When Victorian railways conspired against Christmas

One of the features of the late Victorian British railway industry was competition, with railways in all parts of the nation trying to out-perform each other in order to win the patronage of passengers. From the 1880s the Great Western and London & South Western Railways accelerated their services as well as increased the luxury in which passengers were conveyed, to secure the business to West Country locations such as Exeter and Plymouth.^[1] Competition between companies also existed on the routes between Nottingham and Leeds, Liverpool and Hull, and Edinburgh and Glasgow, as well as between other major cities.^[2]

Some historians have argued that these struggles between railways were a major factor in their declining profitability after 1870, as faster trains and more luxurious carriages cost more to build and operate. Cain, for example, stated his belief that ‘service competition alone would have been sufficient to promote levels of capital spending and methods of operation that continuously eroded profitability.’^[3] Personally, I have always doubted the extent to which competitive trains services actually eroded companies’ profitability. I argued in my thesis, on the management of the London & South Western Railway after 1870, that service competition was on the margins of the railway’s activities. It and the GWR ran hundreds of services each day and only four or five express services to the West Country were truly ‘competitive.’^[4]

One of the fiercest competitions between railway companies were the famed ‘Races to the North’ in 1888 and 1895. Two groups of companies that had control of the east and west coast main lines competed for the fastest trains between London and Scotland. On the east coast route the competitors were the Great Northern (London to York), North Eastern (York to Edinburgh) and North British Railways (Edinburgh to Aberdeen); while on the west coast route the contestants were the London and North Western (London to Carlisle) and Caledonian Railways (Carlisle to Edinburgh and Aberdeen). The race of 1895, which received the same attention in the press as the derby at Cheltenham, captured the public’s imagination, culminating in a west coast train on the night of 22 and 23 August making the journey between London and Aberdeen in 8 hours 42 minutes. This was eight minutes quicker than an east coast train the night before.^[5]

Because of events like this, the press liked to paint these railway races as battles between warring powers. But how serious was the animosity between the companies? Did the east and west coast railways really treat their competitors as enemies? Or were the ‘races’ just an exuberant, but good-natured, expression of a rivalry between them? Perhaps an event that occurred before Christmas 1882 suggests an answer to these questions.

In early December 1882 a very thick letter arrived at King’s Cross headquarters of the Great Northern Railway. Before a list of 214 names was a letter addressed to those in authority within company:

Gentlemen

   We the undersigned draw your attention to the fact that there are in London many Scotchmen who desire to avail themselves of the opportunity of visiting their friends in Scotland during the short vacation at Christmas but are deterred from doing so by the heavy railway fares.

We would therefore petition to you to give this subject your full consideration and endeavour to make some arrangement, whereby the result aimed at by your petitioners may be gained namely: a reasonable reduction in fares between London and Scotland equal to, if not quarter than that granted during the summer months.

   We are certain that should you see your way to meet us in this matter, it would not only confer a great boon, but from the large numbers availing themselves of the opportunity, prove equally to your advantage.

   We are yours respectfully… ^[6]

But this petition was not the only one to be sent, and a duplicate also landed on the desk of George Findlay, the London and North Western Railway’s General Manager. I suspect Findlay’s natural response was to reject the request. But he was an astute railway manager, and possibly because he wished to maintain good relations with his east coast rivals, he contacted to his opposite number within the GNR, Henry Oakley. ‘As I presume a similar application has been addressed to you’, wrote Findlay ‘I shall be glad to know if you will be prepared to join us in declining to accede to the request.’^[7] Oakley’s response is not contained within the file, but the two companies decided to reject the petition. Findlay also communicated with the Midland Railway, who likewise operated a route between London and Scotland, and while they had not received a petition, they too were to going to keep fares at established levels. ^[8]

In 1882 three railway companies, all of which were theoretically competing with each other for traffic between London and Scotland, collectively agreed to deny travellers making this journey reduce-rate fares over the Christmas period. Of course, this case does not indicate the nature of the GNR and LNWR’s relationship five or ten years later when they were racing. Nevertheless, it may suggest that despite superficially appearing to be competing railways, as a matter of fact their relationship was actually quite close and they worked together when it was mutually beneficial for them to do so. ‘Market forces’, in this case at least, did not really work. One thing is for certain, the Great Northern, London & North Western and Midland Railways spoiled Christmas for a lot of London-based Scotsmen and their families in 1882.

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[1] Jack Simmons, ‘South Western v. Great Western: railway competition in Devon and Cornwall’, The Journal of Transport History, 4 (1959), 27-34

[2] Jack Simmons, The Victorian Railway, (London, 1991), p.83; Jack Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, (Leicester, 1978), p.84-85

[3] P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system’, in, Michael J. Freeman and Derek H. Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), pp.115

[4] David Turner, ‘Managing the “Royal Road”: The London & South Western Railway 1870-1911’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of York, 2013)

[5] Oswald S. Nock, The Railway Race to the North, (London, 1958), p.120-121

[6] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 236/721/9, From London `Scotchmen' asking for reduction in fares to Scotland during Christmas vacation, Letter from organisation committee to Great Northern Railway, 4 December 1882

[7] TNA, RAIL 236/721/9, From London `Scotchmen' asking for reduction in fares to Scotland during Christmas vacation, Letter from George Findlay to Henry Oakley, 11 December 1882

[8] TNA, RAIL 236/721/9, From London `Scotchmen' asking for reduction in fares to Scotland during Christmas vacation, Letter from George Findlay to Henry Oakley, 13 December 1882

A Misinformed but Devious Take-over of a Railway

The Somerset and Dorset Railway in 1875

The ultimate point of my PhD on the London and South Western Railway’s (LSWR) management between 1870 and 1910 is to determine the quality of managers' and directors' decisions in the period. Therefore, I deal with questions surrounding what drove decisions and what decision-makers knew when making them. One event I focus on is the LSWR and Midland Railway’s lease of the Somerset and Dorset Railway (SDR) in 1875.

The LSWR and Midland Railway's Lease

The SDR was formed from a number of small companies in 1862. Yet, after connecting to Bath in 1874 it got into financial trouble, even though the trade with the Midland at that place and the LSWR at Templecombe was healthy.[1] Consequently, the beleaguered company approached the Great Western Railway (GWR) with the proposal that it would purchase the SDR. Thereafter, the GWR and its Bristol and Exeter Railway (BER) allies engaged in protracted negotiation with the SDR,[2] and by early August a deal was close. On the 12 August 1875 James Grierson and J.C. Wall, the GWR and BER General Managers, visited the LSWR’s General Manager, Archibald Scott, at Waterloo. The LSWR and GWR were fierce competitors, but as an act of good faith Grierson and Wall informed Scott of the negotiations and offered the LSWR a working agreement on the southern part of the line between Templecombe and Wimborne.[3] Scott expressed his alarm at the proposal[4] and requested another meeting on the 16 August to give him time to consult the LSWR’s board.[5]

James Allport

It was at that point that the LSWR out-flanked the GWR. Scott met his board on 13 August and was immediately sent to Birmingham to confer with the Midland’s Deputy Chairman and General Manager, James Allport.[6] By the 17 August they decided to work with the LSWR to offer the SDR a better deal than the GWR and B&ER's.[7] Yet, knowledge of Scott's trip was withheld from Grierson and Wall when he met them on sixteenth,[8] with Scott stating that a LSWR half-yearly meeting of proprietors had prevented the board considering the matter.[9] This gave the LSWR and Midland time to finalise their deal with the SDR board, who on 19 August rejected GWR and BER’s offer. The agreement between the LSWR, Midland  and SDR was signed on the 1 November.[10] Naturally, the GWR was angered by Scott’s actions and opposed the leasing Bill in Parliament.[11] However, against its many protestations, this passed on 13 July 1876.[12]

Decision-making

The question remains as to why the LSWR decided to go behind the GWR's back and secure the SDR for itself? Certainly, LSWR decision-makers thought their company would benefit from leasing the SDR and augmenting its infrastructure. Scott described its traffic as being ‘in its infancy’ and at the parliamentary committee investigating the lease stated that:

James Grierson

‘A considerable amount of money will have to be expended on the Somerset and Dorset Line to improve it and make it efficient for traffic purposes, and I have no hesitation in saying that the traffic to be carried over the Somerset and Dorset Line in connection with the South Western system and the Midland as well as locally, will be very large indeed.’[13]

However, the LSWR did not employ accurate predictions of the capital expense required to realise the SDR's revenue generating potential. Like Channon argued regarding the Midland’s London extension in 1869, LSWR decision-makers’ knowledge of costs and revenues was too incomplete for accurate predictions of these things to be made.[14] Furthermore, there was realistically not time enough between Scott being notified of the GWR and BER’s plans on the twelfth, and the agreement’s completion on the nineteenth, for accurate forecasts to be formulated. This is not to say LSWR decision-makers had absolutely no idea of the potential revenues and costs of taking over the line, and the proposal for the LSWR to operate between Wimborne and Templecombe was deemed objectionable because Scott recognised the region’s poor revenue generating potential. But this analysis was not systematic, and based on ‘gut-feeling’ and experience.

In reality, the potential profits the SDR could generate with investment was not the reason the LSWR joined with the Midland to lease it. Before 1876 the SDR generated little traffic for the LSWR. In 1871 freight moving from the SDR onto the LSWR’s system contributed to the latter revenue of only £38,282, rising to £54,482 by 1875, the increase being because the Bath connection opened. Yet, this still only constituted 2.19 per cent of the LSWR’s gross receipts in 1875[15] and it is unlikely this traffic alone justified the lease.

Rather, the timing of the LSWR’s approach to the Midland and SDR were determined by the GWR and B&ER’s actions. The LSWR's trade could have been potentially disadvantaged if they had taken over the line, and Portal, the LSWR Deputy-Chairman, stated that the GWR and B&ER’s proposals were ‘highly injurious to the interests of the public, contrary to the interests of Parliament and hurtful to the South Western Company.’[16] Strategically, the SDR was important for the LSWR, with trade coming through it from the north and South Wales to Southampton. In August 1875 Scott stated that ‘…naturally the South Western Company, [has been] interested…for so many years been in the traffic in connection with the Somerset and Dorset line.’[17] Therefore, the GWR’s proposals would have given it control of this traffic, possibly damaging the LSWR's revenue.

Thus, the LSWR’s concern to control its trade and territory on its own terms, overrode others regarding the investment the line needed or its revenue generating capacity. Indeed, LSWR decision-makers were attempting to protect a regional monopoly, as Dodgson argued occurred at the time in the industry more generally.[18]

Archibald Scott

However, the lack of accurate cost and revenue predictions played a role in LSWR decision-makers’ mind-sets when approaching the SDR takeover. Firstly, they had believed from as early as the 1840s that traffic and revenue would always increase irrespective of the state of the economy (as I prove elsewhere in my Phd). This fed the belief that territorial protection would always put extra traffic onto the LSWR’s system, which would ultimately be good for company profits. Consequently, because accurate project forecasting was largely absent and decisions were usually made based on gut-feeling, these largely assumed beliefs underpinned the rationale and timing of most decisions. Indeed, in the SDR's case, for the LSWR to loose territorial control, may also have potentially lost it the profit from the naturally assumed traffic growth. Again, Channon argued that similar thinking was behind the Midland Railway’s construction of the London extension.[19]

A Successful Take-Over?

Ultimately, the SDR lease mirrored Watkin’s extensions of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire railway to some extent, as Hopkins described them as ‘expensive failures’ because they ‘were not properly weighed up as investment opportunities’.[20] While the the success of the SDR lease is hard to determine accurately, it was seemingly limited. Between 1875 and 1880, when the LSWR and Midland was investing heavily in the line,[21] passenger numbers hauled grew by 53.22 per cent, and goods tonnage hauled increased by 26.75 per cent.[22] Contrastingly, the LSWR’s passenger traffic numbers grew by 44.26 per cent and goods tonnage by 37.90 per cent over the same period. Yet, thereafter, traffic growth on the SDR stalled, and between 1885 and 1895 the passenger and goods traffic originating from the company grew by 26.94 and 14.58 per cent respectively, while the LSWR’s proportions were 53.02 and 34.47 per cent.[23] Therefore, in later decades the SDR’s own traffic growth was proportionately much lower than the LSWR’s, and its traffic would have made up proportionately less of its parent company's over time.[24] Nevertheless, the benefit of the LSWR controlling the line for its traffic from the north and South Wales may have been considerable as the SDR provided a more direct route to Southampton for it, but this cannot be determined.

Overall, however, the case of the SDR lease shows that rather than mid-Victorian railway managers and directors making calculated decisions about network expansion; the protection of territory was a very important concern for them in the period. Yet, this was despite them never being able to truly quantify what the costs and benefits of protecting this territory would be.

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[1] Williams, R.A., The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2: Growth and Consolidation, (Newton Abbot, 1973), p.173

[2] MacDermot, E.T., revised by Clinker, C.R., History of the Great Western Railway: Volume 2, (Shepperton, 1982), p.52

[3] The National Archives [TNA] RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[4] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Wyndham S. Portal. To Sir D. Gooch, 4 September 1875, p.46

[5] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[6] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 418, p.55

[7] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.174

[8] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to Wyndham S. Portal. 27 October 1875, p.48

[9] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[10] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.174-175

[11] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Parliamentary Bills and Minutes of Evidence, etc.

[12] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.175

[13] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 378, p.42, 24 March 1876

[14] Channon, Geoffrey, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940: Studies in Economic and Business History, (Aldershot, 2001), p.107

[15] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 369, p.41, 24 March 1876

[16] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Wyndham S. Portal. To Sir D. Gooch, 4 September 1875, p.46

[17] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 375, p.42, 24 March 1876

[18] John, ‘New, disaggregated, British railway total factor productivity growth estimates, 1875 to 1912’, The Economic History Review, 64 (2011), p.639

[19] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.107

[20] Hodgkins, David, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin (Llandybie, 2002)

, p.486

[21] TNA, RAIL 262/16, Somerset and Dorset Joint Line Committee, Meetings of Officers 1875-1884

[22] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1875, p.58-62 and 1880, p.50-54

[23] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1880, p.52-56 and 1885, p.52-56

[24] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1875, p.62 and 1880, p.54

The Rise and Fall of the Second Class Passenger

 These days we only have one numbered class of travel, first class, and what was originally known as third is now designated ‘standard.’ Yet, I was recently asked by someone about what happened to second class, given that the mere fact that we had first and third must denote that at some point we had a second.

Before the railways arrived, the two main modes of transport were stagecoaches and steamships, and these only employed only two classes of travel. Apart from the mail coaches, which charged a premium for travel, most stagecoaches had two classes of passenger. Those paying the higher rate were carried inside, while those on the outside, who were forced to brave the elements, paid a lower rate. Similarly, those travelling on steamships either had ‘cabin’ or ‘deck’ accommodation.[1]

Yet, a glance at some shipping adverts from 1831 (left) shows more nuance in pricing. The steam packet service to the Channel Islands, while offering both ‘cabin’ and ‘deck’ accommodation, also offered ‘fore’ and ‘main’ cabins at different prices. Additionally, the ship to the United States offered steerage accommodation with or without ‘provisions.’ While these adverts would suggest there were three classes, in reality there were only two, and individuals could simply pay more for additional services while travelling. Indeed, there were not three distinct levels of service quality, each different from the other.[2]

Initially, the railways copied this two class system. In 1830 the first inter-city railway in the world, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, had first and second class accommodation. Indeed, like on the steamships and stagecoaches, first class travel would be enclosed, whereas second class would be open. The two-class system was quickly transferred to other early railways, and an advert for the Warrington and Newton Railway (shown), opened in 1831 and which connected with the Liverpool and Manchester, shows this.[3]  

However, by the late-1830s the three class system had become the norm for all new and existing railway companies, even though third class carriages were not necessarily attached to each train. The railways could do this because the speed at which trains conveyed passengers meant that they could offer a range of services which were of varied quality.

The three classes of travel would continue undisturbed until the 1870s. First class passengers always had the best accommodation, their compartments containing soft furnishings and window glazing. Initially, second class carriages had roofs and padded seats, but were usually still open to the elements on either side. However, this latter feature did become less common up to the 1860s. Lastly, third class passengers travelled in little more than open trucks with wooden seats. On the Sheffield and Rotherham Railway’s opening in 1838 a reporter suggested these carriages would be ‘preferred in fine weather.’[4] Nevertheless, by the 1860s most third class carriages had been covered. Ultimately, all that could be said about changes in carriage design before 1870 was that they had got longer.

It was in the 1870s that the decline of second class travel began. On the 1 January 1875, after adding third class accommodation to every train in 1872, the Midland Railway abolished second class travel completely, while lowering the price of third. Furthermore, they downgraded the quality of the second class carriages by removing the leather backs of the seats, while also improving the quality of the third class accommodation by covering the seats with the same material and padding.[5] In addition, the company introduced carriages on its new Settle to Carlisle route which were twice as long as contemporary designs, had improved ride comfort because of swivelling bogies and which combined first and third class compartments.

The Midland undertook this pioneering action because of the forces acting on its business. Whereas in 1859 32.23 per cent of all railway passengers in the British Isles were travelling by second class, by 1874 the proportion was only 15.12 per cent. Furthermore, over the same period, the proportion of individuals travelling by third class rose from 49.92 per cent to 76.66 per cent. Indeed in the Midland’s case, the proportion of passengers travelling second class dropped from 23.37 per cent to 11.24 per cent, lowering the profitability of carrying them. [6] Therefore, eliminating second class accommodation reduced the cost of carriage construction and marshalling for the Midland. Furthermore, the improved third class accommodation would entice customers who would normally travel third class from competing railways. Indeed, to try and capture more of the quickly growing third class market was a shrewd business move.

It is unsurprising that many other railway managers protested at the Midland’s changes, presumably because of the precedent they set. Furthermore, those passengers that were not wealthy enough to purchase first class tickets, but purchased second to avoid the ‘rowdiness’ of the third class environment, also reacted with dismay.

Nevertheless, the Midland’s actions naturally meant that the other companies started examining the viability of their own second class accommodation, as well as increasing the size of their rolling stock. Indeed, the larger carriages constructed after the 1870s included higher quality third class compartments which attracted increasing numbers of people to this class of transport. Consequently, this helped second class travellers to diminish in number from 22.2 per cent of all passengers in 1870 to only 6.0 per cent in 1899.[8]

Therefore, for many companies offering second class accommodation was increasingly less profitable and more companies abandoned it. The Great Northern Railway, Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire and Cheshire Lines Railways only offered second class travel on long distance services in the 1880s, and in the early 1890s the North Eastern, Great Eastern Railways and all Scottish Railways abandoned it completely. [9] The Great Western Railway abandoned second class in 1910.[10]

However, those companies who derived a higher proportion of their revenue from passenger traffic held on to second class for longer, given that they made healthier profits from this traffic. Indeed, in 1881 a report to the London and South Western Railway’s board by the General Manager, Archibald Scott, stated that he felt the reductions in second class accommodation on the northern railways were a mistake. Indeed, given that second class traffic remained an important source of the company’s income, constituting 25 per cent of passengers and one sixth of all travellers, he recommended that it should remain, which it did.[11] Indeed, his successor, Charles Scotter, also argued in 1894 that second class should be kept on the London and South Western given that it still ‘paid.’ However, he did recognise that the company’s case was ‘exceptional’ given that on other companies it did not so.

Ultimately, however, the even the companies dominated by passenger traffic also stopped offering second class accommodation as the proportion they carried fell. Thus, the London and South Western and South Eastern and Chatham Railways preserved it on main line services until 1918 and 1923 respectively.[13] Indeed, the latter was the last company to provide it on a British trunk line.[14] The last vestiges of second class were to be found on London and North Eastern Railway suburban services until 1938 and Southern Railway boat trains until 1948.[15]

Overall, second class had been killed by the higher quality of third class accommodation and ever-increasing numbers of third class passengers. With fewer and fewer people using it, the railways, driven by profit, no longer felt the need to provide it.

SPECIAL NOTICE

I will be doing a talk on 20 December at 6.30 pm at Kew Public Library on Victorian Railwaywomen, looking at who they were, where they worked in the industry and their pay and status. Mince pies and refreshments a provided, all for a mere £1. If you would like to attend, call the library to book a place on 020 8734 3352 (Opening Times: Tues - 10-1, 2-6; Wed 2-6; Fri 2-6; Sat 10-1, 2-6) or email kew.library@richmond.gov.uk 

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[1] Simmons, Jack, ‘class distinctions,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.84

[2] Hampshire Advertiser: Royal Yacht Club Gazette, Southampton Town & County Herald, Isle of Wight Journal , Winchester Chronicle, & General Reporter, Saturday, June 25, 1831, p.1

[3] Liverpool Mercury, Friday, August 5, 1831

[4] The Sheffield Independent, and Yorkshire and Derbyshire Advertiser, Saturday, November 03, 1838, p.2

[5] Birmingham Daily Post, Friday, January 1, 1875

[6] Board of Trade, Railway Returns, 1860 and 1874

[7] Simmons, ‘class distinctions’, p.85

[8] Unknown Author, ‘second class’, Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, 110 (1910, Aug. 27) p.259

[9] Simmons, ‘class distinctions’, p.85

[10] ‘second class’, Saturday Review of Politics,p.259

[11] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/283, Report to the Directors as to Second and Third Class and generally upon passenger traffic, Archibald Scott to Board of Directors, 1 December 1881, p.4

[12] Charles Scotter interview with Commerce magazine, reprinted in The South Western Gazette, 1 December 1894, p.5-6

[13] Simmons, ‘class distinctions’, p.86

[14] Great Eastern Railway Magazine, 8 (1918), p.178

[15] Simmons, ‘class distinctions’, p.85

Discovering Britain's first Railwaywomen (1840s and 1850s) - Part 1

I have repeatedly commented that Victorian railwaywomen are little studied by historians. Indeed, men’s dominance of the workforce has meant that women’s roles have been overlooked. However, this problem is compounded in the case of women working in the early railways as there is a chronic lack of investigation into railway history before 1870 generally.

Therefore, I felt that the working lives of Britain’s earliest railwaywomen were in need of investigation. I used ancestry.co,uk’s railway employee database to search for women that worked on the railways between 1830 and 1860. This was not an exhaustive survey of the available files as I was unable to simply search for them by gender and their years of employment. Consequently, I resorted to using popular women’s first names from the Victorian period with the hope that results would be returned. Happily, I found the records of sixty railwaywomen’s who were working in four railway companies.[1 – distribution of records by company are at the end] Furthermore, I believe more were available and I will have to go back and expand my research. The findings were not startling, but they do make for interesting reading.

Unsurprisingly, as the industry grew increasing numbers women were employed by the railways. Keeping in mind that this only a preliminary survey, no women have been found that worked in the 1830s and only two were discovered from early 1840s. Indeed, the first woman on the list is a Mrs Fuller who was employed by a housekeeper by the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway (LB&SCR).[2] (Note: other women have been found by historians that were employed earlier - See: Wojtczak, Railwaywomen) It was in the late 1840s that women started to be employed by railways large numbers, as the table below shows. Furthermore, as the industry expanded in the 1850s the number obtaining positions increased more rapidly.

The range of occupations women were engaged in were limited. Twenty-four were engaged in cleaning duties of some type. Nineteen were employed as Office Cleaners, such as Elizabeth Blackhouse who started work on the 10^th October 1853 at Ashton on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (MS&LR)[3].  Three others were also classified as ‘Charwoman’ and one was just noted as being a ‘cleaner.’ Furthermore, there was a startling moment when I came across Sarah Dyson who worked at Huddersfield on the London and North Western Railway (L&NWR) in the early 1850s. She was listed as ‘Station Keeper.’ Was this, I thought, one of Britain’s earliest Station Mistresses? Predictably it was not, and a second staff record confirmed she was a cleaner there.[3] Ultimately, and has been recorded elsewhere, most of these women would have received their posts as an act of charity from the company when their husbands were killed or incapacitated by accidents on the railway.

The second largest employment group were gatekeepers and twenty-three women were employed as such, mainly on the LB&SCR. These women’s circumstances are hard to determine without more detailed research, however, other sources would suggest that many would have been the wives of railwaymen. Indeed, some gatekeeper’s records were next to those of other railway employees, such as signalmen, who had the same surname and were based nearby. Furthermore, Ann Hunstead[5] and Frances Earl[6] who were appointed by the LB&SCR to different gates near Berwick in 1849 and 1857 respectively, were both recommended by Mr Oliver of the Permanent Way Department. This suggests that they were the wives or widows of men working on the line in the area, for example platelayers or inspectors. Overall, gatekeeping positions were clearly given to women who already had some association with the railway company through marriage.

What did surprise me is that only seven women were employed as attendants in some form. Six were employed as ‘Ladies Attendants’ and would have looked after Ladies Waiting Rooms where they existed. Indeed, smaller stations did not have separate waiting rooms for men and women and this is confirmed by the fact that all six women were working at large stations that would have had them. They were based at London Bridge (Sarah Kays, Mary McRae), Rugby (Mrs Gillings, Caroline Stephenson) and Wolverton (Thirza Cowdell, Sarah Topsham).  Mrs A Chase, who was a ‘Waiting Room Attendant’ at Brighton also may have worked in a women's waiting room.[7] Again it is likely, as I have pointed out in an earlier post, that most of these women’s’ husbands would have been killed or injured while in the railways’ employ.

Probably the most interesting find was that four women were working as clerks for the LB&SCR, with the earliest being Margaret Savage who was appointed at Three Bridges Station in 1855. Indeed, this is the earliest known female clerk on Britain’s railways so far. Of the four, three were ‘Telegraph Clerks’ who would not have met the public and were ‘back office’ workers. However, another interesting discovery is that Margaret’s sister, Harriet, was also employed at Three Bridges as a Booking Clerk in 1857. Thus, this would make her the first woman to serve passengers in such a capacity. Ultimately, Margaret and Harriet would not have obtained their positions if it were not for the fact that their Father, Thomas John, was the Station Master there.(see above image) [8] Indeed, all four women employed as clerks were the daughters of Station Masters. Consequently, this suggests that the only route for women to obtain these higher status occupations was to have a father who was in a senior position.

Ultimately, this short survey should be treated with caution given the limited survey size, the high proportion of LB&SCR employees in it and the availability of documentary evidence. Yet, it does confirm statistically that the majority of women working on Britain’s railways in the 1840s and 1850s would have been in menial positions and all were dependent on men to obtain employment (even if they had been killed). In the next post I will explore the variable relationships that the women had with their employers.

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[1] The railway companies were the Great Western Railway (10.00%), the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway (48.33%), the London and North Western Railway (20.00%) and the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (21.67%)

[2] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 414/776, Traffic staff: register of appointments, p.438

[3] TNA, RAIL 463/305, Staff register 1, p.124

[4] TNA, RAIL 264/343, Register of uniformed staff No.1 C, p.59

[5] TNA, RAIL 414/776, Traffic staff: register of appointments, p.229

[6] TNA, RAIL 414/770, Traffic staff: register of appointments Indexed, p.119

[7] TNA, RAIL 414/773, Traffic staff: register of appointments, p.247

[8] TNA, RAIL 414/770, Traffic staff: register of appointments Indexed, p.62

"Scale of Advances for Junior Clerks" - The Pay of Midland Railway Junior Clerks in the 1880s

Sometimes as a historian you come across single documents that shed light on a whole subject, and this happened to me today. When browsing some railway company staff records online, something that I am apt to do at the moment, a Midland Railway clerical staff record book had pasted in the front a number of documents on clerks’ pay scales before and after the 31^st of December 1885. Indeed, it seems that the Midland Railway’s board modified significantly the pay scales for all new clerks at this date and the document these changes.

Before commenting on the pay scales, it is interesting to note that the ages at which new clerks were employed changed. The first document, listing employment practices before the 31^st December 1885, showed the wages for clerks beginning their careers ‘over 14 or 15.’ However, in the document specifying employment procedures thereafter, the word ‘over’ was lost and it merely stated individuals started at ’14 or 15.’ It may be tentatively suggested that the Midland, in line with procedure from most railway companies at the time, began to restrict entrance ages of its new clerical staff to younger and younger individuals. However, without more data this is uncertain.

Before 1885, in a practice that has not been observed at railway the London and South Western Railway which I am studying, the department that individuals went into determined their initial wages. Thus, new clerks who entered into the Locomotive, Carriage, Secretary’s, Accountant’s and Stores departments started on the measly sum of £15 per annum or 5s 9d per week. However, those going into the Way and Works Department received £24 per annum (9s 3d per week), those entering the General Managers, Goods and Coaching Offices received yearly £20 (7s 8d per week) and ne clerks in the Telegraph department received £30 per annum (11s 6d per week).

Possibly, the prestige of the different departments and the skill involved in the job of hand may have affected the starting salaries. While the telegraphists would have required far more skills to undertake their work and consequently received more pay, the higher salaries of the ‘General Managers, Goods and Coaching Offices’ may have reflected that these posts had more potential to lead to managerial careers (clerks being the only ones being able to realistically ascend to such heights).

Thereafter, the junior clerks’ wages increased at varying rates of between £5 and £10 per year. While it would be dull to detail all the wage increases the clerks in the different departments received, I will look at how quickly they reached the point at which they became full clerks and began to be promoted ‘on merit only’. The wages they were receiving in the year before their promotion to being full clerks, as well as the number of years it took, are listed below:

• Locomotive: £65 in eight years
• Carriage: £60 in seven years
• Way and Works: £66 in seven years
• General Managers, Goods and Coaching Offices: £65 in five years (£5 extra at each stage for each clerk working in the London goods Offices)
• Secretary’s, Accountants and Stores: (uncertain) Possibly £60 in eight years (4^th to 6^th years - £5 bonus at Christmas, 7^th and 8^th years £7 10/- bonus)
• Telegraph: £80 in eleven years

Thus, once again there was variance depending on the prestige of the department and the skill involved in the work. Those employed in the prestige General Managers, Goods and Coaching Offices became full clerks quicker than those in other departments. Whereas, those employed in the Secretary’s, Accountants and Stores departments also received regular bonuses after their fourth year. Furthermore, the skill that was required by telegraph clerks is shown by the longer period individuals spent as a junior and the high wages they received at the end of this period.

However, in 1885 the company changed this system and established to two employment streams for junior clerks (thereafter known as ‘third class’ clerks), splitting them into those employed at the head offices in Derby, and those stationed at other locations. This made wage patterns fairer so that most new clerks received the same incomes at the same points in their careers. However, it also would have brought down the company’s costs by slowing the rate at which new clerks in some departments advanced, and would allow the company to anticipate increases in wage costs better than previously, in an era when wage costs were rising.

Clerks appointed to ‘stations’ beyond Derby started on £20 per annum (with £5 extra in their first three years if living away from home), and reached £60 in their sixth year. Thereafter, they became second class clerks. Those living in London, like clerks in other companies, received London-weighting of £5 extra per year. Yet, Clerks who began their careers at the Derby Headquarters began on only £15 per year and remained ‘third class’ until their eighth year when they were receiving £60. However, between their fourth and sixth year they did receive a £5 bonus at Christmas, and in their seventh and eighth year received £7 10/-.

Possibly, the reason that headquarters clerks stayed in the ‘third class’ for so long was due to their  potential to ascend to the ranks of management. Thus, they were given more training. It would, therefore, imply that from a very young age the Midland Railway assessed whether their new clerical intake were ‘management material,’ and posted those competent individuals to the headquarters to become well versed in all aspects of railway operation. Therefore, this change, combined with the reorganised pay scales, suggests an increasing professionalization and standardisation within the Midland Railway in the period.

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All information taken from: The National Archives, RAIL 491/1086, Midland Railway Company: Records, Locomotive Department, 1872-1892,

When Victorian Beer Trains Crash

I was recently invited to the launch of the East Lancashire Railway’s ‘Real Ale Trail,’ where you can explore the pubs in and around the line. Unfortunately, and very sadly, I was unable to make it (but please go and see all about it HERE). However, it got me thinking about the interaction between the railways and breweries and how ale would be hauled from creator to consumer. Of course, much beer in the Victorian period was drunk in the local proximity of the brewery. Yet, while I am in no way a historical beer expert (a goal, for sure), the large breweries mass-produced beer for large markets in Britain and abroad and this was where the railways would play their part. After searching the online 19^th century newspapers I found eight stories between 1873 and 1896 about beer-trains, all involving accidents that occurred to them.

What is most interesting about the accidents was that six of the eight occurred on the Midland Railway. The other two took place on the Great Eastern Railway. The large number on the Midland was because of the many breweries in the Midland’s region, specifically around Burton. Indeed, all the Midland Railway's accidents occurred on trains going from that place. On the 4^th August 1888 a Midnight Goods train, mostly filled with beer, was prevented from erroneously passing onto the main line at Claycross by a slip point, allowing it to career down the embankment. It was going from Burton to Leeds.[1] Furthermore, in January 1883 a beer train being shunted to allow an express passenger train to pass was struck by a train of empty wagons going from Burton on the Leicester to Leeds line.[2]

Importantly, the accidents’ geographical locations evidence that mass-shipment of beer was not a nation-wide phenomenon in the late Victorian period and was restricted to the Burton region. Indeed, if there were other regions of Britain sending beer in such volumes, I’m sure that I would have found a larger geographical spread of accidents.

In addition, I initially thought that most of the accidents would be due to the weight beer causing damage to the trains, it being one of the heavier commodities the railways carried. However, only three accidents were of this nature. On the 7^th August 1873 a Great eastern Railway beer train on its way to Norwich was thrown off the line by a trucks's axle breaking.[3] In February 1881, a ‘Burton beer train’ near Leicester was ‘running at speed’ and broke in two. The forward section moved off, however, when it stopped the rear section careered into it smashing the wagons.[4]

What is more interesting is that when the beer trains did overturn or collide, their weights did cause considerable damage to the track. So, the Beer train to Norwich caused significant damage and held up the mail train by 4 hours. Lloyds Weekly Newspaper commented that ‘Alcohol can thus baffle her Majesty’s mail as well as her Majesty’s Government.’[5] When in 1881 near Bromsgrove the driver of the Birmingham to Bristol Beer train stopped it to check a broken coupling, an auxiliary train came up behind causing 10 vehicles to be thrown off the line. Four hours elapsed before trains were running again.

Luckily, no fatalities were caused in any of the accidents. However, a lot of beer went to waste, and that the real tragedy? In the 1888 Claycross accident the train on reaching the bottom of the embankment became submerged in a deep pool of water. Its length of the train was nine wagons and I can only surmise that they and their contents was lost.[7] The 1873 accident on the route to Norwich involved damage to some barrels that were ‘emptied onto the thirsty road.’[8] On 3^rd December 1896 a beer train from Burton to Leicester ‘struck the points’ and overturned. The result was that the barrels of beer were ‘scattered in all directions, and some were thrown with such violence that they were precipitated into a field adjoining the railway embankment.’[9] Lastly, at Bromsgrove in 1881, local fields were ‘deluged with beer.’[10]

Of course, not all the beer went to waste. On the 14^th January 1876 a train from Burton hit two stray horses on the line between Derby and Sheffield at Wingfield station. The force of the collision overturned to of the beer-laden wagons and threw the driver from the train. However, worse was to come and an oncoming mineral train collided with the wreck despite the driver’s attempt to warn it. In the course of these events several beer barrels were broken and the contents poured out. The York Herald recorded that this was ‘a circumstance which a number of colliers going to their work did not fail to notice, and had their early beer, good and plenty of it, on exceedingly good terms.’[11] All I can say was that this was a happy ending.

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[1] The York Herald, Saturday, September 08, 1888; pg. 4; Issue 11630

[2] The Pall Mall Gazette, Friday, January 26, 1883; Issue 5587

[3] Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper, Sunday, August 10, 1873; Issue 1603

[4] Western Mail, Saturday, February 26, 1881; Issue 3682

[5] Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper, Sunday, August 10, 1873; Issue 1603

[6] Nottinghamshire Guardian, Friday, October 21, 1881; pg. 7; Issue 1900

[7] The York Herald, Saturday, September 08, 1888; pg. 4; Issue 11630

[8] Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper, Sunday, August 10, 1873; Issue 1603

[9] The Derby Mercury, Wednesday, December 9, 1896; Issue 9492

[10] Nottinghamshire Guardian, Friday, October 21, 1881; pg. 7; Issue 1900

[11] The Derby Mercury, Wednesday, December 9, 1896; Issue 9492.

Religion and the Early Victorian Railway (a Research Black Hole)

For some reason, as an atheist, I have been increasingly interested in the way that religion interacts with society and how different people’s views are informed by its presence. Therefore, being a railway historian, it was almost inevitable that I would become interested in religion’s interactions with the railway industry. Indeed, because the new railways were the first big business it was almost inevitable that there would develop different types of relationships between the railways and, in the case of Britain, the Christian Church.

Early Victorian railways were clearly an environment where religion interacted with the industry in different ways. Therefore, while Francis Webb, the London and North Western Railway’s Locomotive Superintendent in the 1870s, coerced the men at the works at the Crewe works to go to,[1] there seemed to be nothing religious about the London and South Western Railway who refused to pay for a scripture reader for men building the Hampton Court branch.[2] On the Great Northern railway in 1854, the board asked the shareholders to vote £8000 for the building of a church, and encountered fierce resistance from them; while on the Taff Vale Railway in 1856, religious observance was woven into the employees’ lives by a rule which stated that the company ‘earnestly requested that each of its servants ‘on Sundays and holy days when he is not required on duty…will attend a place of worships; as it will be the means of promotion when vacancies occur.’[3] Thus, there seemed to be no uniform policy to religion adopted by railway managements.

Quite clearly, companies’ religiosity, or lack thereof, was dependent on the religious leanings of management or those sitting on the board. Channon argued that the board members of the Midland Railway shared ‘religious (non-conformist) and political (liberal)’ values.[4] But how this played out within the company is unknown. Contrastingly, from my research on the London and South Western Railway I have developed the impression that its board was never really concerned with religious matters. Yet, from the evidence above, it is clear that the Taff Vale board felt that church attendance was an indicator of an individual who was worthy of promotion, and, thus, there is no doubt that religion shaped the development of that companies’ management.[5] Further, Webb, cited above, had religious beliefs that shaped who the management class in the works were. While the staff was generally of liberal and nonconformist religious tendencies, a commentator stated that the foremen employed to supervise them were ordinarily conservative and adhered to the Church of England. Clearly, he was trying to engineer religious changes amongst the workers by promoting those who had similar views to him.[6] Thus, overall, it is clear that the religiosity of companies’ managements and board were not the same.

Evidently, from the lack of evidence presented here, more research on how religion shaped the early Victorian Railways needs to be done. I have shown that there are examples of how the religious views of individuals or groups may have impacted on policy. Yet, to what extent it shaped the industry’s development unknown. If I get time, I would to undertake research on this in the future.

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[1] McKenna, Frank, The Railway Workers 1840-1970, (London, 1980) p.48

[2] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/2, Court of Directors Minute Book, 14^th April 1848, Minute No.989

[3] Simmons, Jack, ‘Religion,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (London, 1997), p.418

[4] Channon, Geoffrey, Railways in Britain and the United States 1830-1940, (Aldershot, 2001), p.102

[5] Simmons, Jack, ‘Religion,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (London, 1997), p.418

[6] McKenna, Frank, The Railway Workers 1840-1970, (London, 1980) p.48