What Do You Want Your Railway to Do? - The L&SWR and the Need for a Corporate Vision

Some observers of the Britain’s railway system argue that current problem with the industry is that no one asks what Britain’s railways are for. Indeed, this lack of purpose harms the ability of the industry’s component players to work together, plan long-term or deliver a railway that is truly serving the people of this country. However, this is not simply a modern problem, and railway managers in the past also failed to define what their businesses were trying to do. Indeed, the case of the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) shows how the application of a corporate vision can take a business from failure to success.

Scott

The first General Manager of the L&SWR was Archibald Scott. Scott had been the company’s Traffic Manager since 1852 and was made General Manager in 1870. For fourteen years he held this position within the company, retiring at the end of 1884.

Under Scott his very fixed ideas about how railways should be managed shaped company policy. He believed that because the railways’ had a monopoly on inland transportation, traffic and revenue would increase unabated. Consequently, to keep costs down and profits high improvements to train services, infrastructure and rolling stock were only sought from the Traffic Committee and Board when really necessary. Indeed, he believed that with no competition on many routes, it did not matter if the customers were unhappy as they would to use the railway anyway.  Thus, train services, stations and carriages were left in such a poor state during Scott’s administration that Punch nick-named the company’s management the ‘Wags of Waterloo.’

However, after 1870 these policies caused the company’s profit margin to be the smallest of the all Britain’s fourteen largest railways. This was because every potential improvement was looked at on a case-by-case basis with the minimisation of cost being the only factor in the decision. Thus, there was no joined-up thinking about overall company strategy and problems were simply solved in the short-term. Furthermore, no thought was given to growing the business beyond the traffics the company already served. Ultimately, this meant that while in the short-term costs were kept down, in the long term the company did not have an established trajectory, forcing up overall costs.

Scotter

Charles Scotter became the company’s General Manager in 1885 and rapidly set about turning the company’s fortunes around by bringing a vision and direction to the company’s policies. On his retirement in 1897 the Railway Magazine (RM) wrote that he was keen that ‘the line should live down any unfavourable reputation which it might have earned, and he found that the policy of giving the best possible facilities to the travelling public was the one at which at the same time, yielded to proprietors the highest dividend.’

The majority of Scotter’s reforms related to reversing the policies of Scott in the Traffic Department through improving the company’s services. Scotter did not, however, simply expand services uniformly and judged carefully where it would be advantageous to improve provision. To do this he engaged with the public and business people within the company’s territory, listening to their requests, even if they could not always be satisfied. Thus, the company’s train services, rolling stock and infrastructure improved in line with the public’s needs and beyond. No longer did the railway dictate to the customers what services they received, rather, the customers now had input on them. Thus, RM stated that Scotter had ‘led the proprietors step-by-step into fresh fields of traffic.’

Overall, Scotter’s tenure at the L&SWR was a success. RM stated, ‘there is no instance on record in this country where such striking results have been produced by a railway manager as those which have, within the short period of twelve years, attended the policy pursued by Sir Charles Scotter.’ Indeed, the company’s profit margin aligned with the average of the top fifteen companies and its share price rose from 118d per hundred shares in 1885 to 224d per hundred in 1897.[1]

Conclusion

Therefore, this case study shows why it is important for businesses to have corporate goals. Scott’s simplistic ad hoc approach to management, of simply minimising cost, delivered poor company profitability and an even poorer public image. However, Scotter’s arrival and the application of a corporate vision brought the L&SWR good profitability and wide praise. Indeed, this suggests that those in charge of Britain’s railways in the 21^st century really do need to ask the question of what the railway is for, so that they can ascertain where they want their industry to be in twenty or thirty years’ time. Such a step would allow everyone employed in the industry to be working towards the same goals, improve industry efficiency and deliver the British travelling public better value for money.

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[1] Railway Magazine, November 1897, p.385

What is important in Train Renewals? A Historical Consideration.

I was recently involved with a discussion online regarding the current average ages of trains on Britain’s railways. One individual’s argument was that it was a bad thing that on average British trains are older than they were in yesteryear. Indeed, his main complaint was levelled at South West Trains, whose class 455s on the inner suburban routes (Hampton Court, Kingston Loop, Hounslow Loop) are nearly thirty years old. While they are actually between twenty-six and twenty-nine years old, I pointed out that historically electric multiple units frequently have operational lives of between thirty and forty-five years. But further to this, currently, the ages of British passenger rolling stock is at its lowest for some time.

However, I believe that age should not be the primary issue when policy makers consider renewing rolling stock. The main factors should be how much work trains are undertaking each year, their ability to be upgraded when the business and trading environments change, and their capacities. Indeed, while the 455s are getting on now, unlike their compartmented predecessors the ‘open’ seating arrangement they were originally built with makes them far more suitable for upgrading. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason to dispose of them when they are mechanically sound, especially given that last November SWT won the ‘Golden Spanner’ award for their reliability.[1]

Naturally, the link between rolling stock ages and renewals is one that has been approached by railway managers since the industry’s beginnings. As an illustration of this I will look at William George Beattie’s tenure as the London and South Western Railway’s (L&SWR) Locomotive Superintendent between 1871 and 1877. Beattie was employed by the company in 1862 as a draughtsman and was later placed in charge of the company’s hydraulic equipment.[2] Therefore, it seems unusual that a man with no locomotive design experience should be placed in charge of the company’s locomotive department. However, there was one factor in his favour. His father, Joseph, was the L&SWR’s locomotive superintendent between 1850 and 1871. He had great talent and I presume the directors felt that his son would have inherited some of his skill.

The directors were mistaken. Poor William should never have been appointed and was the most inept locomotive superintendent the company ever had. While he ran the company’s locomotive department shambolically, the most serious problem was that he was not attuned to the company’s locomotive traction needs in a time when passenger numbers were increasing massively.[3] Indeed, between 1871 and 1877 the number of passengers the L&SWR conveyed rose by 68.3% from 14,347,577 to 24,142,851.[4]

It could be said that part of Beattie’s failing was that the rate of locomotive renewals slowed. The number of locomotives the company had in its possession only increased between 1871 and 1877 from 272 to 377 (38.6%). Furthermore, the average age of locomotives went from 8.54 to 9.90 years over the same period. Lastly, when Beattie was superintendent only 1.09 locomotives were renewed per year. Yet, between 1878 and 1882 under his successor, Adams, the rate was 1.76. Nevertheless, despite these facts, the slowing of the renewal rate wasn’t actually a serious problem for the company, as on average the number of train miles each locomotive ran per year dropped between 1871 and 1877 from 24,154 to 22,834 miles.[5]

The real problem was the quality and suitability of the new locomotives Beattie introduced. He perpetuated his father’s antiquated and small locomotive designs, which, while suitable in the 1860s, became unsuitable in the 1870s with the increased traffic numbers. Thus, trains were slower as the number of carriages in each increased.[6] The noted railway commentator, William Acworth, commented that ‘engines which had been in the van of progress were mere pigmies by the side of the giants of the present time.’[7]

But his failings didn’t stop there. When in 1876 he could no longer rely on his father’s designs, and because the company needed heavier models, he was forced to design a heavier new locomotive type. However, ordered twenty locomotives without a prototype and these were subsequently recognised as monumental failures suffering problems in both design and construction. Indeed, Bradley argued that Beattie had inadequate knowledge of locomotive design to meet the L&SWR’s needs.[8]

Therefore, this historical case reinforces the fact that when considering issues surrounding locomotive renewals, the age of rolling stock should not be the primary concern. Rather, rolling stock’s suitability for the trading environment and whether they meet the needs of the operators is far more important.

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[1] http://www.southwesttrains.co.uk/fleetreliability.aspx

[2] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/492, Clerical staff character book No. 2, 1838-1919, p.62

[3] Bradley, D.L., L&SWR Locomotives: The Early Engines 1838-53 and Beattie Classes, (Didcot, 1989), p.5-6

[4] Board of Trade Returns, 1871 and 1877

[5] TNA, RAIL 411/470, Locomotives, boilers, rolling stock, etc: correspondence, 1882-1884, Statement of Engine Stock, renewals of same and train Mileage during the past 14 years., Undated, p.59

[6] Bradley, L&SWR Locomotives: The Early Engines, p.5-6

[7] Acworth, William, ‘The South-Western Railway,’ Murray's Magazine, Vol.3 No.18 (1888, June) p.802

[8] Bradley, L&SWR Locomotives: The Early Engines, p.5-6

Discredited by Victorian Railway Managers: Separating Trains from Tracks

In Britain’s privatised railway system one thing has caused a particular headache for policy makers, namely, that the maintenance of the infrastructure is under separate control from the operation of the trains. Indeed, most now believe that unified control of these elements would have been far more desirable, as such an arrangement would have been improved the communication, management and expenditure within the  railway industry. 

But the current arrangement isn't just a feature of modern railways, and a visit to the 1830s, 40s and 50s would reveal that some railway companies used private contractors to maintain their lines. In 1837 William Allcard's firm was awarded the maintenance contract for the Grand Junction Railway when it had completed it. Furthermore, his firm also maintained the permanent way of the Sheffield and Manchester Railway.[1] On the formation of the London Brighton and South Coast Railway in 1846 the company advertised in Herpath’s Journal for ‘tenders for the maintenance of the Permanent Way and Works of the whole of their main line between Brighton and the Junction with the Greenwhich Line near London.’[2] Also, the directors of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway advertised in February 1851 for the same.[3] Lastly, in 1840 Thomas Brassey's firm, after constructing the London and South Western Railway’s (L&SWR) main line, was given a ten year contract for the maintenance its way and works.[4] Thus, while not identical to today's maintenance arrangements, some Victorian railway companies clearly separated the control of the trains from the maintainers of the tracks.

But why did early railway managers opt for using contractors rather than conducting the maintenance themselves? In the case of Brassey and Allcard both had built lines that they subsequently went on to maintain. Furthermore, the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway advertised for tenders at the point which it was formed. Therefore, the fact that at the beginning of their operations the railway companies engaged contractors who had worked on the railways, and seemingly did not investigate alternatives, suggests that early railway managers did not posses the knowledge to enable them to organise and undertake railway maintenance.  Indeed, it would have been simpler and cheaper in the short-term for the companies to employ the experienced contracting firms, rather than creating whole new maintenance departments with hierarchies, supply chains and staffs.

Yet, by the 1870, as far as I am aware, most railway companies had taken maintenance operations ‘in house.’ Indeed, in the L&SWR's case this was done to improve costs and administrative harmony. When Brassey’s original ten year contract was up in 1850 the L&SWR had re-let part of the contract to him and another part to a Mr Taylor.[5] Five years later, the two contracts were again up for renewal and a special committee of the  L&SWR's board charged the resident engineer, John Strapp, to write a report on the maintenance arrangements. He was to  include ‘a detailed account of his estimate of the expenses attending the company’s keeping the maintenance in their own hand.’ Indeed, this would suggest that by the 1850s the L&SWR's management had developed knowledge of permanent way maintenance and felt that the company could adequately undertake the job themselves.

However, at this stage it wasn't a certainty that the company would take over maintenance, given that Brassey and Taylor were invited to re-tender for their contracts.[6] However, they were not to be successful, and a month later, with Brassey and Taylor’s proposed tenders taken into consideration, the committee recommended to the board that ‘the company should take the maintenance into their own hands’ on the basis that this would reduce company costs.[7] This recommendation was accepted and the committee's decision was justified when the management of the permanent way maintenance improved and the expenses was reduced. Consequently, the company’s annual report of 31 December 1856 stated that ‘the results have proved satisfactory, inasmuch as the ordinary repairs have been more substantially and durably executed than could have been claimed from a contractor, and the total expenditure for the year has only exceeded the estimate by £39.’[8]

Thus, the L&SWR's case (and presumably others) shows that separating control of infrastructure maintenance from control of train operations has always been undesirable. Therefore, those privatising the railways in the 1990s were essentially introducing a system which had been long since discredited on the basis of its inefficiency.

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[1] http://www.steamindex.com/people/civils.htm

[2] Herpath’s Railway and Commercial Journal, No. 391, Vol.85 December, 1846, p.1552

[3] The Railway Record, 8 February 1851, p.96

[4] William, R.A., The London and South Western Railway – Volume 1: The Formative Years, (Newton Abbott, 1968), p.246

[5] William, The London and South Western Railway – Volume 1, p.246

[6] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/216, L&SWR Special Committee Minute Book, 30 August 1855, p.181

[7] TNA, RAIL 411/216, L&SWR Special Committee Minute Book, 30 August 1855, p.181

[8] TNA, RAIL 1110/281, L&SWR Reports and Accounts, Half-year ending 31 December 1856, p.1

Fighting with Richmond Station

Richmond Station is a bit stupid. Now don't get me wrong I love the place, but I feel that it is where all the problems of interchange stations come to the fore in a microcosm. Where at Waterloo the missing of trains, food arrangements and general the general scuffle of commuters are well spaced apart and not much of a nuisance, at Richmond the same problems are compacted within very limited area, which makes the affair somewhat of a trial.

I think I'll start with a brief history of the stations, as this sets my complaints about it in context, please use the map that I made shows when everything was built. The Richmond and West End Railway (Clapham Junction-Richmond) opened the first terminus on 27^th July 1846. When the line was extended to Windsor by the Windsor, Staines and South Western Railway this company opened a new through station in August 1848. Soon after their opening both companies were taken over by their main backers, the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR). The old terminus station was used as Richmond's goods station until 1936. On the 1^st January 1869 the L&SWR connected the West London Joint Railway's station at Addison Road (now Kensington Olympia) with Richmond, and to accommodate the extra trains the company built a new northern terminal station. This was how the station remained until 1937 until the Southern Railway rebuilt the main station buildings, decommissioned the 1848 through station and moved the through platforms to align with the terminal ones. Currently South West Trains operate the main line through services and Transport for London operate the District Line and London Overground services from the terminal station. Unless you want to get into the nitty gritty of the history of the station (and lets face it that is a wild prospect), I think that this is all that will be required for what follows.

The first thing about Richmond is that from any vantage point from within a train, the movements of all services can be observed. This creates a situation were making a connection between the terminus and through stations is like some weird psychological torture, a device formulated by past railway builders to spite the railway traveller. The journeys that I take through the station usually means either leaving the main line services and getting onto the trains that run out of the terminal station (all of which run to my usual destination of Kew Gardens). I also do the return journey. The former journey is always fine, I suppose, as missing a connection isn't an issue. There is usually another train to Kew within 5 minutes. It is the return journey that is the nightmare, something that makes me want to kneel down on the station concourse and beat my fists against the ticket machine. In this journey I will have to catch a particular main line train, at a particular time, usually at either 29 or 59 past the hour. So I travel along in the Overground or Underground train, winding its way through lovely Kew, passing the temple of commerce, Homebase, and I marvel at the skips and general decoration of the line side. The time is 6.21, the train takes 3 minutes, and I believe, foolishly, that my interchange will be a smooth transaction. The train trundles into the approach to Richmond and then STOPS! This is the terror of which I write, a nightmare of limitless proportions, of a clock that is my enemy. 6.24 passes, and no movement. 6.25, 6.26, 6.27, and then like a great instrument of torment the train home on the main line sweeps by on my left hand side. Plastered up against the window, like a 6 ft tree frog, I realise that I'll now be sitting in the Puccinos for half an hour, cursing some railway engineer for the torment he has inflicted. At least at Waterloo the train you miss doesn't go right past you....

So once the journey is completed, there is the second great hazard of Richmond station, a plague at rush hour that in itself is a trial of epic proportions...that includes a balancing element. I of course mean the rush to the barrier. I'm not certain how many of you know Richmond station's layout, however at the end of the terminal station, on the lower level, are the ticket barriers. Therefore getting off the train at rush hour is like those nature documentaries where you see ants going along a branch in either direction. For one thing waiting at the station are those people who are going to be getting on the train when you get off. Now most people observe the unwritten rule that you let people off the train before you get on. I say most people, because I have noticed a increasing propensity for these travel hawks to attempt to get on the train even when crowded, just as the doors open. I know what this is about; its about them desperately trying to get one of those 8 'single' seats on District Line trains. You know the ones, the ones by the window. Once off the train, you then face a fight to the barriers against commuters going one way, and slow moving people, walking in your direction, going the other. What's more this merry dance is all played out on the narrow platform of the terminal station, forcing most people, usually including me, to the edge. I walk along it at this point, looking down at it like some abyss (and the thought of electricity down't make me wild either). At the current time I have never seen anyone fall off the side, but I am sure it has happened. Some poor sod, casually going about his business, takes one wrong move and falls arse-over-tip onto the track below. Perhaps it was when a traveller lost his rag with someone trying to get on a train...and pushed him, I wouldn't put it past a rushed commuter. Once past this peril, like water through a nozzle, 200 or 300 people, are forced through 4 ticket barriers, that are wholly inadequate and always leave someone hard-done-by! There's is always one individual who feels that the person ahead pushed passed. Not once have experienced in this curfuffle a time when an evil look wasn't thrown, or a bad word wasn't said, and once or twice I have witnessed people come nearly coming to blows. At least at Waterloo there are plenty of ticket gates and you don't fall off the platform...

Lastly there is the positioning of the over-bridge. Now I like a good walk, and am a regular runner, however the positioning of the link between the through and terminal stations is in the most difficult places. Say the train, that I may or may not have missed, is coming into Platform 1, and I have to get to it from the terminal station, the only way is to go to the back of the station, through the pandemonium of the rush hour, and over the bridge. Again this is a case of visual psychological torture, with a physical element thrown in. I can see my connecting train all the way through, as I negotiate the people, some smell, some move slowly (not in itself a crime, but bloody irritating) and some think that the station is a good place to have a natter. “Excuse me” I ask as I move through the swathes. Once past the crowd for the barrier I run, like a whippet, through the station, all the while observing my chariot home on the opposite platform. Up the stairs I go, upwards and onwards, across the bridge, and then a sound so terrible as to make we weep, fills my ears. That, sadly, is the sound of a class 450 combined power handle being thrust forward, propelling the train onward. I slow to a walk down the steps, watching it gradually pull out on my left hand side, and consign myself to Puccinos...again.

Richmond Station is quite simply a badly laid out. Whose fault is this? Who is the master of my torments? Well I know I cursed engineers above, but in reality the blame should be placed on the development of the rail network. As any railway historian worth his salt will tell you, the British railway network was left to be formed without strong Government oversight or planning. Therefore many lines were built opportunistically, in an ad hoc fashion and in an adaptive manner. Richmond is the finest exemplar of how railway builders adapted stations over hundreds of years to their immediate requirements. So for example the over-bridge now is in exactly the same place as it was at the older station built in 1848, despite the through station moving. This places it at the back of the station and means it takes far longer to cross between the two stations than a closer footbridge would allow. Why couldn't there have been another footbridge at the other end of the platforms? Secondly when the northern station was to be built in 1863, Richmond town was built up. Thus the station had to be fitted into a smaller space than if where it had been built had been farmland. Thus the platforms on the northern station are too narrow for current demands. Better Government planning may have allowed for the station to be cited in a better place, or that more platforms could have been built. These are just a few of my concerns, however overall, what is true of Richmond is that it is still not one station, it is remains two, something it is still trying to come to terms with.

So my train was on time, and is on time

This week I received an email from Network Rail (NR) that detailed the punctuality of the major railway companies. Of course there is that perennial joke that comes up with reference to Britain's railways that they are always late and that you are going to be stuck on a platform for hours freezing your arse off like a penguin waiting for the next iceberg to turn up. Well let me just burst this miss-information bubble and say that most trains in this country do arrive on time, indeed as the email title proudly proclaims, 'NINE OUT OF TEN TRAINS ARRIVE ON TIME DURING JANUARY.' Indeed the figures do give a good picture of companies' punctuality. I may have to sell everything own to pay for my ticket, but at least I'll get to my empty room on time.

For NR a punctual train is those arriving within five minutes of the scheduled time for commuter services and within 10 minutes for long-distance services. They take into account all factors, such as whether, vandalism and passing antelope. Therefore the results I received for six companies and are as follows (apologies the data hasn't come out well on the blog):-

Jan 2009/10 ; Jan 2008/09 ; % point change

First Capital Connect; 85.5% ; 93.0% ; -7.5%

Virgin Trains; 77.9% ; 71.8% ; +6.1%

London Midland; 89.3% ; 83.6% ; +5.7%

Southeastern; 84.1% ; 89.2% ; -5.1%

South West Trains; 90.8% ; 95.2% ; -4.4%

London Overground; 88.5% ; 91.7% ; -3.2%

Having seen these types of figures for years I can roughly say the results fluctuate, month on month, but that generally we can take it as a given that on average 85% to 90% trains have been arriving 'on time' for about a year, after years of improvement. The only constant is that Virgin Trains are always the worst performer, but given recent performance, they are improving.

What these results got me thinking about is how the punctuality compares with the performance of railway companies of days gone by. Are the railways doing better or worse than their predecessors? The answer lies in a number of parliamentary reports from the 1890s that detailed how punctual different railway companies' trains were (an example is shown). The first thing to note is that unlike NR's press release, the Parliamentary returns show the percentage of each company's trains that arrived on time within within more detailed time periods (i.e. 5-10 minutes, 10-15 and so on). The only exception is that those trains that arrived within five minutes of the timetabled time, in which case the returns were split by the percentage that arrived within three minutes of schedule and those that arrived between 3 and 5 minutes.

Therefore the Parliamentary committee of the 1890s gives far more information than NR. But why is this so? Why do NR only give me a dribble of information when they would clearly have access to more? For example Virgin operates only long-distance trains, however all I know is that 77.9% trains arrived within 10 minutes. What if all of them arrived on the 59^th second of the 9^th minute? Surely that would make Virgin and NR look bad? More importantly why can't I have more detailed information? I think the reason is, and this is purely speculative, that in an age when the media will jump on anything that makes the railways look bad, any data that may harm the reputation of the Train Operating Companies' or NR is closely guarded. Therefore, if we had more detailed returns and was able to say that not one Virgin Train actually ran to time (OK, I know this isn't true) then this would be a PR disaster for the company even though by NR (and apparently European) measurements they were technically 'on time' as they came in under ten minutes. This said NR reported in March 2009 that British railway punctuality was the highest recorded since 1992, so I can't really complain too much. Yet, I still think that there is a case for saying that NR keep a lot of information very close to their chest that would be interesting. Anyway I have gone off on a tangent...onward!

For my comparison I will use the results of the company I am studying for my PhD, the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), and those of South West Trains (SWT) who operate in an almost identical region. This also eliminates in large part having to worry about separating the trains arriving under 5 or 10 minutes in my comparison, as both companies operated mainly suburban and commuter services and as such I can classify all trains arriving under five minutes as 'on time.' I will also compare the punctuality of Virgin trains and the London and North Western Railway (L&NWR) and as both ran mainly ran long-distance services, and therefore the cut-off for trains not running to schedule will be ten minutes. The results are as follows (apologies againthe data hasn't come out well on the blog):

Jan 1890 ; Jan 2010 ; % difference

L&NWR/Virgin Trains; 79.2% ; 77.9% ; +1.3%

L&SWR/South West Trains; 76.4% ; 90.8% ; -14.4%

These results while basic, and highly imperfect, do provide interesting reading. Firstly the L&NWR performed only marginally better than Virgin. However if we consider that the L&NWR and Virgin both operated the West Coast Main Line, that had, and has, the highest levels of traffic of any main line, then the problems with running to time become evident (even though there are far fewer trains on it today). Both companies would have had the difficult job of balancing both goods and passenger trains, would have far more infrastructure that could fail and would have had many more customers to carry. It may be argued that Virgin trains are actually facing fewer problems, given there are fewer trains on the line, however as their trains go at faster speed, then this is a factor that actually negates this consideration because the trains are closer together and require more complex scheduling. However it should also be noted that the recent WCML upgrade was behind schedule, over budget and while now complete, is still replete with bugs, but once things get 'ironed out' there is potential for Virgin's punctuality to improved.

Secondly the results of the L&SWR's performance were poor compared to its successor, despite operating similar services. Of course I cannot venture an wholly adequate reason for the difference, however it may be because SWT operate a clock face timetable, whereby trains leave and arrive at the same time each hour, whereas the L&SWR did not until 1912. Also nowadays the trains arriving at 'x' minutes past the hour have the same rolling stock and passenger capacities. These two factors therefore mean that while SWT can cancel trains if they are running too late, simply turning them into the next scheduled one, a late train on the L&SWR would disrupt the entire timetable as the late runner could not become a following train as they would have put the rest of the timetable into confusion and they would have had different types of rolling stock and locomotives attached to them. In addition on the lines SWT operate, there is very little freight, whereas the L&SWR did have a large goods operation. Therefore the L&SWR had more trains on the line and more potential for passenger trains to get stuck behind them because of failure or late running. Thus overall it seems that the SWT has a much simpler operation than its predecessor that gives it far better performance.

More detailed analysis of past and modern railway punctuality would be welcomed, however, with such limited data, the reasons that I can venture for differences between the past and present can only be speculative at this point.

Waterloo isn't what it used to be

Waterloo is a dump! There I said it. We can of course applaud the cleaners, I didn't see one Metro or Evening Standard dumped floorward today. I did see plenty loitering the train. In fact in a bit of a tangent I think it is weird that Network Rail get a good cleaning job done at Waterloo, while South West Trains clearly don't give a shit about the carriage interior. Different priorities I suppose...anyway

I think that the problem with Waterloo is that now the romance has gone. If anyone has seen the 1961 John Schlesinger film 'Terminus: 24 Hours in the Life of Waterloo Station' they will know what they I mean. Since the station's building in 1848 (with the current station being the product of a re-build between 1900 and 1921) there has always been the bustle of commuters, and the film expertly portrays individuals going to their varied occupations. Yet what I think has changed is the fact that people don't interact with the station in the same way. The film expertly portrays the station as a social arena, where drinks were served, meals were sat and eaten and lovers came together and spent time talking. Now people drink on the move, the meals are over-salted and speedily scoffed, and I see most people arguing, yelling, or moving so fast that others nearly topple like dominoes. Waterloo is now one part in people's a-b-c lives and not an interactive part of it. In short the station experience, while still essentially still about travelling and meeting, has sped up.

The biggest indicator of the 'quicker' station experience are the barriers, designed to catch those devious travellers who were moving in too fast to buy a ticket. Pesky, ugly and unnecessary is my opinion. Oh the Train Operating Companies love them so much that I bet they get aroused by the mere site of yellow circles and flashing lights. I bet every time they see one open they can just hear the money jangling into their pocket. Of course this poses problems for the majority of travellers that are 'honest.' They place anyone who previously would have very willing pay for their ticket on the train or those who make simple errors with regard to ticket buying, in the category of a fare dodger. For all those who fail to have a ticket the mantra is now no ticket...no excuse - you are getting a fine. This is a problem especially prevalent on South West Trains where many stations have been equipped with barriers, most notable amongst them being Waterloo.

Are these revenue-generating, money sucking, fare evasion instalments worth it? No. As Richard Malins at 'Transport Investigations' has just commented in the latest issue of RAIL magazine, they are only profitable at larger stations because of the extra cost of staffing them at the small ones. Thus all the Train Operating Companies have done in their efforts to slow the public down, catch fare dodgers and claim the money that is (rightly or wrongly) there's, is that they have dehumanised the travel experience and set them selves up for grief with their customers. Would it be terrible if at that at the cost of a few dodged fares and turning a blind eye to the errors of the travelling public they could have fostered good customer relations? In truth at the end of the day they just pissed us off, but then again they are monopoly Train Operating Companys with no others to challenge them. Thus this goes to show, in my opinion, that they don't really care about customer relations at all, rather bleeding our pockets dry is all that matters.