknown, 2010), p.2-8

[2] Faulkner, J.N and Williams, R.A., The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, (Newton Abbot, 1988), p.101

[3] Weddell, G.R., L.S.W.R. Carriages: Volume One 1838-1900, (Didcot, 1992), p.209-244 and Weddell, G.R., L.S.W.R. Carriages in the 20^th Century, (Oxford, 2001), p.130

[4] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/192, Locomotive Committee Minute Book, Minute 931, 14^th May 1902

[5] Weddell, G.R., L.S.W.R. Carriages in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 2001), p.16

[6] Casserley, H.C., London & South Western Locomotives, (Shepperton, 1971), p.137-138

[7] Weddell, L.S.W.R. Carriages in the Twentieth Century, p.89

[8] Chivers, The Riverside Electric, p.8-9

[9] Railway Magazine, June 1911, p.456

[10] Faulkner and Williams, The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, p.101

When Two Transports Go To War - The Electric Fight-Back in the 1900s

In my last blog post (here) I talked about how the trams, which were spreading through the suburbs of Britain’s cities, began to challenge the railway’s dominance of suburban passenger traffic. The trams offered a more convenient, clean and cheaply priced door-to-door service than the railways’ somewhat inconvenient, overcrowded and dirty ones. In this blog post I will look at how Britain’s railway’s fought back against this threat.

This week, it will not have escaped anyone’s notice that South West Trains was having a very bad time due to failures in their electrified services. Signalling failures, cable theft and bad customer care created a perfect storm where the company looked very bad, even though the problems were not their fault. The electrified network that SWT currently operate was established by their predecessors, the London and South Western and Southern Railway (L&SWR) in direct response to the tram threat. However, if the L&SWR had pursued a different strategic course, and had adopted more widespread use of the steam railcar, then the problems encountered this week may never have materialised.

Steam railcars were effectively carriages powered by a small steam engine in their front (shown). In the L&SWR’s case the General Manager, Charles Owens, felt that the railcars could be used where the level of traffic did not require the use of a locomotive and carriage. Indeed, the L&SWR were using them on 18 routes by 1912 (although 3 had been discontinued by that point).[1] However, while not strictly a response to the tram threat, as many were used on small branch lines, some did migrate towards the suburban districts, and one service was run between Twickenham and Gunnersbury.

Yet, the L&SWR wasn’t the only company to build steam railcars. Indeed, after borrowing one of the L&SWR’s railcars for trials, and being suitably impressed, the Great Western Railway eventually ordered 99 to operate services on local lines.[2] Furthermore, other companies also built them and 173 are known to have been constructed before 1923.[3] Yet, the steam railcars could never effectively defend against the tram threat as they could only could carry limited numbers of passengers. Indeed, while some did have extra carriages attached to increase their capacities, one was always the maximum. Thus, while they looked like a more ‘modern’ way to travel, in reality they were a re-hash of old ideas.

Thus, some railway companies started to turn to electric traction to match the speed, comfort and cleanliness of the trams, and to make rail travel attractive again. Because of the large electrified network that existed on the southern suburban lines in the 1920s and 1930s, many authors have ignored the fact that initially electrification was a national movement. By 1890 there were a number of electric trains operating on piers, however, in the 1890s a number of standard-gauge suburban lines were opened including the City & South London Railway (1890), the Waterloo & City Railway (1898), the Central London Railways (1900) and the Liverpool Overhead Railway (1893). However, these were all new railways, built when the main line railway companies were still benefiting from rising passenger traffic figures and were not responses to any particular threat

Yet, with people deserting the trains to travel by tram, the railways started investigating electric traction. The Mersey Railway was electrified in 1903, the Lancashire and Yorkshire electrified its Liverpool to Southport route in 1904 and the North Tyneside Systems of the North Eastern Railway were also upgraded in 1904. Furthermore, in 1903 the Metropolitan District Railway started to electrify its lines, followed by the Metropolitan Railway in 1905. But these electrifications, that used a range of different electric systems, were unsuited for the long-distance services that many of the main line companies operated because of their low voltages.[4]

Now, at this point most authors would direct your attention to the fact that the different mainline companies adopted different electrical systems, and indeed they did. The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway started electrifying its suburban network in 1909 using 6,700v ac current supplied from overhead cables. The North Eastern Railway started using 1500v dc current overhead systems on Teesside in 1913. The London and North Western Railway used the London underground’s 4-rail 630v dc system between Watford and Euston, and between Broad Street and Richmond from 1909. The Midland Railway tested 6600v dc systems between Lancashire and Heysham in 1908. Lastly, the L&SWR started to electrify its suburban network in 1912 using third rail 660v ac systems. Thus, by 1923 363 miles of standard gauge line in Britain was electrified using many different systems.[5]

But in a way the minutiae is not important. The important question is why the multiple systems were adopted. By the 1900 most technical aspects of the British railway industry had been standardised through the railway Clearing House (RCH). So, train couplings were the same, accident prevention devices had been formalised, signalling was (mostly) uniform and the height of buffers were all identical. Yet, the railways did not come together to agree a uniform system of electrification. Indeed, this was despite companies having territories, for example those of the southern companies, where their issues regarding declining passenger numbers were almost identical. Indeed, years later the Southern railway, which took over the southern companies, converted all the London, Brighton and South Coast’s overhead electrified systems to the London and South Western’s third rail one.

The reason for this was that the companies, while unified in many respects through the RCH, acted independently in the face of the tram challenge. Because the vast majority of Britain’s railway managers and directors had been working with steam traction throughout their careers, a consensus on what was the best electric system to adopt did not develop within the industry. Therefore, because of their limited experiences and knowledge of electric traction, the result was the haphazard implementation of a hotch-potch of electric systems.

However, the most important question is whether the growth in suburban electric services worked in countering the tram threat before 1923? Nationally the impact cannot be discerned as the majority of passenger trains remained steam hauled. Furthermore, the First World War distorted the figures for the number of passengers conveyed as the railways had unnaturally high usage. Yet, specific figures have been detailed by Colin Chivers for the number of passengers using the L&SWR’ suburban network. Before electrification in 1915 the number of suburban passengers had fallen to 23.3 million. However, by 1920 this had risen to 52.6 million. As Chivers argues ‘an increase of 126% in those five years has to be judged a successful outcome.’[6]

Whether this was repeated elsewhere is unknown, and nationally the number of passengers the railways carried did fall off in the post war period.[7] However, there is clear evidence here that the electrification of commuter lines did improve passenger numbers in those districts. Indeed, after grouping in 1923 the newly formed Southern Railway, who progressively electrified more routes, had consistent passenger traffic growth until 1937. While the northern railway companies continued to be challenged by trams, buses and cars between 1923 and 1937, the number of passengers conveyed by the Southern Railways rose from 236 million to 379 million, a growth of 60.59%.[8] Subsequently, where electrification was applied, the railways remained the dominant form of passenger conveyance until after Work War Two.

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[1] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/415, Personal collection of details of a varying nature covering costs, and information of a general character, p.89

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GWR_steam_rail_motors

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railmotor

[4] Boyes, Grahame, ‘Electrification,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997) p.143

[5] Boyes, ‘Electrification,’ p.143

[6] Chivers, 4 The Riverside Electric, p.164

[7] Munby, D.L. and Watson, A.H.(eds.), Inland Transport Statistics, Great Britain, 1900-1970, (Oxford, 1978) p.100

[8] Moody, G.T., Southern Electric: A history of the world’s greatest suburban electric system, (Shepperton, 1957) p.83-84

When Two Transports Go To War... Trams vs Trains in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

In the late 19th century the number of passengers that Britain's railways carried increased so rapidly that the companies’ infrastructure became desperately stretched. Indeed, I have described previously the London and South Western Railway’s troubles in adapting to this traffic growth; and how the company’s general manager was forced to resign because of complaints in The Times regarding the quality of the company’s service. (Found HERE) In 1870 British railways carried 336,545,397 passengers. By 1880 this had risen to 603,885,025, an increase of 79.44%. In 1890 817,744,046 passengers travelled, a 35.41% increase. Lastly, in 1900 British railways conveyed 1,142,276,686 individuals, equating to further growth of 36.69%.[1]

With such growth, and with the promise of consistently increasing passenger revenue, it is no wonder that in the late 19th century railway directors and managers were happy to make continual investment in improving their infrastructure, rather than hold back and cause overcrowding, poor services and slow train speeds. Thus, the railways invested heavily in improving stations, yards and sidings to improve their services and to accommodate future traffic increases. Furthermore, the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway’s extension to London, started in 1895 and opened in 1899, could not have been initiated without the company’s managers judging that traffic would continue to increase, unabated. Indeed, despite criticism at the time that the extension was unnecessary, they perceived that it would be highly profitable in the future.[2]

Then, in 1900, the unimaginable happened and passenger (along with goods) traffic stopped growing rapidly on Britain’s railways. Between 1870 and 1900 the number of passengers conveyed grew by an average of 7.98% per year. Yet, in 1910 1,248,792,604 passengers were conveyed, a growth of only 9.32% over the decade. Indeed, the average yearly traffic growth between 1900 and 1910 stood at only 0.93%.

This change in the speed of traffic growth was because the street trams started to attack the railways’ short-distance third class passenger traffic. The increased numbers of railway passengers between 1870 and 1900 had principally travelled by third class accommodation. In 1870 they constituted only 67.88% of the total passengers conveyed in the country. Yet, by 1900 90.67% of all railway passengers travelled third class. Subsequently, many of the improvements to the infrastructure of the British railway network after the mid-1880s, and all the expectation of increased revenue and potential profits from future projects, had been built on this low-paying, short-distance, class of passenger.

Electric trams had been introduced into Britain in 1883 when Magnus Volk had constructed the Brighton Tramway, which still exists today. By 1885 the first street tramways were installed in Blackpool. Yet, it should also be remembered that there was not just an increase in electric trams in the period, and horse-drawn trams also played a significant role in urban transport. Thus, after 1885 the trams spread like wildfire. While I have not found statistics for tram mileage growth before 1900, between then and 1910 it grew from 1,041 to 2,434 miles, a 133.81% increase.[3] Thus, by 1896 street tramways in Britain carried 759,466,000 passengers. Yet, by 1910 this had risen to 2,907,177,000, an overall growth of 282.79% or an average 20.20% per year. Indeed, it was in 1900, the year in which passenger growth on the railways slowed, that more individuals travelled by tram than bought third class railway tickets.[4]

Short distance travellers had always existed between 1870 and 1900, and, as Cain pointed out, the majority of commuters did not use public transport. For example, by 1900 in South London only 1 in 10 individuals used public transport to get to work.[5] Yet, as the tram network spread, and access to them was widened in urban areas, their speed, comfort and reasonable ticket prices provided people with a service that the railways could not match easily for very good reasons.

With fixed routes, aged technologies and heavy costs to modify the infrastructure, the railways were in a very difficult position. The heavy investments in infrastructure of the 1890s, which made sense at the time as the railways had little competition in the transport market, looked far more foolhardy after it. None of them were made to deal with the new challenge to their business and most were to address capacity problems or make further profits. Indeed, many investments in improving stations and yards for future use were found to be unnecessary after 1900 as traffic growth slowed. Furthermore, after 1895 railway profitability, through rising costs, government legislation and poor management practices (See my PhD, when finished), had declined significantly, and after 1900 the companies found it hard to raise enough capital to respond to the tram challenge through defensive investment.

Yet, faced with calls from passengers after 1895 for faster, more frequent and more comfortable services, the railways developed responses to the challenge of the trams. These will be covered in part 2.

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[1] Board of Trade Returns.
[2] Harris, Michael, ‘The Great Central Railway,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.188-189
[3] Munby, D.L. and Watson, A.H.(eds.), Inland Transport Statistics, Great Britain, 1900-1970, (Oxford, 1978) p.338
[4] Board of Trade Returns.
[5]Cain, P.J., ‘Railways 1870-1914: The maturity of the private system,’ in Freeman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. (eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), p.101