When Two Transports Go To War... Trams vs Trains in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

In the late 19th century the number of passengers that Britain's railways carried increased so rapidly that the companies’ infrastructure became desperately stretched. Indeed, I have described previously the London and South Western Railway’s troubles in adapting to this traffic growth; and how the company’s general manager was forced to resign because of complaints in The Times regarding the quality of the company’s service. (Found HERE) In 1870 British railways carried 336,545,397 passengers. By 1880 this had risen to 603,885,025, an increase of 79.44%. In 1890 817,744,046 passengers travelled, a 35.41% increase. Lastly, in 1900 British railways conveyed 1,142,276,686 individuals, equating to further growth of 36.69%.[1]

With such growth, and with the promise of consistently increasing passenger revenue, it is no wonder that in the late 19th century railway directors and managers were happy to make continual investment in improving their infrastructure, rather than hold back and cause overcrowding, poor services and slow train speeds. Thus, the railways invested heavily in improving stations, yards and sidings to improve their services and to accommodate future traffic increases. Furthermore, the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway’s extension to London, started in 1895 and opened in 1899, could not have been initiated without the company’s managers judging that traffic would continue to increase, unabated. Indeed, despite criticism at the time that the extension was unnecessary, they perceived that it would be highly profitable in the future.[2]

Then, in 1900, the unimaginable happened and passenger (along with goods) traffic stopped growing rapidly on Britain’s railways. Between 1870 and 1900 the number of passengers conveyed grew by an average of 7.98% per year. Yet, in 1910 1,248,792,604 passengers were conveyed, a growth of only 9.32% over the decade. Indeed, the average yearly traffic growth between 1900 and 1910 stood at only 0.93%.

This change in the speed of traffic growth was because the street trams started to attack the railways’ short-distance third class passenger traffic. The increased numbers of railway passengers between 1870 and 1900 had principally travelled by third class accommodation. In 1870 they constituted only 67.88% of the total passengers conveyed in the country. Yet, by 1900 90.67% of all railway passengers travelled third class. Subsequently, many of the improvements to the infrastructure of the British railway network after the mid-1880s, and all the expectation of increased revenue and potential profits from future projects, had been built on this low-paying, short-distance, class of passenger.

Electric trams had been introduced into Britain in 1883 when Magnus Volk had constructed the Brighton Tramway, which still exists today. By 1885 the first street tramways were installed in Blackpool. Yet, it should also be remembered that there was not just an increase in electric trams in the period, and horse-drawn trams also played a significant role in urban transport. Thus, after 1885 the trams spread like wildfire. While I have not found statistics for tram mileage growth before 1900, between then and 1910 it grew from 1,041 to 2,434 miles, a 133.81% increase.[3] Thus, by 1896 street tramways in Britain carried 759,466,000 passengers. Yet, by 1910 this had risen to 2,907,177,000, an overall growth of 282.79% or an average 20.20% per year. Indeed, it was in 1900, the year in which passenger growth on the railways slowed, that more individuals travelled by tram than bought third class railway tickets.[4]

Short distance travellers had always existed between 1870 and 1900, and, as Cain pointed out, the majority of commuters did not use public transport. For example, by 1900 in South London only 1 in 10 individuals used public transport to get to work.[5] Yet, as the tram network spread, and access to them was widened in urban areas, their speed, comfort and reasonable ticket prices provided people with a service that the railways could not match easily for very good reasons.

With fixed routes, aged technologies and heavy costs to modify the infrastructure, the railways were in a very difficult position. The heavy investments in infrastructure of the 1890s, which made sense at the time as the railways had little competition in the transport market, looked far more foolhardy after it. None of them were made to deal with the new challenge to their business and most were to address capacity problems or make further profits. Indeed, many investments in improving stations and yards for future use were found to be unnecessary after 1900 as traffic growth slowed. Furthermore, after 1895 railway profitability, through rising costs, government legislation and poor management practices (See my PhD, when finished), had declined significantly, and after 1900 the companies found it hard to raise enough capital to respond to the tram challenge through defensive investment.

Yet, faced with calls from passengers after 1895 for faster, more frequent and more comfortable services, the railways developed responses to the challenge of the trams. These will be covered in part 2.

------

[1] Board of Trade Returns.
[2] Harris, Michael, ‘The Great Central Railway,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.188-189
[3] Munby, D.L. and Watson, A.H.(eds.), Inland Transport Statistics, Great Britain, 1900-1970, (Oxford, 1978) p.338
[4] Board of Trade Returns.
[5]Cain, P.J., ‘Railways 1870-1914: The maturity of the private system,’ in Freeman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. (eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), p.101

Defending London's Interior - Railway Promotion and the 1846 Royal Commission

It has probably escaped no one’s attention that the three of London’s great stations, Euston, St Pancras and King’s Cross, are all in a line along the Euston Road. But why is this so? Why did the London and Birmingham, Midland and Great Northern Railways not push their lines further into the city, whether the passenger traffic that it had to offer could be more easily tapped?

The first railway lines to run through parts of London were of little consequence. The London & Greenwich and London & Blackwall Railways were short in length, on the outskirts of the city, built mostly on viaducts and any housing they cleared was slums. Indeed, clearing slums was an activity that landowners, parish councils and government were not going to complain about. More pertinently, these railways did not come into conflict with any of London’s major landowners and their construction was therefore relatively cheap.[1]

But thereafter, many of the major railways who wished to build termini in the capital did not attempt to penetrate the interior, as this would mean passing through parts of the capital where land-owning was well established, purchase prices were high and a degree of dispute was inevitable. Thus, many railways decided to finish their lines outside of London’s central zone. The Great Western Railway established their terminus at Paddington, the London and Birmingham’s line ended at Euston Square and the London Southampton Railway ceased construction at Nine Elms.[2]

However, during the railway mania between 1844 and 1847, the number of new railways promoted increased significantly. Indeed, in 1846 alone 272 were authorised by Parliament (with a third never being built).[3] With such fervour and with the available capital seemingly inexhaustible, many of these projects planned to drive lines right into London’s centre. Subsequently, in 1846 no less that 19 projects had plans to site termini within central London. But the multitude of plans brought alarmist reactions at the time, and Kellett argued that the new railways would ‘have completely altered the topography and character of west and central London, of Southwark and Lambeth.’[4]

Faced with the almost complete destruction of central London, the government decided that a Royal Commission should be established investigate the railways’ possible incursions. Indeed, the area of London under consideration was from Park Lane in the West, up to the line of the Marylebone and Euston Roads in the north, down to the Lambeth road on the south (shown in black on the map).[5] In the usual course of affairs, bills authorising the construction of new railways were considered individually by separate parliamentary committees. The commission on the other hand would call witnesses representing a wide range of bodies who would ordinarily not have a say in these committees and railway construction. Included were the Corporation of London, Parish bodies, the Surveyors of Pavements and Sewers, urban carriers of omnibuses, independent valuers as well as many others.

The result was that these voices dominated the commission’s deliberations, effectively silencing those of railway promoters and managers. Subsequently, the commissioners deemed that the promoters arguments, that railway lines into the centre of London would be of benefit to its population, were overstated. Indeed, the Commissioners stated that despite the fact that London residents may have to travel further if the railway companies were kept out of the centre, this inconvenience was worth it if the disturbance to the people and property there was avoided. Furthermore, as some of the projected lines crossed the Thames, naval concerns were also taken into consideration and the fact that the Admiralty might object to further bridges being built.[6]

As such, the commission recommended that only two of the 19 projected railway lines through the central metropolis should proceed. Both were located south of the river, and while one never got built, the other was the London and South Western Railway’s line to Waterloo. Furthermore, they suggested that one line be built across the Thames west of Vauxhall to link northern and southern railways. They also recommended that the limits of railway building into the centre that had been established, for example the no penetration between the Euston road and the river, be maintained. Lastly, and most importantly, they recommended that ‘under no circumstances should the thoroughfares of the Metropolis, and the property and the comfort of its inhabitants be surrendered to separate schemes brought forward at different times, and without reference to each other.’[7]

The commission only made recommendations that were not legally binding. However, it was important as it put in place a framework of ideas into the minds of legislators and railway builders when they approached new railway promotion and construction. Thus, in 1852 when the Great Northern Railway opened King’s Cross Station it was on the Euston road, the company not being permitted to go any further. Additionally, when the Midland Railway built St Pancras station between 1862 and 1868 it also did not go any further south. And whilst the commission’s core recommendation was eroded in the 1850s and 1860s through new termini being built over bridges coming from the south side of Thames to Victoria (1858), Charring Cross (authorised 1858, opened 1864), Cannon Street (authorised 1861, opened 1866) and Ludgate Hill (1864) stations; realistically it ensured that surface railways never truly broke into London’s heart.[8]



-------------------

[1] Robbins, Michael, ‘London,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.277
[2] Robbins, ‘London,’ p.277
[3] ‘Railway Mania, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railway_Mania
[4] Kellett, John R., Railways and Victorian Cities, (London, 1979), p.35
[5] Robbins, ‘London,’ p.279
[6] Klapper, Charles, London’s Lost Railways, (London, 1976), p.33
[7] House of Commons Parliamentary Papers [HCPP], 1846 [719] Report of the commissioners appointed to investigate the various projects for establishing railway termini within or in the immediate vicinity of the metropolis, p.21
[8] Robbins, ‘London,’ p.278

The State of Britain's Railways, 1945-1948

During World War Two Britain’s railways played a crucial role, hauling the goods, people and machines that allowed this country to make war. Indeed, in 1944 the freight ton mileage of Britain’s Railways was 50% above 1938 levels. However, when the conflict was over the railway network was in a horrendous state. Infrastructure had not been maintained adequately, obsolete locomotives were common place and the wagon and carriage rolling stock was run-down. This post will examine the state of Britain’s railways in 1945 and will summarise possible causes. I will be using statistics and information provided in Terry Gourvish’s British Railways 1948-73: A Business History (p. 3-5).

The maintenance of all sorts of Rolling Stock, locomotives, carriages and wagons, had fallen back significantly creating a maintenance and renewal backlog. On the 31^st December 1938 only 6.04% of Britain’s total locomotive stock was awaiting or under repair (a 32% increase). Whereas on the same day in 1946 the proportion stood at 7.98%. Coaching stock had fared worse, and over the same period the proportion had risen from 6.52% to 12.52% awaiting maintenance or under repair (a 92% increase). It was Britain’s “little bob-tailed wagons” that had received the worse treatment, and on 31^st December 1938 only 2.82% were awaiting or were under repair. However, by 31^st December 1946 the figure had risen to 10.79% (a 281% increase).

The causes of these maintenance deficiencies were simple. Many locomotives were at the end of their operational lives, had not been broken up because of wartime requirements and, thus, required heavy repairs. Wagon stock had been augmented by the railway companies acquiring 563,000 privately owned wagons during wartime, many of which were aging and obsolete. Indeed, more than 50% being over 35 years old. Lastly, passenger carriages, which had not been prioritised for renewals under wartime conditions, were falling to bits. The London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) had approximately 22,000 carriages, yet, had only renewed a measly 16 per year between 1940 and 1944.

Alongside the evident problems afflicting the rolling stock, after the war the condition of Britain’s railway infrastructure was just as bad, if not worse. The increases in traffic had not precipitated an increase in track maintenance, which had reduced to 30% of pre-war levels. Indeed, in 1945 2,500 miles of track required maintenance, the equivalent of two years’ worth of work at pre-war rates of repair and renewal. Indeed, similar requirements were felt on the structures of the network, the bridges, the buildings, the tunnels etc.

The cause of these back-logs has been put down to the fact that the railways had a weakening financial position. The government had restricted railway earnings to £43.5 million per year, it retaining any revenue above this level. Thus, between 1941 and 1945 the railways earned £412.6 million pounds, but £195.3 million was retained by government. However, the restricted income was inadequate for all the maintenance required given the significant increases in coal, material and labour costs. Despite this, the government did not invest any more money.

Some of the surplus government retained went into an accumulating trust fund for deferred repairs and renewals, i.e. a fund for after the war. However, despite the pressing needs of the time, government thinking was that this fund would be sufficient to meet replacement infrastructure costs at ‘future prices’ [italics in text] which diminished the need for heavy wartime investment, some of which may be unnecessary. Furthermore, they felt that the money should be held back so that post-war renewals could be geared more towards changed national transport needs and ‘motive power policy.’

Yet, despite all these factors, Gourvish argued that much of the under-investment was due to wartime shortages and that ‘it may be difficult to accept that a more generous wartime policy towards railway investment would have succeeded in safeguarding assets which were, it is generally agreed, in relatively good shape in 1939.’ (p.5)

Whatever the cause, Britain’s four private operators, the Southern (SR); London, Midland and Scottish (LMS); London and North Eastern (LNER) and Great Western Railways (GWR), did not have the financial or physical resources to reverse the maintenance and renewal situation quickly or efficiency after the war. The result was that the Labour government nationalised Britain’s railways through the 1947 Transport Act, which came into force on the 1^st January 1948 and created British Railways.

Improving the Management Class? LSE Training and the London and South Western Railway.

I have written before about the training of London-based railway clerks at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the very early twentieth century ( here). Realistically, clerks were the only individuals in the pre-1914 railway industry that had a chance of moving into management. Thus, the training, which took place from 1903 onwards and which was up to the clerks themselves to attend (although the railway companies made a donation to the LSE), were designed to give them a good grounding in what was considered good management technique. What is of interest in this post is not the courses themselves, they have been covered before. Rather, I am interested on the effect that the courses had on the quality of railway managers. Did the courses have the potential to improve the quality of railway companies’ management class? The company of choice is the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR).

The LSE contacted the L&SWR about their clerks attending its courses in October 1903, and by May 1904 183 were attending.[1] Some of the earliest courses L&SWR Clerks attended were as follows:-

1- The Economics of Rapid Transit

12 - The Law relating to railway companies

14 - Economic Factors in Railway Administration

41 - Railway Statistics in England and Foreign Countries

108 - The Law of Carriage by Railway[2]

After 1903 number of L&SWR employees attending fell consistently up until 1913 when only 43 took the courses. Understandably, during World War One the number of attendees dropped off further. However, after 1918 there was a slight recovery in numbers. This is shown in the graph below. It is suspected that this drop, apart from during the war, can be attributed to the fact that in 1903 most of the clerks who were willing to attend the LSE did so at that point. Subsequently, those who went later on were either new employees or they had moved to places where the LSE was geographically accessible. However, their numbers were not as great.

Yet, despite high overall attendance, the effect the courses had on the calibre of the L&SWR’s management class seems marginal. I have found that 156 L&SWR employees attended courses at the LSE which were assessed by examination, their results being recorded on their staff records. Of these individuals only 3 (1.92%) actually went on to become senior managers within the company. Furthermore, in 1921 the company did a detailed survey of its entire staff. This census showed that across all departments that it had 162 individuals in senior management positions. Thus, the three individuals constituted only 1.85% of the L&SWR’s management in this year.

The three men were John Percival Milton, William Tucket Venton and Herbert Ivor Bond. Milton was a clerk in the Goods Manager’s Office when he took his first course in 1903 (Law of Carriage by Railway). He later became District Goods Superintendent at Salisbury in 1918.[4] Venton was also a clerk in the same office and also began in 1903 (‘Law of Carriage by Railway’). He later became a District Goods Superintendent in 1912 at London, later moving to Southampton.[5] The last was Bond, and Draughtsman in the Engineering Department. It is unknown what courses he took, but in 1919 he became London District Engineer. Of the three only Milton excelled, and in 1912 he won the 'Brunel' Medal for three first class certificates in three subjects in not more than four years.

Therefore, attendance by L&SWR employees at the LSE courses had minimal effect on the quality of its senior management between 1903 and 1922. Nevertheless, it is possible that it did improve the day to day performance of the other 153 attendees from the company. Indeed, the LSE training may have had far had more benefits for the quality of its junior management. Presumably, many of those who attended the courses later on in their history (after 1910, for example) would not have had time to rise up into senior management positions by the time the L&SWR was dissolved in 1922. Yet, by then they may have become stationmasters or chief clerks. Furthermore, their career advancement may also have quickened because senior managers advanced them based on their LSE attendance.

Lastly, it is highly plausible that the training courses had an effect on the senior management of the Southern Railway (formed in 1923 from the L&SWR, London, Brighton & South Coast and South Eastern & Chatham Railway), as after its formation the majority of the LSE attendees would have had long enough careers to be senior managers. This will, however, require further research.

----------------

[1] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/265, Traffic Committee Minute Book, Minute No. 886, 18th May 1904

[2] TNA, RAIL 411/265, Traffic Committee Minute Book, Minute No. 562, 18th November 1903 and TNA, ZPER 11/23, South Western Gazette, June 1904 pp.5

[3] TNA, RAIL 411/673, L&SWR 1921 Census of Staff

[4] TNA, RAIL 411/493, Clerical staff character book No.3 1839-1920, p.119

[5] TNA, RAIL 411/494, Clerical staff character book No.4 1859-1920, p.258

How [not] to Defraud a Victorian Railway Company

Being large corporations, the biggest of their day, it is unsurprising that the railways were highly susceptible to attempts to defraud them. All sorts of individuals attempted to steal from the railways by devious means, including railway employees, passengers, traders and others. Thus, this post will detail some of the interesting cases that have been found in 19^th century newspapers which show how the individuals tried, and failed, to commit fraud.

In 1849 John Coulson was a booking clerk in the employ of the Bolton, Blackburn, Clitheroe and West Yorkshire Railway company based at Over Darwen. The company in its formative years seemed to be one of the first to offer cheap tickets to holiday resorts, and it offered them to Blackpool. At the court case in Preston in September, the General Manager of the line, Terence Flanagan, stated that he had become alerted to the fact that something wasn’t right when he noticed that the traffic returns from Over Darwen were less than those from other stations by some considerable margin. Indeed, Coulson’s return sent to the Audit office on Sunday the 12^th of August, recorded that he had booked 10 men and 34 women and children to Blackpool. Yet, the porter at the station, Thomas Griffith, swore that more people than that had been booked from the station. Coulson had no chance after that, and seventeen other witnesses were brought forward who had between them purchased 20 tickets on that day. Furthermore, it was revealed that he was discharged previously from the employ of the Board of Excise for collusion. It was unknown how much he got away with.[1] However, he was eventually sentenced to six months imprisonment with hard labour.[2]

Probably the most common attempts to defraud railway companies were when individuals attempted to travel without a ticket. In May 1858, William Byrd came up before Bromsgrove Pettys Sessions for such an offence. He was known to Midland Railway staff for being a fruitier and dealer in Birmingham. Indeed, he had secured as a trader a free pass for the western part of the company’s line ‘to enable him to visit markets.’ On the 21^st April he had arrived at Camp Hill Station without a ticket. When James Goodchild, the inspector, challenged him he said he had paid his fare at Bromsgrove Station. An investigation soon proved this to be untrue. He had in fact joined the train at Worcester and had avoided paying 11s 0.5d. Byrd pleaded guilty and said he was sorry for the offence. On account of his ‘circumstances in life’ and ingratitude to the company, he had the heaviest fine possible inflicted on him by the court of £2, plus £1 2s 4d in costs. Interestingly, at the trial Mr Draycott, a Midland Railway Inspector, stated that ‘attempts were made daily to defraud railway companies.’[3]

One of the oddest cases of fraud being committed against a railway company relates to twenty individuals who tried to impersonate militia men in Lancaster in 1869. The men, from various parts of the county, had been simultaneously caught on the 31^st of May ‘endeavouring to obtain by false pretences’ from Bryan Thornhill a ‘pair of boots, two shirts and one pair of socks and one shilling and threepence.’ Presumably, they had impersonated militia men in the process of being called up in order to obtain these items. All twenty of them pleaded guilty and were imprisoned for three months with hard labour. However, in passing sentence the chairman of the petty sessions stated that all of them must have ‘defrauded the railway company in making their journeys to Lancaster.’ Indeed, real militia men would have been entitled to free or reduced fare travel and presumably the defendants took advantage of this. However, it is unknown whether any were charged in relation to these offences.[4]

The Abergele railway disaster on 20^th August 1868 was the worst accident on Britain’s railways up to that point. At 12.39 pm a London and North Western Railway (L&NWR) mail train ran into some runaway wagons, causing the train to overturn and setting light to some paraffin oil in the wagons. The ensuing fire enveloped the locomotive and first three carriages, and 33 individuals died, with many more being injured.[5] Some days later Henry Ford contacted a solicitor by the name of Fox to prosecute a claim for £4000 against the L&NWR for injuries he had sustained in the accident. Fox wrote the L&NWR stating that:

‘Our client, Mr Henry Ford, of Patricroft, was in the train at the time of the accident on the Holyhead Railway and was a first-class passenger from Chester to Dublin. He was very much shaken and injured by the shock and has found it necessary to consult a surgeon, who says he is suffering from concussion of the spine, and that he must remain in bed for some time to give him any opportunity of recovering. Mr Ford will claim compensation of the company in respect of his injuries, but it is impossible at present to state the extent and nature of them. If you wish the surgeon of the company to see Mr Ford, please put him in communication with us, and we will arrange for his doing so.’

The surgeons of the company visited Mr Ford and judged that he had indeed been injured. Thus, the £4000 was duly paid. Yet, one of the company’s superintendents was dissatisfied with the claim and commenced an action at the spring assizes to reclaim the money. It was at this point that Ford disappeared. Some weeks later he was met in the street in London, apparently in good health and was arrested. The case at the Manchester assizes on 16^th January 1869 brought forward testimonies that on the day of the accident he had been seen sitting in his lodgings in Patricroft reading a newspaper. Furthermore, a day or two afterwards he was seen in good health in his lodgings. Lastly, his landlord had paid an unexpected visit in the days after the accident and found him standing in his rooms. Ford was found guilty for trying to defraud the company, and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment.

While I have shown some of the more interesting cases I found, there can be no doubt the majority of the cases of fraud were where the individuals did not pay the full fare, or paid no fare at all. Therefore, it would be interesting to know how much money the railways lost in the manner, and how they attempted to counteract it.

-------------

[1] The Preston Guardian etc, Saturday, September 29, 1849; Issue 1935

[2] The Preston Guardian etc, Saturday, October 20, 1849; Issue 1938

[3] Berrow's Worcester Journal, Saturday, May 15, 1858, pg; 8 Issue 8113

[4] The Lancaster Gazette, and General Advertiser for Lancashire, Westmorland, Yorkshire, &c., Saturday, July 03, 1869, pg. 2, Issue 4292

[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abergele_Train_Disaster

[6] Liverpool Mercury etc., Thursday, August 12, 1869; Issue 6723

Statistics for Managers on the 1830s Stockton to Darlington Railway

The Stockton to Darlington Railway (SDR), which was promoted by local businessmen, was authorised as an act of parliament in 1821 and was completed in 1825. Its significance is because it was the first railway to be permitted to carry goods and passengers by steam traction. However, some historians dispute that it was the railway that started the ‘Railway Age’ and only consider it a precursor to it. These views have been formed on the basis that initially the railway ran from collieries to Stockton via Darlington, a mere 30 miles. Secondly the bulk of the early traffic was heavy minerals, and lastly the company sub-contracted portions of its operations. Yet, while many comparisons are made with the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, opened in 1830, the SDR did help George Stephenson to refine locomotive design, track building techniques and rail profiles.

However, the SDR it soon became more than just a short line, and in 1828 the company extended its line to Middlesbrough. [1] However, it was in 1833 that the company started to truly resemble a modern railway. Prior to this date the company had only used locomotives on mineral trains, with horses pulling the passengers. Furthermore, the company owned only a few trains, and the majority of individuals could pay to use their own traction to pull their own trains on it. Thus, the line was managed in much the same manner as a canal or toll road, and there were no timetables or safety mechanisms.

In 1833, this all changed and the management of the SDR took control of the line. Firstly, double tracks were laid to allow trains to run in opposite directions. Timetables were introduced, as well as a crude system of signalling.[2] Lastly, the Shildon works, which had been established on a small scale in 1825 to build and maintain the company’s own locomotives, came to resemble what we would now know as a locomotive works under the charge of the company’s new locomotive superintendent, Timothy Hackworth.[3] Subsequently, the SDR became a standard railway and was a huge success.

While outwardly appearing like a conventional railway, it cannot be ignored that the company also started to use management techniques that were akin to other early companies. Within the files of the SDR at the National Archives can be seen the SDR’s early attempts at statistical gathering. The data that has survived pertains to the number of passengers conveyed and how far they went. While it is unknown what other data the company kept (at this point at least) the statistics do suggest that very quickly after establishment early railway companies were gathering metrics beyond just revenue and expense.

The first page of data showed me the monthly totals of passengers conveyed and how far they travelled. In 1833 12,829 passengers travelled 101,288 miles on the SDR (7.90 miles per passenger). However, between January and September 1834 the railway conveyed 143,672 passengers 1,049,370.5 miles (7.30 miles per passenger). Thus, while the company was conveying more passengers in 1834 than in 1833, on average they were going shorter distances. Subsequently, financial information (which I do not have at the moment) may reveal that the effect that this had on the company’s profitability. What is for certain is that the company was rapidly becoming more popular, and this also may have had an effect on the statistic of miles travelled per passenger.

In addition, how the passengers were carried was also noted. While we are familiar with the distinctions of First, Second and Third class carriage from later on in British railway history, it seems that the early SDR distinguished the customers by ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ passengers. The evidence, which again showed the monthly totals, indicates that from the 1^st January 1834 to the 17^th December, 11,270 (25.54%) passengers paid more to travel ‘inside.’ However, 32,857 (74.46%) travelled by the evidently cheaper ‘outside’ accommodation.

Furthermore, by 1835, it is clear that the managers were demanding more complex statistics, and another document evidences the number of passengers each month travelling under specific headings: ‘Number of Passengers on Market Days,’ ‘Number of passengers not including market days’ and ‘total number of passengers.’ For that year 23,485 (45.54%) passengers travelled on market days, with 28,082 (54.46%) conveyed at other times.

Lastly, a document from 1836 shows that the SDR was not just recording the volume of passengers across the line, but was also recording specific detail were passengers were travelling to and from (however, this can be inferred from the details communicated by the first document). Between April and October that year, the company earned £202 10s 0d from passengers conveyed from Stockton to Darlington (58.96%), £41 10s 0d from passengers going from Shildon to Darlington (12.08%), £85 6s 4d from those going from Shildon to Middlesbrough (24.84%) and £14 2s 8d was spent by individuals making other journeys (4.12%). Thus, the management could gauge what their most popular journeys were, and where extra capacity in trains may have been needed.[4]

Overall these documents indicate that even in the early days of railway operation railway managers were using statistics to measure demand, pricing and uptake of their services. Indeed, on the bottom of the first sheet, which showed the number passengers conveyed and the number of miles they travelled, there is a calculation in pencil of how far, on average, each passenger travelled. Later documents also show that these calculations were made. Thus, what these documents indicate is that systems of management accounting were developed very quickly in the early railway industry. Furthermore, as they started at the beginning of the SDR’s proper operation it can be deduced that management recognised, based on prior experience that management accounting was important.

[1] Kirby, Dr Maurice, ‘Stockton & Darlington Railway’, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.478

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockton_and_Darlington_Railway

[3] Ransom, P.J.G, ‘Works, railway manufacture and repair’, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.569

[4] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 667/1364, Statistics of passenger journeys: numbers carried, mileages, receipts etc., 1833-1837

"The Man With A Gold Cap" - The Life of a Stationmaster - 1912

While I talk a lot on this blog about the broad issues of railway operations, I rarely discuss the day to day running of Britain’s railways. In July 1912 the Railway & Travel Monthly printed an article entitled ‘The man with the gold cap.’ The article discussed the nature of the daily work of the stationmaster. Written by J. Thornton Burge, a stationmaster on the London and South Western Railway, he stated that he had ‘often been struck by the apparent ignorance of the general public as to the duties and responsibilities of a stationmaster.’ Burge worked at Templecombe Station, a station of considerable size where there was a ‘very large transfer of traffic’ and ‘marshalling of trains.’ Burge, while working for one company, clearly felt that the experiences he was describing applied to most station masters throughout Britain.

Burge’s day started at 7.45am, where on arrival he would find between 50 and 100 letters. Some were from Head Offices which had ‘arrived by trains during the night,’ some were from his own staff, and others came from other station masters. The details of the letters were very varied, including requests for ‘special attention to be given to some old person or child changing trains,’ the quick transit of goods and complaints from traders. There were also enquiries from headquarters as to suggested timetable changes, derailments, operating irregularities, staff changes or pay rises. All of these had to be read, and responded to.

After dealing with the correspondence he next received the night inspector’s report that detailed any irregularities as to the running of the trains, followed by the yard foreman’s report that showed how many wagons were in the yard. From this, he would be able to determine whether there were more wagons waiting to be sent from the station, than the goods trains that were due to arrive were able to convey. Thus, he would have to arrange special trains. Lastly he read the signalmen’s report which explained any delays, most of which he could account for to head office without the further need for investigation.

Stationmasters in the period were also responsible for the station’s accounts and returns. Therefore, he had to check and sign many returns, accounts had to be settled and claims by traders investigated. He also had to make sure all trains were ‘cleaned and birthed’ for the morning services and every delay in the train service had to be reported to headquarters.

By now many trains were passing through the station, it being the busiest part of the day. Being the man in charge he had to make sure that their movements were completed efficiently. On the one hand, he was not to delay the fast trains considerably, lest he ‘incur the censure of his chiefs.’ Yet because his station was a junction, if he let trains go that were due to connect with others that were late, meaning passengers missed their connections, he may also ‘upset plans’ and ‘greatly annoy passengers.’ However, the telegraph and telephone was utilised to regulate the service and plan for irregularities.

After all the correspondence had been completed and the rush in traffic was over, the stationmaster had to do his early morning inspection of the station to check that all was in order. This encompassed every part of the station from the waiting rooms to the lavatories, to the goods shed and yard. Additionally, once or twice a month he made surprise visits to the outlying signal boxes to make sure that nothing was out of order.

The rest of the day seemed to be filled up in attending to the range of other issues that arose at the station. Burge laid stress on frequency with which ‘blockages’ occurred on the main lines to which he had to attend. They occurred for multiple reasons, for example flooding on the line, the slippage of an embankment, a derailment, or an accident. It was the stationmaster’s duty to make sure that safety was ensured, but that, if possible, trains could continue to run. With a group of gangers and platelayers he would proceed to the blockage and put signalmen on either side of it to warn oncoming trains. He would then marshal the employee’s efforts to restore the free movement of trains. Interestingly, he commented that on such occasions it would be useful to not wear a uniform, as when hurrying around the station in times of urgency, he would be continually accosted by passengers or traders wanting information or trying to make a complaint.

Burge made the point that unlike other grades of employees, his responsibilities for looking after the station meant that he was never off duty and was ‘supposed to be always within reasonable call for cases of urgency day and night, Sunday and weekday, and from the time he becomes stationmaster he practically gives himself wholly to the company’s business.’ Thus, on many occasions, after he had left his post, he was called back to the station to attend to some matter. This was particularly the case for Burge as trains ran all through the night. He remembered a number of cases when he was called on at such times to attend to a disabled man, to make a decision about some injured cattle and when fog and snow storms slowed operations on the line.

While this was only a cursory view of stationmaster’s activities, and I could not do the entire article justice here (peppered as it is with very detailed, quite boring, information), what has been shown is that the stationmasters before the First World War were a dedicated group of individuals who were under consistent pressure to keep the railways of Britain moving. Their jobs while relatively clean and free from risk of physical harm, were far from easy and on occasions were very arduous.

All taken from The Railway and Travel Monthly, July 1912, p.201-210